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Every day in the United States the following scenario is repeatedcountless
times. A lawyer challenges a potential juror. The opposing party objects,
arguing that the juror was challenged on the basis of the juror's race or
gender. The judge then asks the deceptively simple question, "Why? Why did
you challenge that juror?" The lawyer responds, in good faith and as
truthfully as she can, with a race- or gender-neutralreason. The vast majority
of the time the judge believes the lawyer - after all, she will appearcredible,
since she believes she is telling the truth - and the peremptory challenge is
upheld. But what ifthe lawyer is wrong? What ifher awarenessof her mental
processes is imperfect? What ifshe does not know, or even cannot know, that,
in fact, but for the juror's race or gender, she would not have exercised the
challenge?
This article examines the findings from recent psychological research to
conclude that the lawyer often will be wrong, will be unaware of her mental
processes, and would not have exercised the challenge butfor thejuror's race
or gender. As a result (and not because of lying lawyers), the Batson
peremptory challengeframework is woefully ill-suited to address the problem
of race and gender discriminationinjury selection. Current reform proposals
are hit or miss, because they do not directly address this source of injustice.
Although abolishing the peremptory challenge would be optimal, in the
alternative this article recommends several steps that lawyers and judges
should take to reduce the impact of unconscious bias on jury selection.
INTRODUCTION

The peremptory challenge "has very old credentials,"' dating back to at least
the Roman Empire. 2 The United States initially adopted the peremptory
I Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212 (1965) (providing a brief history of the
development of the peremptory challenge), overruled in part by Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79 (1986).
2 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 119 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citing WILLIAM FORSYTH,
HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY 175 (1852) (explaining that the Romans used the peremptory
challenge in criminal cases)).
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4
3
challenge from English common law, then explicitly codified it in 1790.
5
Although not found in the U.S. Constitution, the Supreme Court has said that
the peremptory challenge is "one of the most important of the rights secured to
both the reality and
the accused."' 6 At least in theory, it helps ensure
7
trial.
fair
a
thus
and
jury
impartial
an
of
perception
The peremptory challenge, almost by definition, 8 was permitted "without

3 See id. at 120 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (tracing the history of the peremptory challenge
in the United States).
4 See An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, ch. 9, § 30,
1 Stat. 113, 119 (1790) (securing a defendant's right to peremptory challenges in trials for
treason and other capital crimes).
5 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 91 (remarking that the Federal Constitution does not confer a
right to peremptory challenges). In 1789, Congress considered including language
guaranteeing "the right of challenge" in a constitutional amendment that in final form
became the Sixth Amendment. Douglas L. Colbert, Challengingthe Challenge: Thirteenth
Amendment as a Prohibition Against the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76
CORNELL L. REv. 1, 10 (1990) (quoting GAZETrE OF THE UNITED STATES, Aug. 29, 1789, at
158). The right to peremptory challenges is found in some state constitutions and statutes.
See, e.g., Williams v. State, 669 N.E.2d 1372, 1377 (Ind. 1996) (referencing IND. CODE
ANN. § 35-37-1-3 (West 2004)) (giving defendants the right to peremptorily challenge a
certain number of jurors, depending on the defendant's alleged crime and the potential
punishment); State v. Wilson, 632 So. 2d 861, 865 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (citing LA. CONST.
art. I, § 17).
6 Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894) ("Any system for the empanelling of
a jury that prevents or embarrasses the full, unrestricted exercise by the accused of th[e]
right [to peremptory challenge], must be condemned."); see also Holland v. Illinois, 493
U.S. 474, 484 (1989) ("We have acknowledged that th[e] device [of peremptory
challenge] ...has indeed been considered 'a necessary part of trial by jury."' (quoting
Swain, 380 U.S. at 219)).
7 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 91 (peremptory challenges "traditionally have been viewed as
one means of assuring the selection of a qualified and unbiased jury"); Lewis v. United
States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892) ("The right of challenge.., has always been held essential
to the fairness of trial by jury."). See generally 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 1024 (3d ed. 1894) (asserting that the peremptory challenge

helps to leave a criminal defendant with a "good opinion of his jury" because it permits the
removal of disliked potential jurors even if the defendant is not "able to assign a reason for
such his dislike"); Barbara Allen Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power, "
27 STAN. L. REV. 545, 552 (1975) (remarking that the peremptory challenge "form[s] a
system... for meeting the constitutional requirement that juries be impartial"). Lawyers
often view jury selection, of which the peremptory challenge is a significant part, as the
most important part of a trial. See John H. Blume et al., Probing "Life Qualification"
Through Expanded Voir Dire, 29 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1209, 1209 (citing more than twenty
sources for the claim that "[t]he conventional wisdom is that most trials are won oi lost in
jury selection"). A lawyer's goal, of course, is to select ajury partial to her side.
8 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1136 (6th ed. 1990) (defining a peremptory challenge

as "[t]he right to challenge a juror without assigning, or being required to assign, a reason
for the challenge"). A later edition defined the peremptory challenge as one "that need not
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cause, without explanation, and without judicial scrutiny." 9 In contrast, a
challenge for cause requires a "narrowly specified, provable and legally
cognizable basis of [a juror's] partiality."' 10 In practice, because few attorneys
actually exercise peremptory challenges without any basis at all, a peremptory
challenge is one based on evidence that persuades the attorney, but is
insufficient to persuade the judge, that the potential juror tends to be more
hostile to the litigant's position than the likely replacement. At best, a
peremptory challenge is an educated guess, whereas at worst it is merely the
expression of naked prejudice.
Nevertheless, attorneys cannot necessarily challenge a juror without
providing a reason for the challenge. The Supreme Court, in the 1965 case
Swain v. Alabama, recognized that a "[s]tate's purposeful or deliberate denial
to Negroes on account of race of participation as jurors in the administration of
justice violates the Equal Protection Clause."'1 1 The difficult question was how
to reconcile the dictates of the Constitution with the tradition of the unfettered
"arbitrary and capricious" peremptory challenge. 12
Twenty-one years after Swain, the Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky
outlined a three-step procedure by which a criminal defendant could attack
racially motivated peremptory challenges. 13 In step one, the defendant must
raise an inference that the prosecutor used a peremptory challenge to exclude
the person from the jury on account of her race. 14 In step two, the trial court
judge, in order to determine whether the peremptory challenge was exercised
unconstitutionally, asks the prosecutor to supply a race-neutral reason. 15 If the
prosecutor meets this burden, in step three the judge decides whether the
prosecutor exercised the peremptory challenge with the requisite purposeful
discrimination.16 This step primarily concerns the attorney's credibility. Is the
attorney telling the truth about her neutral reason? Although Batson involved
racial discrimination in the context of a criminal trial, the Court subsequently
extended the protections of Batson to all civil and criminal litigants and to

be supported by any reason, although a party may not use such a challenge in a way that
discriminates against a protected minority." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 223 (7th ed. 1999).
9 See Swain, 380 U.S. at 212 (finding merit in the argument that history supports using
peremptory challenges to strike potential jurors for any reason at all).
10Id. at 220. Typical reasons that permit an excuse for cause were described in Hopt v.
Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 432-34 (1886), such as "being the party adverse to the defendant in a
civil action," and "having served on the grand jury which found the indictment."
" Swain. 380 U.S. at 203-04.
12 Id. at 212 n.9 (quoting 4 BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES 353 (15th ed. 1809)).
13Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93-98 (1986) (considering whether a prosecutor
violated a criminal defendant's constitutional rights by using peremptory challenges to
strike all four black potential jurors on the venire).
14See infra Part I.C.1.
1'See infra Part I.C.2.
16See infra Part I.C.3.
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challenges based on gender. 17
If the Batson procedure's goal is to eliminate racial and gender
discrimination in the selection of juries, then the crucial question regarding that
discrimination should not be whether the attorney was consciously
8
discriminating - this article assumes that most attorneys act in good faith' 17 See
18

infra Part I.C.1.

This article does not address the attorney who, in bad faith, deliberately discriminates

against protected potential jurors. Put in psychological terms, this paper will not address the
dominative or old-fashioned racist (or her sexist counterpart) but rather focuses on the
"aversive racist," "symbolic racist," or "modern racist" (and their sexist counterparts). See
infra notes 120-129 and accompanying text. This paper focuses on this second type of racist
for three reasons.
First, it appears as though this latter type of racist is now far more common than the first
type; thus, this type of racist may pose the bigger threat. Although precise numbers are
impossible to obtain, some estimates run as high as eighty percent of the U.S. population.
E.g. Susan T. Fiske, What's in a Category?:Responsibility, Intent, and the Avoidability of
Bias Against Outgroups, in THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF GOOD AND EVIL 127, 127 (Arthur

G. Miller ed., 2004).
Second, given that "[tihere are any number of bases" on which an attorney may
reasonably strike a venire person, see McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1132 (2d Cir.
1984), reh'g denied, 756 F.2d 277 (2d Cir. 1985) (en banc), vacated by 478 U.S. 1001
(1986), it seems unlikely that Batson will stop someone who is of a mind to discriminate.
The vast majority of academic scholarship that focuses on the "deliberate discriminator" has
reached this conclusion. See, e.g., Leonard L. Cavise, The Batson Doctrine: The Supreme
Court's Utter Failureto Meet the Challenge of Discriminationin Jury Selection, 1999 Wis.
L. REv. 501, 505 ("Any trial attorney with the wherewithal to refrain from using gender or
race words in the explanation and the discipline to avoid accepting a juror to whom the
exact same 'neutral explanation' would apply has beaten what one court called the Batson
'charade."'); Susan N. Herman, Why the Court Loves Batson: RepresentationReinforcement, Colorblindness, and the Jury, 67 TUL. L. REv. 1807, 1830 (1993) ("As
many others have noted, allowing peremptory challenges following an acceptable raceneutral explanation also invites any inventive prosecutor to create subterfuges: to articulate
acceptable reasons for excluding jurors when the prosecutor's actual reasons would be
unacceptable."); Sheri L. Johnson, The Language and Culture (Not to Say Race) of
Peremptory Challenges, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 21, 59 (1993) (arguing that any attorney
who wishes to circumvent Batson will find it easy to do so); see also Amnesty International,
Killing with Prejudice: Race and the Death Penalty in the U.S.A., at
(accessed Nov. 18, 2004)
http://www.amnesty.org/library/Index/engamr510521999
("Batson ... has manifestly failed to prevent racial bias in the jury selection process...
since prosecutors need only fabricate a vaguely plausible non-racial reason [sic] for
dismissing potential jurors to conceal their real intent.").
Third, (perhaps naively), absent persuasive evidence to the contrary I would prefer to
believe that the vast majority of lawyers in this country, as professionals and officers of the
court, take their legal, moral, and ethical obligations seriously and thus do not consciously
attempt to circumvent the law. I am not alone in this belief. See, e.g., Batson, 476 U.S. at
99 n.22 ("We have no reason to believe that prosecutors will not fulfill their duty to exercise
their challenges only for legitimate purposes."); People v. Muhammad, 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d
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but rather whether the attorney would have challenged the potential juror but
for the juror's race or gender. Psychological research demonstrates that the
attorney's conscious truthfulness at Batson's second step may not be
dispositive in answering this larger question.' 9 In fact, race- and gender-based
stereotypes almost inevitably affect people's judgment and decision-making,
even if people do not consciously allow these stereotypes to affect their
judgment. This includes attorneys making peremptory challenges.
Part I describes the Batson procedure and its subsequent development in
greater detail. Part II examines how people can form and maintain racial and
gender stereotypes unconsciously, even as their beliefs in these stereotypes
have changed greatly over the last fifty years. People habitually and
automatically categorize others by race and gender. Categorization, a normal
cognitive process, results in stereotyping, whereby we assign perceived group
attributes to individuals. 20 Whereas racists and sexists may stereotype overtly
or covertly (but consciously), those who believe themselves fair-minded and
unbiased often stereotype unconsciously. In addition, we have all learned
stereotypes from our culture and environment. Importantly, a stereotype need
not be consciously believed to affect us - mere knowledge can be sufficient to
21
influence our decisions.
Once stereotypes have formed, they affect us even when we are aware of
them and reject them. Stereotypes can greatly influence the way we perceive,
store, use, and remember information. 22 Discrimination, understood as biased
decision-making, then flows from the resulting distorted or unobjective
information. The attorney exercising the peremptory challenge will be
unaware of this biased information processing and so will be unaware of her
gender- or race-based discrimination. 23 Because she is unaware of her actual
thought processes, she may not be able to completely or correctly answer why
she chose to exercise a peremptory challenge.
To put it simply, good people often discriminate, and they often discriminate

308, 319 (Cal Ct. App. 2003) ("We are confident that most attorneys steer well clear of a
constitutional misuse of jury peremptory challenges .. "); Albert W. Alschuler, The
Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury
Verdicts, 56 U. Cm. L. REv. 153, 172 (1989) (stating that "most prosecutors probably will
comply with [Batson] in good faith .. "); Mark Cammack, In Search of the Post-Positivist
Jury, 70 IND. L.J. 405, 455 (1995) (hypothesizing that "[m]ost attorneys probably take the
prohibition against race- or gender-based peremptories seriously"). Those who would argue
otherwise should surely have the burden of proof on this issue.
'9 See infra Part III (explaining how an attorney may be unaware that her reason for
challenging a potential juror is in fact race- or sex-based, and therefore she will likely
appear to be telling the truth when she offers a neutral reason for the strike).
20 See
21See
22 See
23 See

infra Part II.A.
infra notes 173-185 and accompanying text.

infra Part III.B-C.
infra Part III.D.
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without being aware of it. 24 Or, as one psychologist recently observed,
"[s]ubtle forms of bias are automatic, unconscious, and unintentional ....The
implication of these subtle forms of bias is that people - observers and actors
alike - cannot so easily detect, name, and control them. They escape notice,
even the notice of those enacting the bias. ' '25 This is the heart of the Batson
problem, rather than the deliberately dishonest racist and sexist lawyer. Part
III explores how racial and gender stereotypes affect decision-making, without
the awareness of the decision-maker, and examines the implications of
unconscious stereotyping on the Batson inquiry.
Finally, Part IV evaluates various current proposals in light of the
psychological issues. These proposals, generally designed to address the
problem of the dishonest lawyer, will in some cases nevertheless have 26
a
beneficial effect. The best proposal, abolishing the peremptory challenge,
would, of course, eliminate the problem of its discriminatory use. Absent the
political or judicial will for this action, however, there are more moderate steps
that attorneys and judges should take to reduce the problem. These steps
include judicial warnings about unconscious stereotyping before jury selection,
enhancing voir dire through the use of race- and gender- blind questionnaires,
and expanding the time allowed for voir dire. 27 Although much bias is
automatic, unconscious, and unintentional, unconscious bias can be reduced by
both raising the visibility of our society's egalitarian norms and by increasing
the amount of information about potential jurors available to litigants.
I.

THE BA TSON APPROACH TO DISCRIMINATION AND THE PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGE

A.

The Peremptory Challenge Before Batson

The Equal Protection Clause guarantees that a state will not exclude even
one member of the defendant's race from the jury on the basis of race.2 8 The
Supreme Court first recognized this principle in the 1965 case of Swain v.
Alabama.29 Nevertheless, the Swain Court imposed a stringent evidentiary
24 1 am deliberately paraphrasing Professor John F. Dovidio and colleagues who recently
wrote, "[g]ood people are often racist, and they are often racist without being aware of it."

See John F. Dovidio et al., Contemporary RacialBias: When Good People Do Bad Things,
in THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF GOOD AND EVIL, supra note 18, at 141, 141 (examining the

nature of aversive racism, including its operation in the behavior of whites toward blacks, its
contribution to interracial miscommunication and distrust, and its social implications).
25 Fiske, supra note 18, at 127-28.
26 See infra notes 463-466 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 447-448, 501-519 and accompanying text.
2' Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86.
29 380 U.S. 202 (1965) (considering defendant's motions to strike the trial jury venire
and declare void the petit jury on account of the state's peremptory challenges of African
Americans during jury selection).
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burden on the defendant to prove unconstitutional discrimination. The
defendant was able to allege a prima facie case for unconstitutional
discrimination by showing that no African American had been on a petit jury
since 1950, even though roughly six or seven African Americans were called
for the typical venire. 30 The defendant failed to show, however, that it was the
prosecutor alone who had been responsible for the lack of African American
representation on the petit jury. 31 For the Swain defendant to have prevailed,
he would have had to produce detailed information on the composition of the
venires and how parties had exercised their challenges over a long period of
time. 32 Given that court records frequently did not show the race of the
members of the venire, 33 and that the voir dire was often not transcribed, this
would have been a near impossible task. The Court required this difficult
showing because the Court believed that the peremptory challenge "must be
'34
exercised with full freedom, or it fails of its full purpose.
Notwithstanding the ruling in Swain, however, there remained a serious
problem with the representation of minorities on petit juries. "The reality of
practice ... shows that the [peremptory] challenge may be, and unfortunately
at times has been, used to discriminate against black jurors. ''35 If jury selection
guides and anecdotal evidence accurately reflect the reality of practice,
peremptory challenges were in fact often exercised because of race, gender or
ethnicity. 36 A recent Supreme Court opinion, for example, summarizes

30 Id. at 205. The Court also considered whether the striking of African Americans in

this particular case alone was impermissible, and concluded that the Court would not inquire
as to the prosecutor's reasons for striking any member of the venire. Id. at 222.
3" Id. at 224 ("[T]he record.., does not with any acceptable degree of clarity, show
when, how often, and under what circumstances the prosecutor alone has been responsible
for striking those Negroes who have appeared on petit jury panels .... ").
32 Id. at 226-28 (explaining the evidence that the Swain defendant might have presented
to prove that the prosecutor purposefully discriminated during the jury venire).
31 See id. at 240 (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (arguing that in light of the lack of evidence a
prima facie rule, whereby the consistent absence of any African Americans on the jury
makes out a prima facie case for discrimination, is more sensible and realistic).
14 Id. at 219 (quoting Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 378 (1892) (holding that
preventing the defendant from knowing which venire people had been challenged by the
prosecution was substantial error)).
" Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 (1986) (asserting that the Court's decision would
alleviate the discrimination by requiring trial courts to be more sensitive to the racially
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges).
36 See Solomon M. Fulero & Steven D. Penrod, Attorney Jury Selection Folklore: What
Do They Think and How Can Psychologists Help?, 3 FORENSIC REP. 233, 234 (1990)
(discussing the widespread use of stereotypes in jury selection guides); see also MELVIN M.
BELLI, SR., 3 MODERN TRIALS §§ 51.50-.84 (2d ed. 1982) (discussing considerations in
selecting a jury including those based on race and sex, and stating that "if counsel
challenges a juror of an obvious racial group, a Negro, he will have to challenge another
Negro on, or coming up on that panel"). Clarence Darrow is particularly prominent for his
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extensive evidence of the Dallas County prosecutor's office systematic pattern
and practice of attempting to exclude minorities from jury service before the
defendant's 1986 trial. 37 The Court had to reexamine Swain.
B.

The Batson Decision: The Three Step Process

The Supreme Court revisited the constitutionality of the peremptory
challenge in Batson v. Kentucky. 38 In Batson, the Court recognized that the
required showing in Swain was a "crippling burden of proof,"39 which
rendered "prosecutors' peremptory challenges ... largely immune from
constitutional scrutiny. '40 Batson outlined a three-step framework to produce a
41
much-needed new evidentiary standard.
In step one of the Batson framework the defendant must raise an inference
that the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to exclude one or more
members of the venire from the petit jury on account of their race. 42 In step
two, the burden of production (but not the burden of proof or persuasion) shifts
to the prosecutor to articulate a race-neutral explanation for striking the jurors
in question. 43 Finally, in step three, the trial court must determine whether the
defendant has carried her burden of proving purposeful discrimination. 44 The

advice on the use of racial and ethnic stereotypes in jury selection. See Clarence Darrow,
Attorney for the Defense, EsQuIRE, May 1936, at 35-37 (describing how to choose the best
jurors by observing their subtleties and by making assumptions about the jurors based on
those subtleties).
37 See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 334-35 (2003) (evaluating defendant's
evidence of a 1963 circular from the District Attorney's Office that contained these
instructions to prosecutors: "Do not take Jews, Negroes, Dagos, Mexicans or a member of
any minority race on a jury, no matter how rich or how well educated"). The defense also
presented a jury selection manual outlining the reasons for excluding minorities from jury
service. Id.
18 476 U.S. at 82.
39 Id. at 92; see also McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1120 (2d Cir. 1984) (referring to
the Swain burden of proof as "Mission Impossible"); Riley v. State, 496 A.2d 997, 1011
(Del. 1985) (critiquing "the tremendous burden of proving under federal constitutional law
an equal protection violation through a party's exercise of its peremptory challenges");
James 0. Pearson, Jr., Annotation, Use of Peremptory Challenge to Exclude from Jury
Persons Belonging to a Class or Race, 79 A.L.R.3d 14, 56-73 (1979) (listing cases in which
the defendants failed to meet their burden of proof under Swain).
40 Batson, 476 U.S. at 92-93.
41 Id. at 96-98.
42 Id. at 96 ("[T]he defendant must first show that he is a member of a cognizable racial
group, and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the
venire members of the defendant's race." (citation omitted)).
" Id. at 97 (stating that the prosecutor may not permissibly claim that she removed a
potential juror because she felt that the person would be sympathetic to the defendant on
account of their shared race).
44 Id. at 98.
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Court overruled Swain,4 5 in that a litigant could establish a constitutional
violation based only on the facts of the defendant's case, rather than requiring
46
the demonstration of a pervasive pattern across many cases.
C.

Batson's Progeny

1.

Expanding the Applicability of Step One

Since Batson, the Court in Powers v. Ohio,47 Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co.,48 Georgia v. McCollum, 49 and J.E.B. v. Alabama ex. rel. TB.,50

has expanded the scope of the decision, in terms of defining the parties to
which Batson applies and the juror characteristics that are protected. 5 1 These
4'The Batson court characterized its holding as overruling Swain. Id. at 100 n.5 ("To the
extent that anything in Swain v. Alabama is contrary to the principles we articulate today,
that decision is overruled." (citation omitted)). Others have suggested that Swain in fact
found no equal protection violation in the exercise of peremptory challenges on the basis of
race. See Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About Batson and
Peremptory Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 447, 450 (1996) ("[Wjhile the Batson
Court characterized its decision as merely overruling Swain as to the 'evidentiary
formulation' necessary to establish radically motivated discrimination, the truth is that
Batson radically recharacterized a form of discrimination, previously endorsed in Swain, as
a violation of equal protection." (footnote omitted)).
46 Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 (observing that requiring "'several [to] suffer discrimination'
before one could object would be inconsistent with the promise of equal protection to all"
(quoting McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961, 965 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari)).
47499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991) (holding that a criminal defendant may object to race-based
exclusions of jurors through peremptory challenges, even if the defendant and the excluded
jurors are not of the same race).
4'500 U.S. 614, 631 (1991) (extending Batson to civil litigants).
49505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992) (prohibiting criminal defense counsel from exercising
race-based peremptory challenges).
50 511 U.S. 127, 146 (1994) (expanding Batson to peremptory challenges made on the
basis of gender).
" The Supreme Court has also stated in dicta that ethnic origin is a protected class. See
United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 314-15 (2000) ("Under the Equal
Protection Clause, a defendant may not exercise a peremptory challenge to remove a
potential juror solely on the basis of the juror's gender, ethnic origin, or race."); see also
State v. Levinson, 795 P.2d 845, 849 (Haw. 1990) (holding that a party may not exclude a
juror on the basis of ancestry under the state constitution).
Lower courts, however, are still looking for guidance, asking "[w]hat, though, does
'ethnicity' or 'ethnic origin' mean and how does one define the 'cognizable racial group' to
which Batson itself referred?" See Rico v. Leftridge-Byrd, 340 F.3d 178, 183 (3d Cir.
2003). In Rico, the court explained that most courts avoid this difficult question by
"assum[ing] without deciding that Batson has applicability to racial or ethnic groups other
than black Americans .... Id.
Religious affiliation will perhaps be the next federal category added. See United States v.
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cases have also served to clarify that the constitutional violation at issue is
primarily of the potential juror's equal protection rights as opposed to simply
the rights of the litigants. 52 In essence, these cases have begun to clarify the
first step: who can make a prima facie case and who Batson protects. More
recently, Miller-El v. Cockrell has,53among other things, elaborated on what
should constitute a prima facie case.

Stafford, 136 F.3d 1109, 1114 (7th Cir. 1998) (suggesting, without deciding, that "[i]t would
be improper and perhaps unconstitutional to strike a juror on the basis of his being a
Catholic, a Jew, a Muslim, etc."); State v. Purcell, 18 P.3d 113, 120 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001)
(holding that Batson is applicable to challenges based upon religious affiliation); State v.
Hodge, 726 A.2d 531, 553 (Conn. 1999) ("[W]e conclude that the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution prohibits the exercise of a
peremptory challenge to excuse a venireperson because of his or her religious affiliation.");
Nunez v. State, 664 So. 2d 1109, 1111 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (stating that a person may
contest a peremptory challenge by proving discrimination against a member of a cognizable
religious group). Contra State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 771 (Minn. 1993) (declining to
extend Batson to religion). Several courts have stated that individual state constitutions
prohibit the exercise of the peremptory challenge on the basis of religion, at least in some
circumstances. See, e.g., State v. Levinson, 795 P.2d 845, 849 (Haw. 1990) (holding that,
under the state's constitution, the right to serve on a jury cannot be taken away on the basis
of one's religion); Thorson v. State, 721 So. 2d 590, 594 (Miss. 1998) (finding that the state
constitution prohibits exercising peremptory challenges based solely on a person's religion);
State v. Eason, 445 S.E.2d 917, 922-23 (N.C. 1994) (stating that North Carolina's
constitution forbids religious discrimination in peremptory challenges). Religiosity itself,
however, when not directly associated with a specific religion, has not been protected. See
United States v. Dejesus, 347 F.3d 500, 510-11 (3d Cir. 2003) (distinguishing between a
peremptory strike motivated by the potential juror's religious beliefs, which is
constitutional, and a strike motivated by the potential juror's religious affiliation, which is
unconstitutional).
52 See, e.g., McCollum, 505 U.S. at 48 ("[T]his court [has] recognized that denying a
person participation in jury service on account of his race unconstitutionally discriminates
against the excluded juror."); Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 618 ("[A] prosecutor's race-based
peremptory challenge violates the equal protection rights of those excluded from jury
service."); Powers, 499 U.S. at 409 ("An individual juror... possess[es] the right not to be
excluded from [a petit jury] on account of race."). Batson itself suggested two additional
harms: the criminal defendant's right to an impartial jury that can view him without racial
animus, and preserving "public confidence in the fairness of the justice system." Id. at 87.
Professor Sheri Lynn Johnson has criticized the Court for this evolution, arguing that it
suggests that "the appearance of racial neutrality matters more than racially fair outcomes."
See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Batson Ethics for Prosecutorsand Trial Court Judges, 73 CHIKENT L. REv. 475, 485 (1998) (criticizing Supreme Court cases subsequent to Batson for
ignoring Batson 's focus on fairness to defendants in peremptory challenges).
53 See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 331, 342 (2003) (concluding that where the
prosecutors used their peremptory challenges to strike ten out of eleven African American
venire members but only four out of thirty-one non-black jurors "the statistical evidence
alone raises some debate as to whether the prosecution acted with a race-based reason when
striking prospective jurors"). The court went on to state that "[h]appenstance is unlikely to
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Notwithstanding Batson's three step framework, courts have sometimes
moved on to step two without deciding whether or not the prima facie case of

step one has been demonstrated.5 4 Even though this approach has generated a

mixed response from higher courts, 55 to the degree that step one is easier to
meet, it increases the importance of the later steps of the Batson test in
determining whether a peremptory challenge is unconstitutional.
2.

Eviscerating Step Two

Once a party has raised the inference that the other party has exercised one
produce this disparity." Id. at 342. For an interesting discussion of the possible application
of statistical techniques to jury discrimination cases, see Michael 0. Finkelstein, The
Application of Statistical Decision Theory to the Jury DiscriminationCases, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 338 (1966), exploring the applicability of statistical decision theory to cases involving
claims of discrimination in the selection of jurors. But see Harris v. Kentucky, 134 S.W.3d
603, 611 (Ky. 2004) (reasoning that "generally numbers alone are insufficient to satisfy this
[first] step"). For a review of how courts determine whether a party has made a prima facie
case, see Melilli, supra note 45, at 470-78, reviewing virtually every court decision applying
Batson between April 20, 1986 and December 31, 1993.
54 See, e.g., Jordan v. Lefevre, 206 F.3d 196, 201 (2d Cir. 2000) ("[T]he judge declared it
was not then necessary that the prosecutor provide a race neutral basis for his challenges,
but asked him to provide one in order to save time."); United States v. Scott, 26 F.3d 1458,
1465 (8th Cir. 1994) (explaining how the district court required the government to justify its
use of peremptory strikes "without expressly finding that [the defendant] had made a prima
facie showing that the government had exercised its peremptory strikes on the basis of
race"); United States v. Johnson, 941 F.2d 1102, 1108 (10th Cir. 1991) ("Because the
Government offered a race-neutral explanation for its peremptory challenge of the two black
jurors, and because the trial court ruled on the ultimate question of intentional
discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether Defendant actually made a prima facie
showing of discrimination is now moot."); State v. Spivey, 874 So. 2d 352, 361 (La. Ct.
App. 2004) (observing that although a party need not give an explanation for its use of a
peremptory challenge if the trial court has not found that the movant has made a prima facie
case, many trial courts require an explanation to create a complete record); see also Steven
R. DiPrima, Note, Selecting a Jury in Federal Criminal Trials After Batson and McCollum,
95 COLUM. L. REV. 888, 904 (1995) (explaining how "district court judges frequently bypass the prima facie stage of Batson analysis").
5'See People v. Smocum, 786 N.E.2d 1275, 1278 (N.Y. 2003) ("As should be clear...
the Batson procedure effectuates its purpose only if the steps are followed in sequence. It
makes no sense, for example, to revisit the issue of whether a prima facie case has been
made once the prosecutor has come forward with race-neutral reasons."). But see Brawner
v. State, 872 So. 2d 1, 10-11 (Miss. 2004) (observing that it is "good practice" for a trial
judge who finds no prima facie showing of gender discrimination to still allow the opposing
party to make a record for appeal by stating their gender-neutral reasons for the strike). As
one would expect, a new trial must be granted in the unusual situation where a trial court
sustains a Batson challenge but the appellate court later decides that there was no prima
facie case. See Cent. Ala. Fair Hous. Ctr. v. Lowder Realty, 236 F.3d 629, 638-39 (11th
Cir. 2000) (remanding the case after reversing the district court's action in disallowing the
plaintiff's peremptory strike).
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or more peremptory challenges on an impermissible basis, the burden of
production shifts to the proponent of the challenge to articulate a neutral
explanation. 56 Batson stated that the proponent may not rebut a prima facie
showing merely by denying that she had a discriminatory motive or affirming
her good faith in making individual selections. 57 Rather, citing language from
a Title VII case, Batson required the prosecutor to articulate a "clear and
reasonably specific" neutral explanation of his "legitimate reasons" for
exercising the challenges. 58 This explanation "need not rise to the level
justifying exercise of a challenge for cause. ' 59 Further, the reason or reasons
60
had to be related to the particular case being tried.
In Hernandez v. New York 61 and Purkett v. Elem,62 however, the Supreme
Court elaborated on the nature of reasons that would satisfy Batson 's second
step. The Court explained away the requirement that the reason be related to

the particular case. 63 Instead, facial neutrality became paramount.
The Court defined a race-neutral explanation to explicitly mean "an
explanation based on something other than the race of the juror." 64 In fact,
56

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986).

57 Id. at 98.

18 Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98 & n.5 (quoting Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248, 258 (1981) (requiring that the defendant employer be "clear and reasonably
specific" in its explanation of how its actions regarding the plaintiff employee were
nondiscriminatory)). The Supreme Court continues to use the Title VII analysis to inform
the Batson test. See, e.g., Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340-41 (referencing a Title VII case in
discussing the role of evidence in proving discriminatory intent); Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S.
765, 768 (1995) (per curiam) (citing the Title VII case of St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,
509 U.S. 502 (1993), with regards to burden shifting); Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S.
352, 359 (1991) (plurality opinion) (referring to a Title VII case while analyzing alleged
discrimination against potential Latino jurors during a jury selection).
59 Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.
60 Id. at 98.
61500 U.S. at 369 (holding that striking Latino jurors based on their proficiency in
Spanish does not constitute racial discrimination).
62514 U.S. at 768-69 (1995) (per curiam) (stating that a "legitimate reason" for a
peremptory challenge need not be "a reason that makes sense, but a reason that does not
deny equal protection").
63 Purkett explained that the Batson language requiring that the reason for the strike be
"related to the particular case to be tried," see Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, was no more than a
warning "meant to refute the notion that a prosecutor could satisfy his burden of production
by merely denying that he had a discriminatory motive or by merely affirming his good
faith." Purkett, 514 U.S. at 769. The dissent argued that the Court was in fact overruling a
portion ofBatson. Id. at 770 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
64 Hemandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991) (plurality opinion) (addressing
how to determine whether the reasons given by a prosecutor for his peremptory strikes were
race-neutral). The Court has said the same thing about gender-neutral reasons. See J.E.B. v.
Alabama ex. rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 145 (1994) (stating that the challenge "merely must be
based on a juror characteristic other than gender").
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"unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the [attorney's] explanation, the
reason offered will be deemed race neutral. '65 Race-neutral reasons thus
include those that are "implausible," "fantastic," "silly," or "superstitious," just
as long as the reason itself is race-neutral. 66 Not surprisingly, lower courts
have also applied this reasoning to the evaluation of gender reasons. 67 As an
example, that a venire person's name begins with a certain letter may be a silly
reason to exercise a peremptory challenge, 68 but it is undoubtedly a race- and
gender-neutral reason and satisfies Batson's second step.
Likewise, with respect to a criterion closely associated with race, as long as
the criterion is not race itself, the principle of race neutrality is satisfied, 69 even
Accordingly in
though that criterion will have a disparate impact. 70

65 Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360 (emphasis added).
66 See Purkett, 514 U.S. at 776 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); see also People v. Payne, 666

N.E.2d 542, 549 (N.Y. 1996) (allowing "outlandish or entirely evanescent" reasons for
challenges). Not all states, however, have agreed with the Purkett approach. See Bruner v.
Cawthon, 681 So. 2d 173, 173 (Ala. 1996) (per curiam) (disapproving the Court of Civil
Appeal's reliance on Purkett); Haile v. State, 672 So. 2d 555, 557 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)
(acknowledging that Florida's constitution may be more stringent than required under
Purkett); State v. Gill, 460 S.E. 2d 412, 415 n.3 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995) (noting that the South
Carolina Supreme Court might apply a stricter standard than required by Purkett), vacated
on other grounds, 489 S.E.2d 478 (1997). U.S. military courts have also applied a stricter
standard. See United States v. Tulloch, 47 M.J. 283, 288 (C.A.A.F. 1997) (finding that an
African American's blinking and seeming uncomfortable did not constitute "reasonable"
race- or gender-neutral reasons for a peremptory challenge).
67 See, e.g., Pruitt v. McAdory, 337 F.3d 921, 928 (7th Cir. 2003) (declaring that any
gender-neutral reason, no matter how implausible or fantastic, is sufficient to rebut a prima
facie case of discrimination); United States v. Yang, 281 F.3d 534, 548 (6th Cir. 2002)
(explaining that the government's gender-neutral explanation for its challenge need not be
persuasive or even plausible).
68People appear to have a strong preference for the letters in their name, and this
preference (bizarrely) appears to affect choices in areas such as occupation and place of
residence. See Brett W. Pelham et al., Why Susie Sells Seashells by the Seashore: Implicit
Egotism and Major Life Decisions, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 469, 483 (2002)
(examining studies which show that people are significantly more likely to live in places
with names that resemble their own names and to choose careers with labels that resemble
their names); see also infra note 221.
69 See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360 ("Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the
prosecutor's explanation [for the peremptory strike], the reason offered will be deemed race
neutral."). Other courts have subsequently found such reasons as the country of one's birth
to be race-neutral. See Wamget v. State, 67 S.W.3d 851, 859 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001)
(holding that the state's challenge of a juror because she was "born in Liberia" did not
establish race discrimination).
70 For example, attending Alabama State University, where the student body is
approximately ninety percent African American, see Black American Colleges and
at
Universities,
(accessed
www.petersons.com/blackcolleges/profiles/alabama-state.asp?sponsor-2904
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Hernandez, a potential juror's ability to speak Spanish, while closely
associated with being Hispanic, was not exclusively Hispanic, and thus was not
an impermissible reason on its face. 7 1 Under this definition, a trial court may

even find appearance to be race-neutral. 72 At least 73one lower court has
accepted a race-neutral reason that was objectively false.
Even before Purkett, a
Satisfying Batson's second step is trivial.
read Hernandez and
who
have
exist
commentator observed, "[i]f prosecutors
on the basis of race,
discriminating
reason
for
a
'racially
neutral'
cannot create
'74
the direction
foreseeing
Marshall,
Justice
bar examinations are too easy."
can easily
prosecutor
"[a]ny
concurrence,
in
his
take,
noted
Batson would
assert facially neutral reasons for striking a juror, and trial courts are ill
75
equipped to second-guess those reasons.
The trial court, however, must second-guess those reasons because for the

Nov. 16, 2004), is race-neutral because some of the students are not African American. See
Scott v. State, 599 So. 2d 1222, 1227-28 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992) (accepting as race-neutral a
challenge on the basis of attendance at Alabama State University). Accordingly, anything to
do with demeanor will also be race-neutral because it will never be exclusive to one race. It
is worth noting that although disparate impact does not bear on the question of facial
neutrality, it may be given some weight in deciding stage three. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at
362 (stating that disparate impact should be given "appropriate weight" in determining
whether the prosecutor acted with a forbidden intent, but not in determining whether the
second step of the Batson inquiry was satisfied).
7' Hernandez, 500 U.S at 361-62.
72 See State v. Williams, 97 S.W.3d 462, 471-72 (Mo. 2003) (rejecting defendant's
argument "that striking the venire person based upon physical appearance was inherently
race-based because both he and [the defendant were] African-Americans"); see also State v.
Bolton, 49 P.3d 468, 479 (Kan. 2002) (finding that the prosecutor's challenge of a potential
juror who, like defendant, had hair braids, was race-neutral even though "the vast majority
of those with that particular hairstyle are African Americans").
73 See, e.g., Hurd v. Pittsburg State Univ., 109 F.3d 1540, 1547 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding
that a subjectively held but erroneous belief about a juror's testimony as a reason for a
peremptory challenge could withstand both steps two and three of Batson); see also United
States v. Chandler, 36 F.3d 358, 367 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that a peremptory challenge
survives Batson, where the race-neutral reason cited was false, but no evidence showed that
lawyer did not believe the falsehood); Salinas v. State, 888 S.W.2d 93, 98 (Tex. Ct. App.
1994) ("Even if the prosecutor was mistaken in some of these beliefs, the judge could still
conclude that the strike was race-neutral because the prosecutor based his peremptory strike
on an honest belief.").
7 Johnson, supra note 18, at 59.
7 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 (Marshall, J., concurring) (criticizing the
Court's decision for allowing "easily generated" race-neutral explanations to sustain
peremptory challenges); see also Minetos v. City Univ. of N.Y., 925 F. Supp. 177, 185
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("[L]awyers can easily generate facially neutral reasons for striking jurors
and trial courts are hard pressed to second-guess them .... "). Of course just because a
lawyer could easily fabricate a neutral reason does not mean that that she deliberately would
do so.
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selection of the petit jury, mere disproportionate impact on a group is
insufficient to violate the Equal Protection Clause. 76 Second-guessing an
attorney's reasons is the focus of the next step.

Disproportional impact alone is rarely sufficient for equal protection cases. See
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (remarking that the Supreme Court has
never found a law unconstitutional solely because it had a racially disproportionate impact
without regard to whether it had a racially discriminatory purpose). Without a showing of
discriminatory intent, the actual effect on the protected group must be sufficient so that
intent itself can be presumed. See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960)
(holding that the change of a square electoral district to a twenty-eight sided electoral
district could only have been motivated by intent); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
(1886) (finding discrimination when all but one white applicant and zero Chinese applicants
were granted a permit to operate a laundry, and one hundred fifty Chinese owners were
prosecuted whereas none of eighty similarly situated white owners were prosecuted for
operating laundry facilities without permits).
It is also interesting to note that the Court did not need to rely on an equal protection
analysis to protect minority representation on the petit jury. The highest courts in
California, Florida, and Massachusetts achieved the same goal using Batson-like procedures
in reliance on the fair cross-section guarantees contained in their respective state
constitutions and analogous to the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. See People v.
Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 757 (Cal. 1978) (holding "that in this state the right to trial by a jury
drawn from a representative cross-section of the community is guaranteed equally and
independently by the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution and by article I, section
16, of the California Constitution"); State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481, 486 (Fla. 1984) (basing
its decision on Florida's constitutional guarantee of an impartial jury); Commonwealth v.
Soares, 387 N.E.2d 499, 516 (Mass. 1979) (holding that both parties are constitutionally
entitled to expect "a petit jury that is as near an approximation of the ideal cross-section of
the community as the process of random draw permits" (quoting Wheeler, 583 P.2d at 762));
see also Riley v. State, 496 A.2d 997, 1012 (Del. 1985) (concluding "that the use of
peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors solely upon the basis of race violates a
criminal defendant's right under [Delaware's equivalent of the U.S. Constitution's Sixth
Amendment] to a trial by an impartial jury"); State v. Crespin, 612 P.2d 716, 718 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1980) (following the California and Massachusetts approach). Two federal courts of
appeal also used a Sixth Amendment fair trial analysis to evaluate peremptory challenges.
See, e.g., Booker v. Jabe, 775 F.2d 762, 770 (6th Cir. 1985) ("The Sixth Amendment
guarantees that a criminal charge will not be tried before a jury that fails to represent a
cross-section of the community as a consequence of a method of jury selection that
systematically excludes a cognizable group from jury service."), vacated, Michigan v.
Booker, 478 U.S. 1001 (1986), reinstated, Booker v. Jabe, 801 F.2d 871 (6th Cir. 1986);
McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d 1113, 1124-28 (2d Cir. 1984). In fact, the equal protection
claim that prevailed in Batson was not even raised in the petitioner's brief, which relied on
the Sixth Amendment fair trial claim. See Petitioner's Brief at 4-5, Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79 (1986) (No. 84-6263). The Court did not reject the Sixth Amendment claim until
1990. See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 480 (1990) ("The Sixth Amendment
requirement of a fair cross section on the venire is a means of assuring, not a representative
jury (which the Constitution does not demand) but an impartialone (which it does).").
76

2005]

BA TSON'S BLIND-SPOT

3. Step Three: All About Credibility
Once the attorney has offered a neutral basis for the peremptory challenges,
determine whether the movant has established
in step three the trial court must
'77
"purposeful discrimination."

The Supreme Court, however, has never
directly clarified what it means by "purposeful discrimination" in the exercise
of peremptory challenges. 78 There is a conflict between the Court's language
that suggests a subjective intent requirement and the Court's statements
endorsing the use of evidence that will not invariably illuminate the attorney's
79
state of mind.
Discriminatory intent or purpose, as used by the Supreme Court, implies
more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences.80 "It
77 Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 328-29 (2003).
78

In one instance, two justices dissenting from the denial of certiorari argued that

deciding the case would have clarified the meaning of "racial discrimination." See
Wilkerson v. Texas, 493 U.S. 924, 927-28 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari). In contrast, cases decided under the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of an
"impartial jury," starting with Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 309 (1879),
concentrated on the "prejudices [that] often exist against particular classes in the
community, which sway the judgment of jurors." Justice Thomas, for one at least, believes
that this is still accurate. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 61 (1992) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment) ("I do not think that this basic premise [prejudice] ... has
become obsolete.").
79 See Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 339 (citing evidentiary factors such as the attorney's
demeanor, reasonableness of the explanations and whether the "rationale has some basis in
accepted trial strategy"). The Court has recognized this problem of proof and evidence in
other equal protection contexts. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253 (1976)
(Stevens, J. concurring) (stating that "[flrequently, the most probative evidence of intent
will be objective evidence of what actually happened"). For a general discussion of the
evidence that can be used to prove intent or purpose, see David Crump, Evidence, Race,
Intent and Evil: The Paradox of Purposelessness in the Constitutional Racial
Discrimination Cases, 27 HOFSTRA L. REv. 285, 333 (1998), arguing that Washington v.
Davis is "dubious" as it fails to "recognize that the government's lack of an articulable
explanation for the disparate impact is relevant, as are all of the pragmatic circumstances
that impede its eradication or explanation." See also Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional
Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 287 (1997)
(arguing that the "real question" is the kind of evidence the Court will "require as proof of
intent").
80 Interestingly, venire-selection cases decided under the Sixth Amendment's guarantee
of an "impartial" jury - as opposed to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment that governs the peremptory challenge analysis - often depended on statistical
proof with little attention being paid to the intent of the decision-maker. See, e.g., Norris v.
Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 598-99 (1935) (reversing a conviction where defendant
successfully showed "long-continued exclusion of negroes from jury service"). The
framework established in Norris, a Sixth Amendment decision, was a precursor to the
framework eventually used in Batson, decided under the Equal Protection Clause. Under
Norris, the defendant could make a prima facie case that African Americans were

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85:155

implies that the decision-maker ... selected ... a particular course of action at
least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an
identifiable group." 81 The Court's language suggests that the striking attorney

under-represented in the venire by presenting only statistical evidence. Id. The prosecution
would then have the burden of showing that the statistical differences either resulted from
chance, or due to a lack of sufficiently qualified African Americans. Id.; see also Eric L.
Muller, Solving the Batson Paradox: Harmless Error,Jury Representation, and the Sixth
Amendment, 106 YALE L.J. 93, 149 (1996) (arguing that Batson would be less inconsistent if
based on the Sixth Amendment); The Supreme Court, 1993 Term: Leading Cases, 108
HARV. L. REv. 139, 246 (1994) (arguing that although Batson "expressly disavowed any
reliance upon the defendant's Sixth Amendment claim ... [i]mplicit in Batson's
emphasis... was a deep respect for the defendant's... Sixth Amendment right to an
impartial jury").
Sixth Amendment cases have held that a statistical disparity alone is sufficient to
demonstrate a constitutional violation. E.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 501 (1977)
(finding that a large statistically disproportionate representation of Mexican Americans on
grand juries presented a presumption that prosecution failed to rebut); Alexander v.
Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 630-31 (1972) (reversing a conviction in an indictment returned by
a grand jury from which certain ethnic groups had been systematically excluded); Whitus v.
Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 551 (1967) (reversing a conviction where prosecution failed to rebut
the presumption of discrimination demonstrated by showing that the grand jury was selected
from segregated tax rolls). In all of these cases, objective reality, as exemplified by history
and population composition, rather than a trial court's finding regarding subjective intent,
was dispositive. Weak but honest explanations were insufficient to rebut a defendant's
prima facie case. See, e.g., Norris, 294 U.S. at 598-99 (holding that although the jury
commissioner knew no qualified African Americans, this did not negate the defendant's
case).
This rule, developed in cases decided under the Sixth Amendment, would have a simple
application to the peremptory challenge context decided under the Equal Protection Clause.
The defendant's presentation of a prima facie case would be dispositive, as there can never
be a strong reason for a peremptory challenge. (Any strong reason becomes a challenge for
cause). Intent and effect would thus be collapsed, as has essentially already occurred in the
venire-selection cases. See Johnson, supra note 18, at 91 (stating that applying venire cases
to peremptory challenges would "mean that prima facie cases are the only inquiry"). There
are exceptions to this. Even in the fair venire-selection cases, at times intent rather than
effect has been the critical inquiry. See, e.g., Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 290 (1950)
(plurality opinion) (finding intentional discrimination where the white jury commissioners
chose grand jurors only from among people with whom they were acquainted); Akins v.
Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 406-07 (1944) (holding that the jury commissioner's admission that
they "had no intention of placing more than one Negro on the panel" left the Court
"unconvinced that the commissioners deliberately and intentionally limited the number of
Negroes on the grand jury list").
81 Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979), quoted in Hernandez v.
New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991). In Feeney, intent and motive are not distinguished.
Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279. In general, "motive is the inducement to do some act, intent is the
mental resolution or determination to do it." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 813 (7th ed. 1999).
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must have subjective discriminatory intent. 82 It also suggests that the Court is
83
ignoring or is blind to unconscious bias.
Assuming subjective discriminatory intent is necessary, whether it is
sufficient remains undecided. Some courts have upheld peremptory challenges
despite the striking attorney admitting on the record that race or gender was a
factor in the decision, provided that the striking attorney can also demonstrate
84
that she would have struck the venire person for a neutral reason anyway.
82

See Cavise, supra note 18, at 529 (noting that "evil intent" is required to overrule a

strike); Robin Charlow, ToleratingDeception and DiscriminationAfter Batson, 50 STAN. L.
REv. 9, 31-38, 37 (1997) (evaluating arguments, and after analyzing Batson, Edmonson,
Hernandez, and Purkett, concluding that "the court intends to leave us with a subjective
understanding of the concept of discriminatory intent in the peremptories context"); Sheri
Lynn Johnson, Respectability, Race Neutrality, and Truth, 107 YALE L.J. 2619, 2659
(1998); K.G. Jan Pillai, Shrinking Domain of Invidious Intent, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
525, 538-48 (arguing that following Purkett, the focus is "the subjective motivation of errant
attorneys"); see also infra note 89.
83 Some members of the Court have accepted the possibility of unconscious bias. See,
e.g., Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 68 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("It is by now clear
that conscious and unconscious racism can affect the way white jurors perceive minority
defendants and the facts presented at their trials, perhaps determining the verdict of guilt or
innocence."); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring) ("[I]t
is even possible that an attorney may lie to himself in an effort to convince himself that his
motives are legal."); see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 345 (2003) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring) (stating that "conscious and unconscious race bias.., remain alive in our
land"). In one case, a dissenter joined by three other members of the Court suggested that
the decision was the "unconscious product" of the majority's views. See Alexander v.
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 317 (2001) (5-4 decision) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Like much else
in its opinion, the present majority's unwillingness to explain its refusal to find the
reasoning in Cannon persuasive suggests that today's decision is the unconscious product of
the majority's profound distaste for implied causes of action rather than an attempt to
discern the intent of the Congress that enacted Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.").
Any acceptance of unconscious bias, however, has not (yet) affected the Batson procedure's
focus on the striking attorney's discriminatory intent. One reason for this may be that the
Court still believes discrimination is "easy to identify." Johnson, supra note 18, at 67.
84 To date at least five circuit courts have accepted this analysis and none have rejected
it. See, e.g., King v. Moore, 196 F.3d 1327, 1335 (11th Cir. 1999) ("When the motives for
striking a prospective juror are both racial and legitimate, Batson error arises only if the
legitimate reasons were not in themselves sufficient reason for striking the juror."); Howard
v. Senkowski, 986 F.2d 24, 27-30 (2d Cir. 1993) (applying the "dual motivation analysis" to
a Batson claim); accord Gattis v. Snyder, 278 F.3d 222, 235 (3d Cir. 2002); Weaver v.
Bowersox, 241 F.3d 1024, 1032 (8th Cir. 2001); Jones v. Plaster, 57 F.3d 417, 421-22 (4th
Cir. 1995). Various states have also adopted this approach. See e.g., State v. Hodge, 726
A.2d 531, 544 (Conn. 1999); People v. Hudson, 745 N.E.2d 1246, 1258 (I11.2001); State v.
Weaver, 912 S.W.2d 499, 509 (Mo. 1995); Guzman v. State, 85 S.W.3d 242, 244 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2002). The approach has been described as a "mixed motive" analysis. Rico v.
Leftridge-Byrd, 340 F.3d 178, 186 (3d Cir. 2003). Justice Marshall, joined by Justice
Brennan in a dissent from the denial of certiorari argued that "[t]o be 'neutral' the
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Under this approach, once the movant has succeeded in establishing that a
discriminatory purpose in part motivated the non-movant, the burden of proof
then shifts to the non-movant to establish that she would have made the same
decision regardless of race or gender.
These courts, as in other equal protection cases,8 5 are applying a 'but-for'
test. 86 A court, given the existence of a discriminatory purpose, is determining
whether, but for the potential juror's race or gender, she would have been
struck. If the woman were a man, or if the African American were white,
would she have been challenged anyway? 87 If and only if the answer is 'no,' is
there but-for causation.
This but-for test has not gone uncriticized. Other courts have found that any
subjective discriminatory motivation, even when there are legitimate neutral
motivations, is sufficient to uphold a Batson challenge. 88 The courts find these
because they have been
challenges unconstitutional
peremptory
89
"irredeemably" tainted by the impermissible intent.

explanation must be based wholly on nonracial criteria." Wilkerson v. Texas, 493 U.S. 924,
926 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
85 See, e.g., Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 284-87
(1977); Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 n. 21
(1977) (finding partial improper motivation insufficient for invalidation); see also Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989) (plurality opinion) (applying mixedmotives analysis to Title VII case). The Civil Rights Act of 1991 overruled this part of
Price Waterhouse. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-66, § 197 (a), 105 Stat.
1071, 1075 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000)).
86 See, e.g., Murray v. Groose, 106 F.3d 812, 814 (8th Cir. 1997) ("We often frame the
question as one of 'but-for' causation, that is, we ask whether the prosecutor would have
kept a particular juror but for his race."); Burnett v. State, 27 S.W.3d 454, 458 (Ark. Ct.
App. 2000) (explaining that in Batson 's third step, "we ask whether the juror would have
been kept but for his race").
87This is a variation on the "reversing the groups tests." See David A. Strauss,
DiscriminatoryIntent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 935, 956-57 (1989)
(attempting to define the meaning of discriminatory intent); see also Selmi, supranote 79, at
291 (describing it as "the best test developed to date for identifying intentional
discrimination").
88Several state courts have held that any discriminatory explanation vitiates every valid
offered reason for a strike. See, e.g., Ex parte Sockwell, 675 So. 2d 38, 41 (Ala. 1995);
State v. Lucas, 18 P.3d 160, 163 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001); Rector v. State, 444 S.E.2d 862 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1994); McCormick v. State, 803 N.E. 2d 1108, 1113 (Ind. 2004); South Carolina v.
Shuler, 545 S.E.2d 805, 811 (S.C. 2001); Wisconsin v. King, 572 N.W.2d 530, 535 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1997); see also Wilkerson, 493 U.S. at 926-27 (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari) (attacking the "but for" standard used by the lower court).
89 See, e.g., Lucas, 18 P.3d at 163 (citing cases that applied the "tainted approach"). The
but-for (or reversing the groups) test could also be used in order to capture unconscious bias.
Strauss argues that this test's ability to address unconscious bias is one of its advantages.
See Strauss, supra note 87, at 960-62 (arguing that the reversing the groups test would catch
unconscious discrimination as it simply asks what would happen under different
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Regardless of whether the Supreme Court adopts the 'but-for' or 'tainted
view' approach, it has made clear that the Batson inquiry typically becomes
one of credibility:
[T]he decisive question will be whether counsel's race-neutral
explanation for a peremptory challenge should be believed. There will
seldom be much evidence bearing on that issue, and the best evidence
often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the
challenge....

... The credibility of the prosecutor's explanation goes to the heart of the
equal protection analysis, and once that has been settled, there seems
nothing left to review. 90
circumstances, rather than trying to discern subjective intent). The question would then be,
even if the attorney has no subjective discriminatory intent, would the juror have been
challenged but for her race or sex? Did race or gender, consciously or unconsciously, make
the difference in the exercise of the challenge?
Arguably, the Batson framework already "allows unconscious bias to satisfy the
discriminatory purpose standard." See Sheila Foster, Intent and Incoherence, 72 TOL. L.
REv. 1065, 1094 (1998); see also Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection,
41 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1120 (1989) (arguing, before the Court decided Hernandez and
Purkett, that "[it is simply wrong to say ...that [the Batson standard] hinge[s] on intent");
Selmi, supra note 79, at 286-94 (arguing that the key question in the equal protection
contexts is "whether race made a difference in the decisionmaking process, a question that
targets causation, rather than subjective mental states"). At least one member of the
Supreme Court believes that unconscious bias should be able satisfy the requirement, but
that it does not. See Hemandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 377 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(arguing that "the 'discriminatory purpose' ... can sometimes be established by objective
evidence that is consistent with a decisionmaker's honest belief that his motive was entirely
benign"). Most commentators would agree, as a normative matter, that equal protection
should apply to unconscious bias. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and
Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 323 (1987)
(arguing that "equal protection doctrine must ...come to grips with unconscious racism");
Strauss, supra note 87, at 1000 (arguing that "the 'disparate impact' standard... is in fact
the only effective way to implement the discriminatory intent standard").
Commentators are thus in agreement, in the sense that subjective discriminatory intent
either should not be required, or is not required. For the purposes of this article, the Court's
meaning of intent is only relevant for emphasis. If subjective discriminatory intent is not
required, the more important issue becomes understanding unconscious bias and attempting
to address it. See infra Parts II, III, IV. If, however, as is likely, subjective discriminatory
intent is required, the psychological research discussed infra Parts II, III demonstrates the
impoverished nature of this conception of bias, and the weakness of the Court's so-called
"unceasing efforts to eradicate racial discrimination" in the jury selection process. See
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85 (1986). Accordingly, the Batson standard should be
changed so that subjective discriminatory intent is no longer required, and the issue becomes
addressing the problem of unconscious bias. See infra Part IV.
90 Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 339-40 (2003) (citations omitted); see also United
States v. Bentley-Smith, 2 F.3d 1368, 1375 (5th Cir. 1993) ("[T]he ultimate inquiry for the
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The trial court is intended to focus in step three on "the genuineness of the
motive" rather than the "reasonableness" of the reason, 9' even as the reason's
reasonableness helps determine the motive's genuineness. 92 Accordingly, a
judge may find an attorney's reason for exercising a strike trivial, but if the
judge also believes that the attorney has been honest, she must sustain the
93
challenge.
The Court assumes that an attorney exercising a peremptory challenge can
correctly determine the reason for the challenge, so that if gender or race made
the difference, she will know it. 94 It is as though the Supreme Court believes
that attorneys are hooked up to a wonderful machine, an "Inner Self
judge is not whether counsel's reason is suspect, or weak, or irrational, but whether counsel
is telling the truth in his or her assertion that the challenge is not race-based." (emphasis
added)); cf Barbara Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination in Jury Selection: Who's
Right is it Anyway?, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 735, 770 (1992) (claiming that determining
whether an explanation is pretextual is merely a fact-finding problem no more acute in the
jury selection context than in any other).
9' Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 769 (1995) (upholding the trial court's finding that the
prosecutor satisfied Batson step three after explaining that he exercised a challenge against a
black juror because of his long hair and excessive facial hair).
92 See Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 339 (listing reasonability as a factor in credibility).
9' See id. at 339-40 ("[I]f an appellate court accepts a trial court's finding that a
prosecutor's race-neutral explanation for his peremptory challenges should be believed, we
fail to see how the appellate court nevertheless could find discrimination." (alteration in
original) (quoting Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 367)); People v. Sprague, 721 N.Y.S.2d 205, 207
(N.Y. App. Div. 2001) ("[T]here is no authority for the court to conclude, as it did here, that
a proffered race-neutral reason for seeking the peremptory strike of a prospective juror,
while actually non-pretextual, was so insignificant as to be the equivalent of pretext.").
9 The Court also assumes that an attorney exercising a peremptory challenge will act
objectively. The attorney is seen as the quintessential rational decision-maker, so that
absent discriminatory intent, the attorney will have a facially neutral reason for her actions,
and this reason will be at least somewhat persuasive to others. An implausible reason is
likely a false reason. So too is a reason that appears inconsistent with other decisions. An
error of judgment, such as striking someone on poor or even merely sub-optimal grounds, is
treated in the very same way as an impermissible challenge. The Court has essentially
created a dichotomy between real reasons and pretextual reasons, where the persuasiveness
or plausibility of the reason helps determine the veracity of the reason. Discriminatory
intent is inferred through defects in the striking attorney's thought processes.
In the peremptory challenge context, the decision to strike is often made on very limited
information. A venire person's occupation or residence and the assurance that she can be
impartial does not necessarily reveal anything about how she will think. In addition, the
limited information will be processed subjectively. It is legitimate to strike a venire person
who is actually hostile towards the striking attorney. It may be difficult, however, to judge
what set of behaviors constitute hostility, or sufficient hostility, to warrant the strike. The
rational decision-making attorney exercising a peremptory challenge is thus expected to act
on both limited and possibly inaccurate information. This is a dubious assumption, given
the peremptory's "arbitrary and capricious" nature. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202,

212 (1965).
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Detector." 95 The "Inner Self Detector" explains what reasons really and truly
lead to a decision. 96 From this point, there are two types of lawyers.
Conscientious lawyers will in good faith evaluate their decision-making
processes to eliminate the impermissible gender or race considerations from
their decisions. Lawyers with invidious motives who do not wish to curb them
will be aware of their intent, and so they will invent pretextual reasons to keep
from being discovered. The trial court's job is merely to sort the conscientious

lawyer from the invidiously motivated lawyer.
In many situations, however, the attorney will neither know what the reason
actually was nor even know that she does not know.97 Accordingly, she states
what she thinks the reason is, and presumably her demeanor will suggest that
she is telling the truth. After all, she is telling her subjective truth. The
assumption that asking an attorney for a neutral explanation will reveal the real
basis for the strike is flawed, not because, or not solely because, attorneys can
lie, but more importantly, because attorneys, like everyone else, can lack self98
awareness.
In addition, because the trial court is determining credibility, to refuse to
accept a peremptory challenge is the equivalent of calling the attorney a liar,
and maybe racist or sexist as well. 99 A judge is likely to be reluctant to
stigmatize a lawyer in this way.100 Such a determination is also likely to color
95 See TIMOTHY D. WILSON, STRANGERS TO OURSELVES: DISCOVERING THE ADAPTIVE
UNCONSCIOUS
96

2-3 (2002) (describing the sadly non-existent "Inner Self Detector").

Id.

9' This lack of knowledge may explain why sometimes attorneys will admit that they
struck jurors because of a hunch, instinct, or gut feeling. See, e.g., United States v. Hunter,
86 F.3d 679, 683 (7th Cir. 1996) (affirming a determination of no Batson violation where
the prosecutor struck a potential juror based on a "gut feeling"); United States v. Briscoe,
896 F.2d 1476, 1489 (7th Cir. 1990) (accepting "intuitive assumptions that are not fairly
quantifiable"); People v. Francisco C., No. F034910, 2002 WL 110580, at *20 (Cal. Ct.
App. Jan. 25, 2002) (accepting exclusions that are "hunches, arbitrary reasons, highly
speculative, or even trivial grounds, if genuine and neutral").
98 See infra notes 368-404 and accompanying text (explaining how difficult it is for an
individual to accurately identify her motives for reaching a conclusion).
99 See Jose Felipe Anderson, Catch Me if You Can! Resolving the Ethical Tragedies in
the Brave New World of Jury Selection, 32 NEw ENG. L. REV. 343, 374 (1998); Cavise,
supra note 18, at 531 (commenting on the difficult position a trial judge is put in when
judging neutral explanations); see also Johnson, supra note 82, at 2639. It is not just
academics that believe the judge is calling the attorney a liar. See Munson v. State, 774
S.W.2d 778, 780 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (stating that "the defendant's practical burden [is]
to make a liar out of the prosecutor"); Charlow, supra note 82, at 11 (relating a judge's
"feeling that she had just rendered an official ruling that the attorney was lying to the court"
when upholding a Batson motion).
"00 This may be one reason why trial judges frequently accept "superficial or almost
frivolous excuses for peremptory challenges." See United States v. Clemons, 892 F.2d
1153, 1159 (3d Cir. 1989) (Higgenbotham, J., concurring) (accepting the majority's
affirmation of a conviction but worrying that Batson'sprotection had been gutted).
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the rest of the trial, 10 1 and other trials in jurisdictions where lawyers appear
frequently before the same judges.
D.

A Chorus of Criticism

Not surprisingly, Batson has engendered an enormous amount of often
virulent criticism.10 2 "Batson and the cases which followed merely heightened
101See Charlow, supra note 82, at 11 (reporting a conversation with a judge who related

that after finding a Batson violation, the "implied accusation affected the remainder of the
trial, producing continued discomfort whenever she interacted with the rebuked attorney").
102 See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 18, at 199 (criticizing Batson for acting only
symbolically against racism, without doing enough to alter the preemptory challenge);
David C. Baldus et al., The Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder Trials: A
Legal and Empirical Analysis, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 3, 44-46 (2001) (methodically
identifying and answering a number of empirically testable assumptions about the
mechanics of the peremptory strike that authors claim underlie the Batson decision); Jeffrey
S. Brand, The Supreme Court, EqualProtection andJury Selection: Denying That Race Still
Matters, 1994 Wis. L. REv. 511, 524-25 (1994) (arguing that Batson is part of a "flawed
methodology for eliminating racist influence in the jury selection process and supported by
naive assumptions regarding the influence of race on the judicial process"); Lonnie T.
Brown, Jr., Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection: Professional Misconduct, Not
Legitimate Advocacy, 22 REv. LITIG. 209, 214 (2003) (arguing that Batson 's burden shifting
framework actually makes trial judges "more willing to accept proffered race-neutral
explanations for alleged discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, no matter how
suspect"); Cavise, supra note 18, at 505 (describing Batson and progeny as "this curiously
twisted bundle of cases that leaves nothing more in its wake than a confusing and timeconsuming procedural morass"); Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should be
Abolished: A TrialJudge's Perspective, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 809, 835 (1997) (attacking as
absurd the idea that a right to be on a jury can be abrogated for "a universe of other unstated
and unstatable reasons" but not for other certain reasons); Johnson, supra note 18, at 91
(attacking anything short of a truly community representative jury and the acceptance of
alternative explanations to rebut a prima facie case); Jean Montoya, The Future of the PostBatson Peremptory Challenge: Voir Dire by Questionnaireand the "Blind" Peremptory,29
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 981, 981 (1996) (proposing a system of blind voir dire to avoid
problems with the Batson framework); Jere W. Morehead, When a Peremptory ChallengeIs
No Longer Peremptory: Batson's Unfortunate Failure to Eradicate Invidious
Discriminationfrom Jury Selection, 43 DEPAUL L. REv. 625, 638-43 (1994) (proposing the
elimination of the peremptory challenge system); Charles J. Ogletree, Just Say No!: A
Proposal To Eliminate Racially Discriminatory Uses of Peremptory Challenges, 31 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 1099, 1105 (1994) (asserting that "Batson has ... become impotent in
preventing discrimination"); Brian J. Serr & Mark Maney, Racism, Peremptory Challenges
and the Democratic Jury: The Jurisprudence of a Delicate Balance, 79 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 65 (1988) (recognizing Batson as a difficult attempt to balance complex
interests and calling for a more exacting effort to implement Batson by the lower courts);
Tania Tetlow, How Batson Spawned Shaw - Requiringthe Government to Treat Citizens as
Individuals When It Cannot, 49 LoY. L. REv. 133, 157-69 (2003) (criticizing Batson for
asking the impossible in requiring "the government to disentangle race from the web of
stereotypes it uses when guessing at the beliefs of citizens"); David D. Hopper, Note,
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the rhetoric of equality and inclusion, but did little to bring those goals to
fruition."'10 3 Justice Marshall himself, concurring in Batson, wrote that
attorneys were still free to discriminate, "provided that they hold that
discrimination to an 'acceptable' level."'10 4 One even less charitable
commentator has said, "Batson is either a disingenuous charade or an
ill-conceived sinkhole."' 1 5 A federal district court judge has commented:
[T]he awkward analyses set forth in Batson and its progeny.., have
proved... to be uncertain in their application and ...have caused great
consternation to the courts. A brief review of case law shows that judicial
interpretations of Batson are all over the map.

It is time to put an end to this charade....

Batson and Purkett's

protections [are] illusory.
...[J]udicial experience with peremptory challenges proves that they are

a cloak for discrimination ....106
Most of the criticism of Batson is justifiable, but focuses only or primarily
on dishonest racist and sexist lawyers. A major part of the problem with
Batson is its inability to address the honest, well-intentioned lawyer who
nevertheless still discriminates. As some commentators have argued, "courts
are not equipped to evaluate the validity of a litigant's purportedly neutral
explanations."' 0 7 This is not primarily because litigants are good liars. Rather,

Batson v. Kentucky and the ProsecutorialPeremptory Challenge: Arbitraryand Capricious
Equal Protection?, 74 VA. L. REv. 811, 811-41 (1988) (examining the inconsistent
application of Batson by the lower courts and proposing solutions); Robert V. Rodriguez,
Comment, Batson v. Kentucky: Equal Protection,the FairCross-Section Requirement, and
the Discriminatory Use of Peremptory Challenges, 37 EMORY L.J. 755, 797 (1988)
(criticizing parts of Batson for being too easy to bypass in the third stage).
Of course there are some commentators that support the Batson approach. See, e.g.,
Underwood, supra note 90, at 770 (arguing that using the existing body of
antidiscrimination law is the correct approach for the peremptory challenge situation).
'03Brand, supra note 102, at 574, 527 (arguing that the Supreme Court has "created a
self-contained system for proving discriminatory purpose that insulates rather than exposes
racist attitudes").
"oBatson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 105 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring) (expressing
this sentiment as a reason to entirely eliminate the peremptory challenge).
105Johnson, supra note 18, at 67.
106 Minetos v. City Univ. of N.Y., 925 F. Supp. 177, 183-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citation
omitted) (refusing to grant a new trial on a Batson claim in an employment discrimination
case, but arguing that peremptory challenges should be banned).
107See, e.g., Pamela R. Garfield, J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B.: Discrimination by any
Other Name, 72 DENV. U. L. REv. 169, 188 n. 186 (1994) (equating attempts to ban genderbased challenges to the failures of Batson and proposing the elimination of the peremptory);
see also Alschuler, supra note 18, at 175-76 (lamenting the ease of proffering alternative
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it is because, even though they are telling the truth about their neutral
explanations, the potential juror would not have been challenged but for their
race or gender. The attorney is both honest and discriminating on the basis of
race or gender. Such unconscious discrimination occurs, almost inevitably,
because of normal cognitive processes that form stereotypes. The next section
explores how stereotypes are formed and maintained.
I.

STEREOTYPE FORMATION, DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE

Over a century ago, Emile Durkheim proposed that "social life should be
explained, not by the notions of those who participate in it, but by more
profound causes which are unperceived by consciousness," and "that these
causes are to be sought mainly in the manner according to which the associated
individuals are grouped."' 08
Despite Durkheim's ideas, until roughly thirty years ago most mainstream
psychological research analyzed racial discrimination' 0 9 through observable
behavior and self-reports. Researchers saw racial discrimination primarily as a
function of the discriminator's motivation and personality, 110 in part because
they also principally saw racism as "an ideology, doctrine, or set of beliefs"' I l
explanations); Andrew G. Gordon, Note, Beyond Batson v. Kentucky: A Proposed Ethical
Rule ProhibitingRacial Discrimination in Jury Selection, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 685, 694
(1993) (describing the Supreme Court's unwillingness to clarify the standards for assessing
proffered explanations for strikes).
108 PETER WINCH, THE IDEA OF A SOCIAL SCIENCE 23-24 (2d ed. 1990) (quoting Emile
Durkheim, Review of A. Labriola: Essaissur la conception materialistede 1'histoire, REVUE
PHILOSOPHIQUE, Dec. 1987).
109 Racial discrimination can be understood as the negative behavior towards the racial
group, as opposed to the attitudes towards the group (prejudice). John F. Dovidio & Samuel
L. Gaertner, Prejudice, Discrimination,and Racism: Historical Trends and Contemporary
Approaches, in PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM 1, 3 (John F. Dovidio & Samuel
L. Gaertner eds., 1986).
"10 See id. at 21; Susan T. Fiske, Stereotyping, Prejudice and Discrimination, in 2
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 357, 357-58 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998)
(describing different approaches taken in studies of prejudice and discrimination). See
generally Richard D. Ashmore & Frances K. Del Boca, Conceptual Approaches to
Stereotypes and Stereotyping, in COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN STEREOTYPING AND INTERGROUP
BEHAVIOR 1, 1-12 (David L. Hamilton ed., 1981) [hereinafter COGNITIVE PROCESSES]
(summarizing the history of stereotype research and theory); Edward E. Jones, Major
Developments in Five Decades of Social Psychology, in I HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 3 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998) (describing developments in
social psychology from the mid 1930s to mid 1980s). Of course, many academics continue
to focus on motivation. See, e.g., J. L. A. Garcia, Three Sites for Racism: Social Structures,
Valuings, and Vice, in RACISM IN MIND 35, 41 (Michael. P. Levine & Tamas Pataki eds.,
2004) (discussing how to best psychologically and sociologically describe racism).
...Tamas Pataki, Introduction, in RACISM INMIND, supra note 110, at 1, 10 (recounting
an early definition for racism before proceeding to chronicle development of understandings
of prejudice).
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' 12
or as a problem of "disordered personality." "

' 13
In the late 1970s, however, as part of the "cognitive revolution," "
psychologists began to explore the notion that discrimination and other forms
of biased intergroup judgment may result from ordinary, routine and
The results of this
completely normal cognitive mental processes."14
research" l 5 suggest that a basic way in which people try to understand their
- can, of its own accord, lead to stereotyping and
world - categorization
6
discrimination. 1
Since the late 1980s researchers have closely examined the role of the
unconscious in these processes."17 Motivation, intent, purpose, and, most

112Id. at 11 (developing further the chronology of conceptualizing racism). For a famous

example of an approach to prejudice that emphasizes its psychopathology, see T.W.
ADORNO ET AL., THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY 11 (1950), arguing that individual

ideology derives from rational organization of apparent facts, influenced by personality.
"3 The term "cognitive revolution" is used to refer to the enormous increase of
psychological research in the 1970s that focused on the way people think, rather than their
observable behavior. See generally, Jones, supra note 110, at 34-43 (cataloging the rise of
varies theories of cognitive psychology from the 1930s through the 1970s).
114See, e.g., Dovidio, supra note 24, at 144 (stating that the "negative feelings and
beliefs that underlie aversive racism are hypothesized to be rooted in normal, often adaptive,
psychological processes"); Samuel L. Gaertner & John F. Dovidio, The Aversive Form of
Racism, in PREJUDICE,

DISCRIMINATION,

AND RACISM,

supra note

109, at 61,

85

("[C]ontemporary white Americans are [not] hypocritical: rather they are victims [sic] of...
cognitive processes that continue to promote prejudice and racism."); David 0. Sears,
Symbolic Racism, in ELIMINATING RACISM: PROFILES IN CONTROVERSY 53 (Phyllis A. Katz
& Dalmas A. Taylor eds., 1988) (arguing that centuries of cultural socialization make
everyone at least somewhat prejudiced); Renee Weber & Jennifer Crocker, Cognitive
Process in the Revision of Stereotypic Beliefs, 45 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL., 961,

967 (1983) (studying logical mechanisms for stereotype reformation and finding some
logical correlations between reformation rates and experience with counter-stereotype
evidence).
115In some ways this research is merely a development of, or return to, ideas that were
expressed in the late nineteenth century. See, e.g., WILLIAM B. CARPENTER, PRINCIPLES OF
MENTAL PHYSIOLOGY 543 (New York, D. Appleton, 1874) (observing how unconscious

"tendencies of thought" result in "unconscious prejudices which we thus form, [that] are
often stronger than conscious; and they are the more dangerous, because we cannot
knowingly guard against them").
"16 See William A. Cunningham et al., Implicit and Explicit Ethnocentrism: Revisiting
the Ideologies of Prejudice, 30 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1332, 1332-45 (2004)

(explaining how use of stereotypes is a normal part of human thought); David L. Hamilton
& Tina K. Trolier, Stereotypes and Stereotyping: An Overview of the Cognitive Approach,
in PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM, supra note 109, at 127, 128-37 (describing the

categorization process and how differences in "cognitive, information-processing biases"
can lead to the development of different stereotypes).
117 See infra Part Ill.D; see also Susan T. Fiske, Unintended Thought and Social
Motivation Create Casual Prejudice, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 117, 119-20 (2004) (explaining the
role of unconscious thoughts in a cognitive study of prejudice); Timothy D. Wilson &
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importantly, conscious awareness, 118 under this newer analysis, are not
necessary pre-requisites for stereotyping and any resulting discrimination.1 19
This change in emphasis of psychological research does not mean that the
old studies were necessarily incorrect or misguided, but rather that
contemporary forms of racism are "qualitatively different from the oldfashioned, blatant kind."' 120 Over the years the nature of racism had changed.
In the 1960s and before, racist acts were generally blatant, overt and easy to
recognize, 121 performed by a "dominative racist" - the typical bigot. 122 In
subsequent years, however, expressions of prejudice 123 have also changed, as
Elizabeth W. Dunn, Self Knowledge: Its Limits, Value, and Potentialfor Improvement, 55
ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 493, 502 (2004) (describing the recent "explosion of research").
18 Researchers
have labeled this distinction between consciousness, and
unconsciousness or nonconsciousness, as explicit-implicit, aware-unaware, direct-indirect,
and automatic-controlled. See Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit
Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-esteem, and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 4, 4 n.1
(1995) (listing word-pair possibilities and settling on implicit-explicit due to its connotations
in memory research). "Unconscious" itself is an extremely challenging word to adequately
define.
For sixteen distinct definitions of unconscious, see JAMES G. MILLER,
UNCONSCIOUSNESS 21-44 (1942). For a similar number of definitions of conscious, see
GILBERT RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND 154 (Univ. Chi. Press 1984) (1949).

Fortunately,

there is no need in this article to closely parse the many sometimes subtly different
definitions of unconscious and conscious.
For the purposes of this article, "unconscious" can best be thought of as "mental
processes that are inaccessible to consciousness but that influence judgments, feelings, or
behavior." WILSON, supra note 95, at 23. Note that this is a very different conception from
the repressive unconscious described by Sigmund Freud involving the id, ego, and superego.
See generally SIGMUND FREUD, THE EGO AND THE ID (James Strachey ed. & trans., 1962). In
contrast, automatic thinking, including the tendency to categorize and stereotype other
people, is characterized in varying degrees as "nonconscious, fast, unintentional,
uncontrollable and effortless." WILSON, supra note 95, at 52-53. Not all of these criteria
need be present, and in fact they rarely are. See Irene V. Blair, The Malleability of
Automatic Stereotypes and Prejudice, 6 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 242, 242-43
(2002) (reviewing the extent to which categorization is truly automatic and unavoidable).
119 See Dovidio et al., supra note 24, at 144 (negative feelings and beliefs about
minorities "may occur spontaneously, automatically, and without full awareness"); see also
Fiske, supra note 18, at 128 ("By far the biggest news in the last decade of research on bias
is how underground it can be. Automaticity characterizes stereotypes, prejudices, and
associated behavior." (citation omitted)).
120 Dovidio et al., supra note 24, at 143 (defining aversive racism).
121 Public lynching, Jim Crow laws, and other open expressions of racial antipathy are
easy to see as racist. See also id. at 141-42 (commenting on the decreasing instances of
overt racism).
122 Gaertner & Dovidio, supra note 114, at 62 (contrasting traditional and aversive
racism).
123 Prejudice is the term usually used for exclusively negative and unjustifiable attitudes
towards a member of an outgroup. See Nilanjana Dasgupta, Implicit Ingroup Favoritism,
Outgroup Favoritism, and Their Behavioral Manifestations, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 143, 145
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racism has become not only recognized as morally wrong, but, as a result of
civil rights cases 24 and legislation, 25 legally wrong as well. 26 Obvious,
127
explicit or open expressions of prejudice have dwindled substantially.
A more modem racist will "sympathize with the victims of past injustice;
support public policies that, in principle, promote racial equality and
ameliorate the consequences of racism; . .. regard themselves as non
prejudiced and discriminatory; but almost unavoidably, possess negative
feeling and beliefs about blacks.... [that] are typically excluded from
awareness."'128 A similar narrative, albeit less extreme, describes modem-day
n.3 (2004) (distinguishing between prejudice, defined above, and stereotype, defined as a
belief referring to characteristics thought to be common to a particular group).
124 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), is only the most prominent of
these cases.
125See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-66, § 107 (a), 105 Stat. 1071,
1075 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000)) (prohibiting public and
private employers from discriminating based on "race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin").
126 See Dovidio et al., supra note 24, at 141-142; John B. McConahay, Modern Racism,
Ambivalence, and the Modern Racism Scale, in PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM,

supra note 109, at 91, 91.
127 See Dasgupta, supra note 123, at 144 (citing studies showing that "prejudice and
stereotypes have declined steadily over the past few decades, especially towards African
Americans [and] women" (citations omitted)); Patricia G. Devine et al., Classic and
Contemporary Analyses of Racial Prejudice, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY: INTERGROUP PROCESSES 198, 200-01 (Rupert Brown & Samuel L. Gaertner
eds., 2001) [hereinafter INTERGROUP PROCESSES] (citing survey evidence and studies of
stereotyping in mass media and concluding that "[i]n sum, overt, direct forms of
prejudice.., have declined"); Dovidio et al., supra note 24, at 143 (citing several sources
which contrast the decline in overt expressions of racism to continuation of subtler forms of
racism). Pundits in the popular press agree. See Michael Barone, A Very Civil Act, WALL
ST. J.,
July 2, 2004 at A10 ("Today, the American people believe almost unanimously that
racial discrimination is wrong.").
128Gaertner & Dovidio, supra note 114, at 62 (emphasis added); see Dovidio et al.,
supra note 24, at 145 (explaining that many racists express their unconsciously harbored
negative feelings about blacks in "subtle, rationalizable ways that disadvantage minorities").
Other theorists agree that racism is now much more subtle and often below the level of
consciousness. See McConahay, supra note 126, at 91 (portraying the mindset of modem
racism); T. F. Pettigrew & R. W. Meertens, Subtle and Blatant Prejudice in Western
Europe, 25 EuR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 57 (1995) (analyzing the distinction between blatant and
subtle prejudice); David 0. Sears et al., Egalitarian Values and Contemporary Racial
Politics, in RACIALIZED POLITICS: THE DEBATE ABOUT RACISM IN AMERICA 75, 77 (David 0.

Sears et al. eds., 2000) (describing a system of symbolic racism which consists of the belief
that blacks are no longer discriminated against, that blacks do not follow American values,
and that blacks demand and receive special treatment). Some legal commentators agree
with these psychology studies. See, e.g., Judith Olans Brown et al., Some Thoughts About
Social Perceptionand Employment DiscriminationLaw: A Modest Proposalfor Reopening
the Judicial Dialogue, 46 EMORY L.J. 1487, 1492-1503 (1997) (presenting evidence of
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129

As a result of these changes, the old tools of detecting racism - asking
people to report on their own attitudes - were much less effective because they
could not distinguish between people who were racist and lying about it (those
giving the socially desirable responses) and people who genuinely did not
think they were racist. 130 Increasingly researchers realized "that a great deal of
what they [we]re interested in measuring [wa]s not consciously accessible to
their participants, forcing them to rely on alternative methods."' 131 Researchers
developed new tests, 132 including indirect self-report measures, latency
response measures, and physiological measures such as respiratory activity,
electromyographical activity, and eyeblink startle reflex, 133 that have allowed
researchers a window into people's unconscious attitudes and associations.
This research has compellingly demonstrated the existence of unconscious
race- and gender-based stereotyping. 134 Many people may simultaneously hold

continued subtle employment discrimination); Linda Hamilton Krieger, Civil Rights
Perestroika:IntergroupRelations After Affirmative Action, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1251, 1286-91
(1998) (discussing the role of unconscious stereotypes in discrimination).
129 See Peter Glick & Susan T. Fiske, The Ambivalent Sexism Inventory: Differentiating
Hostile and Benevolent Sexism, 70 J.PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 491, 491 (1996)
(arguing that sexism is "a multidimensional construct that encompasses two sets of sexist
attitudes: hostile and benevolent sexism"); Janet K. Swim et al., Sexism and Racism: Oldfashioned and Modern Prejudices, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 199, 199-200
(1995) (assessing modem forms of sexism); see also VIRGINIA VALIAN, WHY SO SLOW? THE
ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN 1-9 (1998) (examining alternative explanations for the glass
ceiling, including unconscious creation of gender schemas).
130 Attempts were made to address the problem with self reports, such as the "bogus
pipeline" procedure in which participants were incorrectly led to believe that they were
hooked up to a machine that would monitor their muscle movements and thus function as a
lie detector. See Neal J. Roese & David W. Jamieson, Twenty Years of Bogus Pipeline
Research: A Critical Review and Meta-Analysis, 114 PSCYH. BULL. 363, 372 (1993)
(arguing that bogus pipeline research was moderately effective at reducing responses
tailored to be socially desirable); see also Timothy D. Wilson, Knowing When to Ask.
Introspection and the Adaptive Unconscious, 10 J. CONSCIOUSNESS STUD. 131, 134 (2003)

").
("The search for indirect measures of attitudes also has a long history ....
131Wilson, supra note 130, at 133; see also Dasgupta, supra note 123, at 144 (explaining
the adaptation of cognitive science tools to study memory without conscious awareness).
132 McConahay, supra note 126, at 92 (discussing why the Modem Racism Scale was
developed).
133 Some physiological measures, such as galvanic skin response, had been in use since
the 1950s, but the measure did not adequately differentiate the valence of whites' affective
race-based responses. David M. Amodio et al., Individual Differences in the Activation and
Controlof Affective Race Bias as Assessed by Startle Eyeblink Response and Self-Report, 84
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 738, 738 (2003).
131See Dovidio et al, supra note 24, at 143-44 ("A critical aspect of the aversive racism
framework is the conflict between the denial of personal prejudice and the underlying
unconscious negative feelings and beliefs."). Several studies have illustrated negative
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conscious, or explicit, egalitarian attitudes and unconscious, or implicit,
negative attitudes. 135 The impact of this type of bias on minorities can be as
insidious as the older traditional form of discrimination.
This section begins by looking at the nature and origin of stereotypes and
how they are formed and maintained. It then looks at the distinctions between
the different kinds of knowledge that people possess. Finally, it looks at some
of the cognitive processes identified by researchers that make stereotypes
resistant to change.
A.

The Roots of Stereotypes: Categorization

"The human mind must think with the aid of categories ....

We cannot

Life is just too short to have differentiated
possibly avoid this process ....
136
concepts about everything."'
Although some are critical of the process, people inevitably generalize, or
categorize. 137 Categorization has been defined as "the process of understanding

unconscious beliefs that some people have about blacks. See, e.g., Russell H. Fazio et al.,
Variability in Automatic Activation as an Unobtrusive Measure of Racial Attitudes: A Bona
Fide Pipeline?, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1013, 1025 (1995) (presenting
findings on the limited ability of subjects to suppress negative racial feelings); Anthony
Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The Implicit
Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464, 1478 (1998) (confirming the
usefulness of the implicit association test for assessing stereotypes about blacks); Bemd
Wittenbrink et al., Evidencefor Racial Prejudice at the Implicit Level and its Relationship
With Questionnaire Measures, 72 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 262, 273 (1997)
(finding the presence of implicit prejudice by using explicit questionnaires). Similar studies
have shown gender stereotyping. See, e.g., Mahzarin R. Banaji & Curtis D. Hardin,
Automatic Stereotyping, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. 136, 136-37 (1996) (finding some success using
reaction time studies to assess automatic responses in gender prejudice experiments).
135 See Cunningham et al., supra note 116, at 1342 (noticing a "growing consensus" that
implicit and explicit attitudes towards minorities can be "dramatically opposed to each other
in valence"); see also Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 109, at 6 (explaining how
inconsistent internalization of cultural values and influences is an important component of
aversive racism).
136 GORDON ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 20, 173 (1954).

137 William Blake famously wrote that "[t]o Generalize is to be an Idiot. To Particularize
is the Alone Distinction of Merit." WILLIAM BLAKE, Annotations to Sir Joshua Reynold's
Discourses, in THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF WILLIAM BLAKE: WITH ALL THE VARIANT

READINGS 445, 451 (Geoffrey Keynes ed., 1957) (1808). Psychologist Charles Stangor said
"going beyond categorization.., is the right thing to do in almost every case." Charles
Stangor, Content and Application Inaccuracy in Social Stereotyping, in STEREOTYPE
AccuRAcY: TOWARD APPRECIATING GROUP DIFFERENCES 275, 286 (Yueh-Ting Lee et al.
eds., 1995) (citation omitted) (comparing the often positive effects of behavioral experience
A
to the often negative effects of socializing based on category membership).
generalization, when it becomes a stereotype, has even more negative connotations.

Perhaps the most opprobrium is reserved for a developed set of generalizations or
stereotypes that have become a profile. Regardless of the nomenclature, however, in each
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what some thing is by knowing what other things it is equivalent to and what
other things it is different from." 138 It is probably "the most basic and essential
1 39
of all cognitive processes."
At the simplest level, categorization allows us to make identifications. For
example, we may categorize an object in increasing order of specificity as a
vehicle, car, sedan, Honda, Accord, or a friend's Accord. We may also
categorize by function, such as categorizing baseball gloves, hockey sticks, and
tennis racquets as "sports equipment." Similarly we may categorize people,
such as Aristotle, Plato, Spinoza, and Kant as "philosophers."
At a more complex level, by allowing us to act and reach conclusions based
on imperfect or limited information, categorization helps people understand the
world and predict future occurrences. 140 It serves to simplify the world, so that
"non identical stimuli can be treated as equivalent." ' 141
Although in a sense all things are different, categorization guards against
our perceiving all of the differences, even if we were capable of this. If we
were unable to categorize, we would be engulfed in a tidal wave of details.
Our minds would be unable to cope. 42 Consequently, categorizing simplifies
the most (or is most effective) when the categories and the constituents of the
categories are distinct. Anything that does not easily fit in a specific category
(such as gray when the categories are black and white) may be forced into a

143
category regardless, thus reducing complexity, but introducing inaccuracy.

Perceived

intracategory

differences

are

reduced

(assimilation)

and

instance a decision is made or conclusion is reached based not on factors specific to the
individual, but on the individual's membership in a class.
138 CRAIG MCGARTY, THE CATEGORIZATION PROCESS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1 (1999).
139 Michael A. Hogg, Social Categorization,Depersonalization,and Group Behavior, in
BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: GROUP PROCESSES 56, 58 (Michael A.

Hogg & Scott Tindale eds., 2001) [hereinafter GROUP PROCESSES] (using categorization
processes to explain a number of intergroup phenomenon).
140 Id.; see also Hamilton & Trolier, supra note 116, at 128-33 (working through the
mechanics and consequences of categorization).
141Eleanor Rosch, Human Categorization,in STUDIES INCROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY
1, 2 (Neil Warren ed., 1977).
142 WALTER LIPPMAN, PUBLIC OPINION 16 (1922) ("For the real environment is altogether
too big, too complex, and too fleeting for direct acquaintance. We are not equipped to deal
with so much subtlety, so much variety, so many permutations and combinations.").
143 For a real world example, consider how the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of
1975 imposed lower fuel efficiency standards on light trucks than on passenger cars. See 49
U.S.C. § 32902(a)-(b) (2004) (authorizing the Secretary of Transportation to regulate fuel
economy standards for vehicles); 49 C.F.R. § 533.5(a) (2004) (increasing the fuel economy
of light trucks). Since then, car manufactures have introduced vehicles with features of both
trucks and cars, such as the minivan and the PT Cruiser. These vehicles are shoehorned into
the light truck category, resulting nationally in lower gas mileage. See generally Kyler
Smart, Losing Ground: How SUVs Are Making the United States Less Fuel-Efficient and
Optionsfor Reversing the Downward Trend, 7 ENVTL. LAW. 159 (2000).
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intercategory differences are increased (contrast).144
1. Stereotyping as Categorization
Normal, routine and unconscious cognitive processes lead to the formation
These same processes cause our categorization of other
of categories.
people. 145 Stereotyping is perhaps best understood as merely a subset of
categorization called social categorization. 146 In this view, "people categorize
other people by race, sex, ethnicity and the like in the same way that they
categorize furniture as chairs, tables, couches and the like.' 47
From this perspective, everyone has and uses stereotypes, not just
invidiously motivated racists or sexists. Stereotyping, like categorizing,
consists of inferring a relatively complete idea about a specific subject based
on a small amount of information. A stereotype can be understood as a
cognitive structure that contains sweeping concepts of the behaviors, traits and
attitudes associated with the members of a social category. 148 It is simply a
144 See infra note 201-216 and accompanying text (discussing how people assess others

within their own group versus people in different groups).
145 The important difference between categorizing objects and categorizing people is that
in the latter situation the comparisons often implicate the one doing the categorization. See
Hogg, supra note 139, at 59-60 (discussing the self-esteem and identity values implicated in
categorization).
146 See Kimberly A. Quinn et al., FunctionalModularity in Stereotype Representation,
40 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 519, 519 (2004) (writing that "[c]ategorization is
central to the process of social perception"); Henri Tajfel, Cognitive Aspects of Prejudice,
25 J. Soc. ISSUES 79, 81-82 (1969) (defining stereotyping simply "as the attribution of
general psychological characteristics to large human groups"); Shelley E. Taylor et al.,
Categoricaland Contextual Bases of Person Memory and Stereotyping, 36 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 778, 778 (1978) (proposing that there is "no theoretical or empirical
reason" to assume that stereotyping is very different from generalizing about other
categories of objects); see also LIPPMAN, supra note 142, 65-69 (using the word stereotype
in social science for the first time to mean a schema).
147Susan T. Fiske, Examining the Role of Intent: Toward UnderstandingIts Role in
Stereotyping and Prejudice, in UNINTENDED THOUGHT 253, 253 (James S. Uleman & John
A. Bargh eds., 1989) (arguing that the ease of categorization should not be taken to imply a
lack of intent or responsibility).
148 See ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION: MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE 315 (1999) (defining
stereotypes as "cognitive structures that contain our knowledge, beliefs, and expectations
about a social group"); Hamilton & Trolier, supra note 116, at 133 (characterizing
stereotypes as "a cognitive structure that contains the perceivers knowledge, beliefs, and
expectancies about some human group"). See generally David L. Hamilton & Jeffrey W.

Sherman, Stereotypes, in 2

HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL COGNITION

1 (Robert S. Wyer, Jr. &

Thomas K. Srull eds., 2d ed. 1994) (surveying a wide swatch of literature on the cognitive
processes associated with stereotype formation and mutation). Other definitions of
"stereotype" have limited the term to generalizations that are incorrectly learned, factually
inaccurate and rigid. See ALLPORT, supra note 136, at 187 (defining stereotype to mean the
perceiver's exaggerated beliefs regarding a category of people); Ashmore & Del Boca,

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 85:155

correlation,149 not necessarily negative in nature,150 and not necessarily false,151
as simple as "the British are reserved" or "Canadians are funny."' 152 For the
selection of jurors in the criminal law context, stereotyping may lead lawyers
or that
to believe that "African Americans make better defense jurors,"'1153
54
female jurors are more likely to convict in rape or child abuse cases.
At the same time, just like other kinds of categorization, stereotypes distort
what we experience by making our world seem simpler and less surprising.

Stereotypes and stereotyping necessarily lead to oversimplified conceptions
and misapplied knowledge. 155 As a result, stereotyping "per se, propels the
individual down the road to bias."'1 56 Or, as psychologist John Bargh puts it,

supra note 110, at 14-15 tbl. 1.2 (providing numerous definitions).
141This is not to say that people are necessarily good at accurately determining
correlations or covariations consciously. In fact, people often are "notoriously bad,"
especially if they have pre-existing expectations. See WILSON, supra note 95, at 62 (stating
that the correlation must be very strong in order for people to consciously detect it). See
generally Lauren B. Alloy & Naomi Tabachnik, Assessment of Covariationby Humans and
Animals: The JointInfluence ofPriorExpectations and Current SituationalInformation, 91
PSYCHOL. REV. 112 (1984) (analyzing people's and animals' assessments of covariation);
Tina K. Trolier & David L. Hamilton, Variables Influencing Judgement of Correlational
Relations, 50 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 879 (1986) (investigating "subjects' ability
to assess correlational relations").
IS0Susan T. Fiske et al., A Model of(Often Mixed) Stereotype Content: Competence and
Warmth Respectively Follow from PerceivedStatus and Competition, 82 J. PERSONALITY &
Soc. PSYCHOL. 878, 879 (2002) ("[Stereotypes often include a mix of more and less
socially desirable traits, not just the uniform antipathy so often assumed about
stereotypes."); see Don Operario & Susan T. Fiske, Stereotypes: Content, Structures,
Processes, and Context, in INTERGROUP PROCESSES, supra note 127, at 22, 24-25
(concluding that most social stereotypes are ambivalent).
'51 See generally Clark R. McCauley et al., Stereotype Accuracy: Toward Appreciating
Group

Differences,

in

STEREOTYPE

ACCURACY:

TOWARD

APPRECIATING

GROUP

DIFFERENCES, supra note 137, at 293, 297 (arguing that there is often a kernel of truth to
most stereotypes).
152 These examples are chosen because I am a citizen of Canada and of the United
Kingdom (and neither particularly reserved nor funny).
'53 See infra note 364 and accompanying text (citing article finding blacks jurors more
likely to acquit criminal defendants).
154 See infra note 365 and accompanying text (citing court opinion referring to numerous
studies that female jurors are slightly less likely to acquit).
155See David A. Wilder, Social Categorization:Implicationsfor Creationand Reduction
of Intergroup Bias, in 19 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 291, 292

(Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1986) ("[T]he mere categorization of persons into different groups
engages a series of assumptions that foster intergroup biases."); see also ALBERT F.
ELDRIDGE, IMAGES OF CONFLICT 22-23 (1979) (describing stereotyping as a method used to

simplify the "cognitive world" that leads to reactions to perceived stimulus that are usually
not real).
156Wilder, supra note 155, at 292; see also Galen V. Bodenhausen & C. Neil Macrae,
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"[s]tereotypes are categories that have gone too far."' 157
2. Stereotyping as Schemas
Researchers have developed these ideas through studies that have viewed
stereotypes as "social schemas."' 158 Social schemas can exist at any level of
abstraction and along any dimension, such as identity group (for example,
race), character traits (for example, dominance), physical traits (for example,
tall), social roles (for example, occupation), or general person impressions.
Whites in America may attribute to blacks character traits such as laziness or
hostility, physical traits such as kinky hair, roles such as entertainer or drugdealer, and an overall negative person impression. 159 Within schemas are
sub-schemas, organized hierarchically, wherein specific examples constitute
1 60
the lowest level of schema abstraction.
People generally match and compare incoming information with the most

Stereotype Activation and Inhibition, in 11 STEREOTYPE ACTIVATION AND INHIBITION:
ADVANCES IN SOCIAL COGNITION 1, 7 (Robert S. Wyer, Jr. ed., 1998) (asserting that "the

road to... discrimination begins with the simple act of categorization"). But see Penelope
Oakes, The Root of All Evil in Intergroup Relations? Unearthing the Categorization
Process, in INTERGROUP PROCESSES, supra note 127, at 1, 16 (arguing against the "widely
endorsed view" that categorization results in intergroup discrimination and concluding
instead that it has been a "scapegoat").
I" See Annie Murphy Paul, Where Bias Begins: The Truth About Stereotypes, PSYCHOL.
TODAY, May-June 1998, at 52 (quoting Professor John A. Bargh), available at
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_ml 175/is_n3_v31/ai_20526120 (accessed Nov. 6,
2004).
158 The term "schema" originally comes from F.C. BARTLETT, REMEMBERING: A STUDY
IN EXPERIMENTAL AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 201 (1932) ("'Schema' refers to an active
organization of past reactions, or of past experiences, which must always be supposed to be
operating in any well-adapted organic response."). Scholars have also referred to schemas
as frames, scenes, scenarios, and scripts, among others. See Ronald W. Casson, Schemata
in Cognitive Anthropology, 12 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 429, 430 (1983) (defining
schemas as "conceptual abstractions that mediate between stimuli received by the sense

organs and behavioral responses," and stating that they "serve as the basis for all human
information processing, e.g. perception and comprehension, categorization and planning,
recognition and recall, and problem-solving and decision-making"). Other terms reflecting
this notion that pre-existing knowledge has an impact on new data include anticipatory
schemas, implicit personality theories, category-based expectations, and causal schemata.
See DAVID F. BARONE ET AL., SOCIAL COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY: HISTORY AND CURRENT

DOMAINS 193 (1997) (detailing the researchers who popularized these terms).
159See Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: The Automatic and Controlled
Components, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 8-9 (1989) (citing studies
documenting subjects' perceptions of the personality traits ofblacks).
160 See Shelley E. Taylor & Jennifer Crocker, Schematic Bases of Social Information
Processing,in 1 SOCIAL COGNITION: THE ONTARIO SYMPOSIUM 89, 92 (E. Tory Higgins et
al. eds., 1981) (describing schema as a "pyramidal structure" which can be connected to
other schemas through "a rich web of associations").
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relevant schema or sub-schema. 16 1 They then tend to order and process new
related stimuli in keeping with other elements of the schema. 162 A schema
essentially operates as an implicit theory, which reflexively "directs the
perceiver's attention... mediates inferences... guides judgment and
evaluation; and. .. fills in ... values for unexpected attributes." 163 It is a way
to integrate new material into familiar understanding and a way to draw
conclusions beyond the information given. Not only do we assume the British
are reserved or that Canadians are funny (if they are), but we also expect the
British to act reserved and Canadians to be funny.
Schemas thus serve to provide an organizational structure, or sort of filing
system, for stimuli. Although they improve efficiency, they also may cause
64
Of
people to ignore, trivialize or simply fail to notice individual differences.
critical importance, however, is that a schema's positive and negative functions
' 65
both occur "without any intentional or conscious recollection."'
3.

Stereotypes: Knowledge Versus Personal Beliefs

Stereotypes and the resulting biases that they promote may result from
unconscious cognitive processes, as opposed to conscious discriminatory
purposes. 166 Note that people's conscious (or explicit) attitudes and their
unconscious (or implicit) attitudes (or associations, or beliefs) are often
67
different, or to use the psychological term, dissociated. 1

161 See id. at 94 ("This process of ordering and structuring the elements of the stimulus

configuration is important because it lays the groundwork for subsequent inferences").
162See id. at 97-8 (remarking that the processing of schemas has a critical influence on
memory).
163Elliot R. Smith, Mental Representation and Memory, in 1 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 110, at 391, 404 (citations omitted) (explaining how "[w]e just

'know' that someone's nasty comment means that he is a boorish person, rather than
'remembering' this connection between a behavior and a trait").
164See William von Hippel et al., Inhibitory Effect of Schematic Processing on
PerceptualEncoding, 64 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 921, 921 (1993).
165 Smith, supra note 163, at 404 (explaining that while the process may not be
conscious, it nevertheless causes the perceiver to play "an active rather than passive role in
perception and cognition"). This process is explored further at Part III.B.
166 See supra notes 77-92 and accompanying text (discussing how the courts define
discriminatory purpose).
167 See Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Attitudes Can Be Measured, in THE NATURE OF
REMEMBERING: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF ROBERT G. CROWDER 117, 143 (Henry L. Roediger III

et al. eds., 2001) (citing psychometric evidence that "implicit and explicit attitudes are
indeed disassociated"); Timothy D. Wilson et al., A Model of Dual Attitudes, 107 PSYCHOL.
REv. 101, 104-06 (2000) (building on the dual attitude model by hypothesizing that implicit
attitudes are more readily retrieved from memory than explicit attitudes but are harder to
change); see also William A. Cunningham et al., Implicit Attitude Measures: Consistency,

Stability, and Convergent Validity, 12 PSYCHOL. SCI. 163, 169 (2001) (finding a
"dissociation between implicit and explicit measures of race attitude").
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Psychologists have conceived attitudes (and related concepts such as feeling
public
and evaluation) as occurring at three distinct levels. 168 First, there are169
("I
attitudes, which are those that people will admit and state publicly.
socially
to
be
They
tend
equally.")
be
treated
should
everyone
that
believe
desirable, as people are generally concerned about their self-presentation or
image to others. Today, few Americans are prepared to publicly state that they
have racist, or to a lesser degree, sexist1 70beliefs, since holding those beliefs is
generally no longer socially acceptable.
Second, there are also private attitudes, which are those beliefs that a person
has consciously, but may not wish to express publicly. 171 ("I think black
people are poor because they are lazy.") The Supreme Court's Batson
procedure is addressed towards peremptory challenges exercised on the basis
of these private attitudes. ("I think black people make lousy jurors.") These
72
beliefs are generally consistent with the individual's principles and values.
Sometimes, maybe even often, a person's private and public attitudes are the

same.
Finally, and most controversially, there are unconscious or implicit attitudes
that "materialize in ways that elude conscious awareness, seem oblivious to
conscious intention, and defy conscious control."'1 73 Implicit attitudes have
been defined as "introspectively unidentified (or inaccurately identified) traces
of past experience that mediate favorable or unfavorable feeling, thought, or
action toward social objects."' 174 These implicit attitudes may also be, and
175
often are, inconsistent with the person's public or private attitudes.
168 This framework is adapted from John F. Dovidio et al., On the Nature of Prejudice:

Automatic and ControlledProcesses, 33 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 510, 519 (1997)
(conducting an experiment examining how conscious and nonconscious "racial attitudes
predict Whites' spontaneous and deliberative interracial responses").
169 Id. ("Individuals may publicly express socially desirable (nonprejudiced) attitudes
even though they are aware that they privately hold other, more negative attitudes.").
170 See supra notes 120-132 and accompanying text (tracing the changing nature of
racism and sexism).
171 Dovidio et al., supra note 168, at 519.
172 Id. ("In contrast to public attitudes that are related to impression management, these
personal attitudes are influenced by an individual's private standards and ideals.")
173 Banaji, supra note 167, at 118 (addressing the challenges in measuring implicit
attitudes).
174 Greenwald & Banaji, supra note 118, at 8.
175 See John T. Jost et al., A Decade of System Justification Theory: Accumulated
Evidence of Conscious and Unconscious Bolstering of the Status Quo, POL. PSYCHOL.
(forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at 20-26, on file with the author) (reviewing ten years of
favoritism studies); Kerry Kawakami & John F. Dovidio, The Reliability of Implicit
Stereotyping, 27 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 212, 213 (2001) (finding that "[i]mplicit
and explicit measures of stereotypes are only weakly and inconsistently related"); see also
John F. Dovidio et al., Implicit and Explicit Prejudice and InterracialInteraction, 82 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 62, 62 (2002) (stating that implicit and explicit attitudes
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Researchers believe that they predict different kinds of behavior, with implicit
176
attitudes being more relevant to "subtle or spontaneous expressions of bias."
Whereas most studies have found that men have more explicit negative racial
stereotypes than women, 177 the reverse may be true with respect to implicit
178
racial stereotypes.
Psychologist Patricia G. Devine has contrasted private beliefs with mere
knowledge of stereotypes. 179 She has argued persuasively that it is both
stereotypes and personal beliefs that represent an individual's knowledge about
a social group, 180 and that peoples' personal beliefs are unlikely to be
completely consistent with all the stereotypes of which they are aware.' 8' So
while nearly all Americans know about stereotypes of blacks, only some
Americans actually believe in the stereotypes.
Therefore, although the
stereotypes of blacks remain largely negative (for example, low in intelligence,
poor, lazy, loud, criminal, hostile), 182 people's "personal beliefs toward Blacks
have progressively become more favorable over the years, to the point that
183
they are, at present, predominately positive."'
The significant aspect of this framework, however, is that despite a person's
beliefs about a social group, the stereotypes remain "a well-organized,
frequently activated knowledge structure"18 4 that can affect judgment and
decision-making. 185 We turn now to how the "knowledge structures" of
"commonly diverge for socially sensitive issues"); Greenwald & Banaji, supra note 118, at
4-5 (documenting "findings of discrimination by people who explicitly disavow prejudice").
176 Kawakami & Dovidio, supra note 175, at 221 (comparing implicit attitudes to
"explicit measures [which] may be better predictors of blatant and deliberative types of
bias.").
177Bo Ekehammar et al., Gender Differences in Implicit Prejudice, 34 PERSONALITY &
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 1509, 1509-10 (2003) (citing nine recent studies to support this
finding).
178 Id. at 1518-19 (studying prejudice towards immigrants).
"9 See Patricia G. Devine & Andrew J. Elliot, Are Racial Stereotypes Really Fading?
The Princeton Trilogy Revisited, 21 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1139, 1146-48
(1995) (studying in further detail Devine's earlier hypothesis that knowledge of a stereotype
and endorsement of that stereotype need not coincide).
180Id. at 1141-43.
"I' Personal beliefs are simply "propositions that are endorsed and accepted as true." Id.
at 1142.
182 These were six of the eight most frequently selected traits in Devine and Elliott's
study of people's knowledge of the "cultural stereotype of Blacks." Id. at 1142-44.
183 Id. at 1145.

184 Id. at 1140 (rejecting studies that conclude that racial stereotypes have "faded over the

years").
185 The Supreme Court, in one sense, may have anticipated Devine's finding by twentyeight years. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 727 (1961) ("The influence that lurks in an
opinion once formed is so persistent that it unconsciously fights detachment from the mental
processes of the average man."). The Court has failed, however, to apply this insight to the
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stereotypes are developed and maintained.
Stereotype Formation

B.

It is easy enough to see how people may develop stereotypes that are based
on real group differences. 186 People can observe whether race or sex is
positively or negatively correlated with some other attribute. Race or sex
(which is easy to see) is in effect used as a proxy for another attribute that may
be more difficult to observe directly.8 7 Stereotypes based on some social
categories, such as age, may have some factual validity. For example, it is
unarguable that many important physical faculties, such as vision, hearing, and
speed of reflex, decline with age. 188 In contrast, there are few racial or gender
stereotypes that are incontestably correct.
The more interesting topic for discussion concerns the formation of
stereotypes when there are either no underlying real group differences or when
any real group differences are small relative to the strength of the stereotype.
Psychological research has suggested several cognitive processes by which
people form and maintain stereotypes in this context. These are examined in
the following sections.
1.

Ingroup and Outgroup Bias/Perceptual Accentuation

As the preceding discussion of categorizing suggests, placing something or
someone in a group can alter people's perceptions of the item. 189 The
pioneering study in this field involved an experiment in which researchers
asked people to estimate the differences in the length of certain lines.' 90 When
participants saw the lines as part of a group, they judged them to be more
peremptory challenge cases.
186 This is not to say that a stereotype based on a real group difference is necessarily an

appropriate basis to judge others.

See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER,

PROFILES,

PROBABILITIES, AND STEREOTYPES 131-54 (2003) (arguing that gender based stereotypes

should not guide a person's decisions, even when the stereotypes represent real group
differences). It is also not to say that people are good at observing real group differences.
See supra note 149.
187 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 689 (2003) (referring to the
use of race or sex as a proxy as "statistical discrimination").
188Stereotypes about age are the justification for the Federal Aviation Administration's
regulation regarding age and pilots for passenger airplanes. See FAA, DOT Airman and
Crewmember Requirements, 14 C.F.R. § 121.383(c) (2004) (providing that "[n]o person
may serve as a pilot on an airplane engaged in [passenger] operations... if that person has
reached his 60th birthday"). Of course, the fact that those aged over sixty are more likely to
have declining faculties is not to say that all of those aged over sixty will have declining
faculties. See SCHAUER, supra note 186, at 131-34 (discussing the "Age Sixty Rule").
"8 See Wilder, supra note 155, at 296 (answering in the affirmative the question "[d]oes
the mere act of categorizing actors into a group lead to a different set of inferences than if
they are perceived to be unrelated to one another?").
190 See Tajfel, supra note 146, at 83-86 (describing the original experiments).
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similar in length to each other than when the identical lines were ungrouped. 191
Likewise they saw the grouped lines as more dissimilar to lines in other
more accurate in judging and
groups.192 Significantly, participants were much
193
comparing lengths when lines were ungrouped.
A more recent study demonstrated the importance of categorization on
judgments of people's attitudes.' 9 4 Experimenters asked subjects to judge how
similar male actors were to each other on a continuous percentile scale of
political liberalism. 95 For example, an actor at the seventieth percentile mark
(meaning that he was more liberal than seventy percent of the population) and
another at the eightieth percentile mark would be ten units apart. 196 In some
cases, the researchers marked off the scale at the twenty-fifth, fiftieth, and
seventy-fifth percentile marks, forming quartiles.197 When experimenters used
the quartile marks, participants judged an actor at the seventieth percentile to
be more similar to an actor at the fifty-fifth percentile, fifteen units apart (but
in the same quartile), than one at the eightieth percentile, only ten units apart
(but in a different quartile). 198 Subjects appeared to treat the quartile marks as
denoting groups, and thus providing additional data, while ignoring the
unchanged underlying reality. 199
Researchers have found similar, albeit much more complex, results in

191Id. at 84 (finding a "subjective reduction of differences within each of the classes").
192 Id.
193 Id.

" See Myron Rothbart et al., Effects of Arbitrarily Placed Category Boundaries on
Similarity Judgments, 33 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 122, 132 (1997) (designing a

study to "assess the effect of category boundaries on inter- and intracategory similarity").
'95 Id. (using fifteen pairs of actors that varied by ten, fifteen, or thirty-five percentile
points).
196 Id.
197 Id.

191 Id. at 136-37 ("Clearly, in this experiment, the effects of interposed category
boundaries were successful in nullifying differences in perceived similarity due to actual
scale position.").
19 Id at 140-42 (showing "evidence that the presence of boundary markers produced
both within-category assimilation and between-category accentuation"). The study also
found the same effect when experimenters added verbal labels to the percentile scale. See
Myron Rothbart, Category Dynamics and the Modification of Outgroup Stereotypes, in
INTERGROUP PROCESSES, supra note 127, at 46, 56 (describing this effect as though "it is as

if a farmer living at the boundary of Poland and Russia, after learning that his house is just
inside the Polish border, exclaims with relief, 'Thank God, no more Russian winters!"').
One wonders if a similar effect occurs with perceptions of law schools. Prospective
students may well see the University of Kentucky (ranked fiftieth) as closer in "quality" to
the University of Utah (ranked forty-seventh) than to Arizona State University (ranked fiftythird), where the top fifty appear on one page and the remaining schools in the top hundred
appear two pages later. See America's Best Graduate Schools: Rankings, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Apr. 12, 2004, at 64, 69-70.
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studies where people themselves are grouped, rather than just lines or others'
attitudes. 20 0 Grouping people, even on a completely arbitrary basis such as a
coin toss, leads to strong biases regarding others' assessments of the people in
the group and the way they behave toward them. 20 1 People experience more
20 2
positive feelings towards those individuals in the same group as they are,
and see those people as being more similar to themselves than ungrouped
individuals or those in other groups. 20 3 They judge same-group members more
positively, 2°4 see and describe failures as more situational than dispositional, 20 5
overrate achievements considerably, 20 6 punish more leniently,20 7 and are more
20

See generally David M. Messick & Diane M. Mackie, IntergroupRelations, 40 ANN.

REV. PSYCHOL. 45 (1989) (discussing cognitive representation, out-group homogeneity,
intergroup bias, and how to improve intergroup relations).
201 See id. at 59 (citing numerous studies "leaving little doubt that the trivial or random
classification of a group of people into two subgroups is sufficient to induce" intergroup
bias); cf Oakes, supra note 156, at 15 (suggesting that grouping in the minimal group
paradigm may matter because participants expect it to matter).
202 See Sabine Otten & Gordon B. Moskowitz, Evidence for Implicit Evaluative InGroup Bias: Affect-Based Spontaneous Trait Inference in a Minimal Group Paradigm,36 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 77, 86-88 (2000) (concluding that positive in-group
stereotypes exist, but finding no support for negative out-group stereotypes).
203 Fiske, supra note 18, at 129 ("The mere fact of categorizing people into 'us' and
'them,' ingroup and outgroup, tends to exaggerate intercategory differences and diminish
intracategory differences."); see also David A. Wilder, Perceiving Persons as a Group:
Categorizationand Intergroup Relations, in COGNITIVE PROCESSES, supra note 110, at 213,
217-18 (citing study showing that "categorization of a person into a group establishes
expectations about the person... that are formed before actually seeing the person's
behavior").
204 See Maria Rosaria Cadinu & Myron Rothbart, Self-Anchoring and Differentiation
Processesin the Minimal Group Setting, 70 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 661, 661-62
(1996) (describing the process of conferring positive self-image to in-group members); W.
Doise et al., An Experimental Investigation into the Formation of Intergroup
Representations, 2 EUR.J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 202, 203-04 (1972) (judging physical traits and
showing that the degree of discrimination depends on whether intergroup interaction is
expected); Miles Hewstone, The "Ultimate Attribution Error"?A Review of the Literature
on Intergroup CausalAttribution, 20 EuR.J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 311, 331 (1990) (documenting
that in-group members were favored with respect to "positive and negative outcomes");
Brian Mullen et al., Ingroup Bias as a Function of Salience, Relevance and Status: An
Integration, 22 EUR.J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 103, 116-19 (1992) (meta-analysis confirming that
ingroups are perceived more positively than outgroups).
205 See Gillian Finchilescu, Intergroup Attributions in Minimal Groups, 134 J. Soc.
PSYCHOL. 111, 116 (1994) ("In-group favoritism in marks for failure was positively
correlated with favoritism in external attributions (task difficulty and bad luck) and
negatively correlated with internal attributions (lack of ability and effort)."); see also infra
note 359 (citing studies showing how people evaluate information that is consistent with
their tentative theory less critically than inconsistent information).
206 Finchilescu, supra note 205, at 117 (finding a correlation between same-group bias in
both attributions of success and allocations of rewards).
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likely to offer assistance to members in their group.20 8 Nearly one hundred
20 9
studies have now demonstrated this ingroup favoritism.
People see those in other groups as a more homogeneous mass (outgroup
homogeneity), 210 and in a more negative manner (outgroup derogation).2 1 Not
2 12 Put
surprisingly, they remember out-group negative behaviors more easily.
succinctly, "[tihey are all alike and different from us, besides.

'213

People even

selectively process information that will reinforce these views over information
that does not.214 Perhaps most tellingly, when permitted to allocate financial
207 Norbert L. Kerr et al., Defendant-JurorSimilarity and Mock Juror Judgments, 19
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 545, 563 (1995) (concluding that juror-defendant similarity generally
resulted in greater leniency in cases of weak or moderately strong evidence).
208 See John F. Dovidio et al., Extending the Benefits of Recategorization:Evaluations,
Self-Disclosure and Helping, 33 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 401, 401 (1997) (finding
that "the manipulation of the intergroup contact situation that created stronger impressions
of one group reduced intergroup bias in evaluations, self-disclosure, and helping").
209 See Dasgupta, supra note 123, at 146 (citing studies documenting ingroup favoritism
and outgroup derogation).
210 See e.g. Miles Hewstone et al., Models of Crossed Categorization and Intergroup
Relations, 64 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 779, 782 (1993) ("[Tjhere is a consistent
tendency to view in-groups as more variable than out-groups."); Patricia W. Linville, The
Heterogeneity of Homogeneity, in ATTRIBUTION AND SOCIAL INTERACTION: THE LEGACY OF
EDWARD E. JONES 423, 446-48 (John M. Darley & Joel Cooper eds., 1998) [hereinafter
ATTRIBUTION AND SOCIAL INTERACTION] (reviewing studies of out-group homogeneity);
Patricia W. Linville et al., Stereotyping and Perceived Distributions of Social
Characteristics: An Application to Ingroup-Outgroup Perception, in PREJUDICE,
DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM, supra note 109, at 165, 167 (calling out-group homogeneity
a "truism" but adding that twenty percent of studies have been unable to document it); cf
Diane M. Mackie, Integrating Social and Cognitive Processes Underlying the Out-Group
Homogeneity Effect: The Homogeneity of Homogeneity, in ATTRIBUTION AND SOCIAL
INTERACTION, supra, 471, 472-73 (observing that out-group homogeneity has yet to be fully
explained); Thomas M. Ostrom & Constantine Sedikides, Out-Group Homogeneity Effects
in Natural and Minimal Groups, 112 PSYCHOL. BULL. 536, 536-37 (1992) (finding strong
evidence for outgroup homogeneity with preexisting group memberships, but criticizing the
widespread conclusion that it obtains in the strict minimal group paradigm).
211 See Dasgupta, supra note 123, at 146 (commenting that "a hundred studies have
documented people's tendency... to associate negative characteristics with outgroups more
easily than ingroups").
212 See John W. Howard & Myron Rothbart, Social Categorization and Memory for InGroup and Out-Group Behavior, 38 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 301, 303-06 (1980)
(conducting three experiments related to ingroup favoritism and its effect on memory); see
also Myron Rothbart & Bernadette Park, On the Confirmability and Disconfirmability of
Trait Concepts, 50 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 131, 135 (1986) (studying the ease or
difficulty of disconfirming beliefs about an individual or group).
213 Fiske, supra note 18, at 129 (remarking that "[m]oderates rarely express open
hostility toward outgroups, but they may withhold basic liking and respect").
214 David A. Wilder & Vernon L. Allen, Group Membership and Preference for
Information About Others, 4 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 106, 109 (1978)
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rewards to members of their group and members of the other group, the most
common choice was to maximize the difference in rewards between the
members of each group, rather than selecting an egalitarian choice or a choice
that maximized the reward for the member of their group.2 15 This is not to say,
always judge their own group more positively
of course, that all people21will
6
than the groups of others.
People's language about ingroup and outgroup behavior helps illustrate how
group bias functions. Positive behavior by a member of the ingroup tends to
be portrayed in broader more abstract, and general terms, such as "we are
diligent," whereas negative behavior is depicted as narrow and specific, "Mary
didn't finish her work." In contrast, the reverse tends to be true for positive
and negative behaviors by a member of the outgroup (for example, "Joe
finished his work on time," and "they are lazy"). 217 The more abstract
(showing these results in both competitive and noncompetitive group settings).
215 See Marilynn B. Brewer & Rupert J. Brown, IntergroupRelations, in 2 HANDBOOK OF
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 110, at 554, 567 (summarizing studies that show "a
reliable tendency to award more money to ingroup members than to outgroup members" and
to "maximize group differences" even when this "in absolute terms" made the ingroup
member worse off); see also Michael Billig & Henri Tajfel, Social Categorization and
Similarity in Intergroup Behavior, 3 EUR. J. SoC. PSYCHOL. 27, 37-48 (1973) (finding
subjects distributed more money to in-group members even when better alternatives existed
and subjects had no personal interest at stake). See generally Richard Y. Bourhis & Andr6
Gagnon, Social Orientationsin the Minimal Group Paradigm,in INTERGROUP PROCESSES,
supra note 127, at 89 (discussing extensive subsequent research expanding on Tajfel's
minimal group paradigm).
216 For example, some minority group members may "respond to discrimination and
prejudice by attempting to disassociate themselves from the group, even to the point of
adopting the majority's negative attitudes." Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 503 (1977)
(considering a claim that Mexican Americans were discriminated against during grand jury
selection). In a similar vein, when Justice Marshall was asked whether his replacement
should be an African American, he replied, "there's no difference between a white snake
and a black snake. They'll both bite." Justice Thurgood Marshall, Press Conference on
Supreme Court Retirement (June 28, 1991), quoted in Neil A. Lewis, Marshall Urges Bush
to Pick "the Best, " N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1991, at A8; see also Dasgupta, supra note 123,
148-150 (summarizing research on implicit majority group favoritism by minority groups);
Jost et al., supra note 175 (manuscript at 38-39) (contending that minorities will sometimes
favor the majority group, especially implicitly, in order to justify the existing social order).
Usually, however, own groups are judged more favorably. See generally Oliver C. S. Tzeng
& Jay W. Jackson, Effects of Contact, Conflict and Social Identity on Interethnic Group
Hostilities, 18 INT'L J. INTERCULTURAL REL. 259 (1994) (studying the effects of social
identity theory, which postulates that ingroup bias "is an omnipresent feature of intergroup
relations").
217 See Anne Maass et al., Language Use in Intergroup Contexts: The Linguistic
IntergroupBias, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 981, 983 (1989) [hereinafter Maass et
al., Language Use] (arguing that the storage of information at a higher level of abstraction is
more resistant to disconfirmation); Anne Maass et al., Linguistic IntergroupBias: Evidence
for In-Group- Protective Motivation, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 512, 512-14
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description allows people to apply an attribution to the whole group, whereas
the more specific description is applicable only to an individual.
It is hard to conclude that a person would have any invidious motivation
against someone where the only information she has is that the other person is
in group X, all by the determination of a coin toss. Rather, these biases appear
to develop not because of an invidious dislike of the outgroup, but rather
"because positive emotions such as admiration, sympathy, and trust are
reserved for the ingroup. ' '219 In addition, although these biases (if not their
causes) may be conscious, they are also implicit. 2 19 Psychologists have
concluded that this intergroup bias results virtually automatically and
220
concurrently with the very process of perceiving someone in a group.
Although perhaps some are surprised by these conclusions regarding group
bias, several studies support them by demonstrating how seemingly trivial
221
similarities affect people's significant life decisions.

(1996) [hereinafter Maass et al., Linguistic Intergroup Bias] (concluding that the study
supported the hypothesis "that positive in-group and negative out-group behaviors are
described more abstractly than are negative in-group and positive out-group behaviors").
218 Marilynn B. Brewer, The Psychology of Prejudice:Ingroup Love or Outgroup Hate?,
55 J. Soc. ISSUES 429, 438 (1999) (observing that ingroup favoritism precipitates racism);
see also Brewer & Brown, supra note 215, at 559 (describing empirical evidence showing
that ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation are independent phenomena).
219 See Leslie Ashburn-Nardo et al., Implicit Associations as the Seeds of Intergroup
Bias: How Easily Do They Take Root?, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 789, 797
(2001) (concluding that "intergroup bias emerges at the implicit level, without people's
intent or conscious awareness"); Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Implicit Partisanship:Taking
Sides for no Reason, 83 J.PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 367, 377 (2002) (studying
implicit partisanship); see also Sabine Otten & Dirk Wentura, About the Impact of
Automaticity in the Minimal Group Paradigm:Evidence From Affective Priming Tasks, 29
EUR. J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 1049, 1065-68 (1999) ("There is firm evidence that a minimal social
categorization is already sufficient to automatically activate positive attitudes towards the
self-inducing category and negative or rather neutral attitudes towards the other (non-self)
category.").
220 See, e.g., Fiske, supra note 110, at 367 (asserting that this automatic categorization
"saves cognitive resources"); Gaertner & Dovidio, supra note 114, at 85 (describing
intergroup bias as "an indirect attitudinal process"); Taylor & Crocker, supra note 160, at
101 (citing data showing that information that conforms to a schema will be processed more
quickly than information that does not).
221 Pelham and colleagues summarize a series of studies based on the "name letter
effect," which is the finding that people tend to prefer letters that appear in their own names
(especially the first letter) over other letters. See Pelham et al., supra note 68, at 470. These
studies demonstrated that people are more likely to live in a place with a name that
resembles their own first or last names than chance would predict (for example, people
named Jack are more likely to live in Jacksonville). Id. at 471. Other studies suggested that
people are more likely to choose occupations that resemble their names (for example, there
are more lawyers named Lawrence, dentists named Dennis, and geoscientists named George
than chance would predict). Id. at 478-80. Similar behavioral effects have been found

2005]

BA TSON 'S BLIND-SPOT

Illusory and Other Inaccurate Correlations
Another cognitive process that can lead to the formation of stereotypes,
particularly those with negative implications, is referred to as an "illusory
correlation." This occurs when people mistakenly believe that two things are
2.

correlated, either more than they actually are correlated or when they are
actually negatively correlated. 222 In the interpersonal context, people create
stereotypes when an attribute is incorrectly associated with a social category.
People appear particularly prone to an "overestimation of the relative degree
of association between an infrequent category of behavior and a minority
group. 223 Psychologists David Hamilton and Robert Gifford demonstrated
this effect in an influential 1976 study. 224 In their study, participants read
descriptions of behaviors of two artificial groups, both of which had an
approximate two to one ratio of positive to negative behaviors. 225 One group,
however, was twice as large and had twice as many total behaviors listed as the
other group. 226 The results showed that people considerably overestimated the
performance of negative behaviors by the smaller group and rated the members
of the smaller group less favorably. 227 The authors of the study explained that
the co-occurrence of two infrequently occurring stimulus items were more

based on people's preference for their own birthdays. See Dale T. Miller et al., Minimal
Conditions for the Creation of a Unit Relationship: The Social Bond Between
Birthdaymates, 28 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 475, 479-80 (1998) (demonstrating that
individuals cooperate more with others who share their birthday, even though there are no
other perceived similarities). I am perhaps an extreme example of this - my wife and I are
birthdaymates.
222 See Loren J. Chapman, Illusory Correlation in ObservationalReport, 6 J.VERBAL
LEARNING & VERBAL BEHAV. 151, 151 (1967) (defining "illusory correlation" as "the report
by observers of a correlation between two classes of events which, in reality, (a) are not
correlated, or (b) are correlated to a lesser extent than reported, or (c) are correlated in the
opposite direction from that which is reported"). Illusory correlation has also been viewed
more narrowly as the finding of "causal patterns and relationships in matters that are the
product of random chance." Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and
Decision Making in Legal Scholarship:A LiteratureReview, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499, 1502
(1998).
223 Sharon Shavitt et al., Broadeningthe Conditionsfor Illusory CorrelationFormation:
Implicationsfor Judging Minority Groups, 21 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 263, 263
(1999) (citing the studies by Chapman, supra note 222, and Hamilton & Gifford, infra note
224).
224 See David L. Hamilton & Robert K. Gifford, Illusory Correlationin Interpersonal
Perception: A Cognitive Basis of Stereotypic Judgments, 12 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 392, 405-06 (1976) (concluding that "distortions in judgment can result from the
cognitive mechanisms involved in processing information about co-occurring events").
225 Id. at 394-95 (using "27 moderately desirable and 12 moderately undesirable"
behavior descriptions).

226 Id. (assigning twenty-six members and traits to group A and thirteen to group B).
227 Id. at 396-99.
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noticeable and attracted more attention in the smaller group; thus these items
228
were remembered as occurring much more frequently than they actually did.

Because minority group members are salient,229 and negative behaviors are
less common and tend to be more salient than those that are positive, 230 people
can create an "illusory correlation," or stereotype, between minority groups
and negative behaviors. 23 1 The empirical finding that increased contact
between groups can reduce intergroup bias by increasing the information
known about those other group supports this notion. 232 These types of illusory
228

Id. at 405. Others have argued that illusory correlations result simply from social

categorization. See Thorsten Meiser & Miles Hewstone, Crossed CategorizationEffects on
the Formation of Illusory Correlations, 31 EUR. J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 443, 446-47 (2001)
(reviewing studies supporting and opposing this argument). In other words, the mere
placement of people in groups causes the perceiver to look for evidence of group
differentiation. See id.
229 In one sense, minority group members are salient by definition, as there always exists
the more familiar majority.
230 See Felicia Pratto & Oliver P. John, Automatic Vigilance: The Attention-Grabbing
Power of Negative Social Information, 61 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 380, 381
(1991) (reconfirming that negative traits attract more attention than positive traits). Experts
attribute this phenomenon to the smaller number of negative behaviors compared to positive
behaviors, and to "automatic vigilance, a mechanism that serves to direct attentional
capacity to undesirable stimuli." Id. at 380. Something that is negative is more likely to be
associated with a threat and thus requires more and quicker conscious attention. See
generally Christine H. Hansen & Ranald D. Hansen, Finding the Face in the Crowd: An
Anger Superiority Effect, 54 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 917 (1988) (studying the
effect of positive and negative facial expressions on a person's ability to detect certain
faces). An angry face is more likely to be a threat than a face with any other expression.
See id. at 922-23 (finding that angry faces are detected faster than happy or neutral faces);
see also Kurt Hugenberg & Galen V. Bodenhausen, Ambiguity In Social Categorization:
The Role of Prejudice and FacialAffect in Race Categorization,15 PSYCHOL. Sci. 342, 34245 (2004) (finding that racially ambiguous faces are more likely to be characterized as black
when presenting angry facial expressions than when presenting happy expressions).
231 See SCHAUER, supra note 186, at 179-80 ("Because race is salient for most people,
they are consequently likely to amplify the extent to which members of a race other than
their own are represented in a larger population with negative attributes, such as the
population of apprehended drug couriers, just because the observer is likely to focus more
on the 'out group' members of that population, and consequently take those 'out group'
members as being more representative of the group than they in fact are."); Mark Schaller,
Social Categorization and the Formation of Group Stereotypes: Further Evidence for
Biased Information Processing in the Perception of Group-BehaviorCorrelations,21 EUR.
J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 25, 32-34 (1991) (showing an "illusory group-behavior correlation").
This can also be seen as a result of the "availability heuristic." See RICHARD H. THALER,
QUASI RATIONAL ECONOMICS 152 (1991)

(stating that "[w]hen using the availability

heuristic people estimate the frequency of a class by the ease with which they can recall
specific instances in that class" (citation omitted)).
232 See Thomas F. Pettigrew & Linda R. Tropp, Does Intergroup Contact Reduce
Prejudice? Recent Meta-Analytic Findings, in REDUCING PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION
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correlations have proved very easy to create in the laboratory, 233 and have been
extended to other contexts. 234
While the preceding discussion refers to research subjects' conscious
detection of relationships (correlations) that do not exist, subjects can also
unconsciously detect relationships. The unconscious detection of relationships
can be surprisingly good. 235
Studies have also demonstrated that

93, 98 (Stuart Oskamp ed., 2000) (concluding, based on a meta-analysis of 203 studies, that
"intergroup contact generally does relate negatively to prejudice"); see also Samuel L.
Gaertner et al., The Contact Hypothesis: The Role of a Common Ingroup Identity on
Reducing Intergroup Bias, 25 SMALL GROUP RES. 224, 242-46 (1994) (studying how contact
between groups reduced bias); Miles Hewstone, Contact and Categorization: Social
Psychological Interventions to Change Intergroup Relations, in STEREOTYPES AND
STEREOTYPING 323, 327-43 (C. Neil Macrae et al. eds., 1996) (summarizing the main points
of the contact hypothesis and noting the importance of the quality of the contact). See
generally Walter G. Stephan, The Contact Hypothesis in Intergroup Relations, 9 GROUP
PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 13 (1987)

(tracing the development of the contact

hypothesis since the 1940s). Not surprisingly, unfavorable contact experience leads to even
higher in-group bias. See Tzeng & Jackson, supra note 216, at 259-60 (testing contact
theory across three ethnic samples).
233 See Brian Mullen & Craig Johnson, Distinctiveness-basedIllusory Correlationsand
Stereotyping: A Meta-analytic Integration, 29 BRIT. J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 11 (1990) (reviewing
hundreds of studies documenting illusory correlations); see also David L. Hamilton, Illusory
Correlation as a Basis for Stereotyping, in COGNITIVE PROCESSES, supra note 110, at 115,
131-137 (documenting multiple studies of illusory correlation); David L. Hamilton &
Steven J. Sherman, Perceiving Persons and Groups, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 336 (1996)
(analyzing numerous studies documenting how information is processed differently when an
impression is formed about an individual and a group).
234 See, e.g., Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, in
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 13, 37-38 (Cass Sunstein ed., 2000) (commenting that

legislation is affected by the overestimation of the frequency of salient events and the
underestimation of the frequency of low-salience events); Jon K. Maner et al., Sexually
Selective Cognition:Beauty Captures the Mind of the Beholder, 85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1107, 1113 (2003) (finding that "female attractiveness captures the initial
attention of both male and female observers" and can result in the overestimation of the
proportion of attractive women).
235 See WILSON, supra note 95, at 26 (stating that the unconscious is capable of learning
complex information, sometimes even faster than the conscious mind). See generally
Thomas Hill et al., Self-Perpetuating Development of Encoding Biases in Person
Perception, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 373 (1989)

[hereinafter Hill et al.,

Encoding Biases] (concluding that an individual's subconscious encoding processes are an
important factor which stimulates the self-perpetuation of biases); Thomas Hill et al., The
Role of Learned Inferential Encoding Rules in the Perception of Faces: Effects of
Nonconscious Self-Perpetuation of a Bias, 26 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 350 (1990)

(discussing how, in the context of perception of faces, inferential encoding rules based on
previous experience operate without the perceiver's conscious awareness); Pawel Lewicki et
al., Acquisition of Procedural Knowledge About a Pattern of Stimuli That Cannot Be
Articulated, 20 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 24 (1988) (determining that the human cognitive

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LA W RE VIE W

[Vol. 85:155

unconsciously detected correlations are capable of creating attitudes, and hence
236
stereotypes.
An unfortunate aspect of unconscious detection, however, is that the learned
patterns prove remarkably resistant to change. Once the unconscious has
detected an initial correlation, a person will continue to behave as though the
correlation exists long after it has disappeared. 23 7 In many situations, the
person will even behave as though the correlation has strengthened, even in the
presence of contradictory information. 238 This self-perpetuation of the
correlation occurs unconsciously, so that a person's behavior is the appropriate
measure of the correlation's strength; a person cannot consciously articulate
239
the reasons for his behavior.
James Hilton and William Von Hippel have argued that exposure to a few
stereotypic individuals is all that is required to form a stereotype and that once
formed, the stereotypes may then strengthen, even without supportive
evidence. 240 They note that because of stereotyping in the media 241 and
because of self-fulfilling prophecies, 242 "it seems highly like that there will
always be at least a few (actual or portrayed) stereotype-congruent individuals
' 243
available to initiate such self-perpetuating stereotypes.
system is able to memorize more information about encountered stimuli than can be
consciously processed).
236 See Michael A. Olson & Russell H. Fazio, Implicit Acquisition and Manifestation of
Classically ConditionedAttitudes, 20 Soc. COGNITION 89, 102 (2002) (suggesting that an
individual need not engage in conscious attitude construal in order to form attitudes, which
in turn can operate unconsciously).
237 See WILSON, supra note 95, at 53-54 (stating that "[a] disadvantage of a system that
processes information quickly and efficiently is that it is slow to respond to new,
contradictory information").
238 Id. at 54 ("[O1nce a correlation is learned, the nonconscious system tends to see it
where it does not exist, thereby becoming more convinced that the correlation is true."); Hill
et al., Encoding Biases, supra note 235, at 413-14 (finding that the strength of a bias
gradually increased even though there was no objective support for the bias).
239 One study deliberately used psychology professors, who researchers believed were
particularly sensitive about complex influences on their behavior. Even though the
researchers told the professors that the study involved nonconscious cognition, the
professors were unable to determine whether they had unconsciously learned the correlation.
See Lewicki et al., supra note 235, at 24 ("Subjects in this experiment were found to have
very little choice or influence over whether or not they learned the pattern and, after they
acquired some knowledge, whether or not to use this knowledge.").
240 James L. Hilton & William von Hippel, Stereotypes, 47 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 237,
245 (1996).
241See infra note 249 (discussing the effects that stereotyping in the media has on the
attitudes of both whites and blacks).
242 See infra notes 256-260 and accompanying text (describing how a person's
expectations can bring about the expected event).
243 Hilton & von Hippel, supra note 240, at 245 (explaining that subtle stereotyping in
the media and other places will assure that there will always be some "stereotype-congruent
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3. Social Origins
Of course, people may also form some stereotypes even before processing
(consciously or unconsciously) any data derived from one's direct experience
with others. Regardless of any motivation to discriminate, in an often-quoted
excerpt Howard J. Ehrlich observed that:
[S]tereotypes about ethnic groups appear as a part of the social heritage of
society. They are transmitted across generations as a component of the
accumulated knowledge of society. They are as true as tradition, and as
having
pervasive as folklore. No person can grow up in a society without
244
learned the stereotypes assigned to the major ethnic groups.
Scholars have made similar statements about gender stereotypes. 245 In
can be
either case, once people learn these associations, their frequency
246
exaggerated, and the stereotypes thereby become self-reinforcing.
Stereotypes often arise developmentally, 247 and at an early age. 248 People
learn stereotypes not only from direct contact with the members of the
categorized group, but also from parents, peer groups, and the popular
media. 249 Children as young as three years old have already formed
individuals" from whom others can form "self-perpetuating stereotypes").
244 HOWARD J. EHRLICH, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PREJUDICE 35 (1973).

Ehrlich

observes that the argument that stereotypes are "based on properties of the target" is
"without empirical confirmation." Id.; see also ALLPORT, supra note 136, at 291-92 ("[W]e
must expect ethnic attitudes to be handed down from parent to child. So universal and
automatic is it that somehow heredity seems to be involved. Actually, the course of
transmission is one of... learning .. ");Lawrence, supra note 89, at 322 ("Americans
share a common historical and cultural heritage in which racism has played and still plays a
dominant role. Because of this shared experience, we also inevitably share many ideas,
attitudes, and beliefs that attach significance to an individual's race and induce negative
feelings and opinions about nonwhites. To the extent that this cultural belief system has
influenced all of us, we are all racists. At the same time, most of us are unaware of our
racism." (footnote omitted)).
245 E.g. EHRLICH, supra note 244, at 33-34 (citing evidence that stereotypes of women as
subordinate are prevalent in the United States).
246 See generally Olsen & Fazio, supra note 236 (concluding that attitudes can form
unconsciously through classical conditioning, even without any conscious consideration of
the attitude object or attitude toward it).
247 See Wilson et al., supra note 167, at 101-02 (discussing how stereotypes formed
during childhood remain latent and sometimes reappear automatically, even if they conflict
with explicit learned attitudes).
248 See Devine, supra note 159, at 6 (stating that "stereotypes are well established in
children's memories before children develop the cognitive ability and flexibility to question
or critically evaluate the stereotype's validity or acceptability").
249 See Frances E. Aboud & Maria Amato, Developmental and Socialization Influences
on Intergroup Bias, in INTERGROUP PROCESSES, supra note 127, at 65, 73-76 (parents and
peers); Leonard M. Baynes, White Out: The Absence and Stereotyping of People of Color by
the BroadcastNetworks in Prime Time EntertainmentProgramming,45 ARIZ.L. REV. 293,
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stereotypes. 250 These learned stereotypes become unconscious as a result of
their frequent presentation and, eventually, overlearning. 2 1 Even as people
later develop their non-prejudiced views, the original beliefs remain in the
252
unconscious, waiting to be activated.
4.

Resistance to Change: Subtyping and Self-fulfilling Prophecies

It seems relatively easy to maintain stereotypes, even in the presence of
contradictory data. The relationship between the attributes of a member of a
stereotyped group and the attributes of the stereotype itself are relatively
flexible. Put another way, "data are more likely to be assimilated to the
253
stereotype than the stereotype is likely to accommodate to the data .... Even if the data cannot be assimilated because they do not conform to the
254
stereotype, the subconscious can create subtypes to preserve the stereotype.

304 (2003) (explaining that both the absence of and stereotyping of minorities in the media
affect attitudes that whites and minorities have toward minorities); Devine et al., supra note
127, at 200-01 (media); see also Elizabeth A. Phelps et al., Performance on Indirect
Measures of Race Evaluation Predicts Amygdala Activation, 12 J. COGNITIVE
NEUROSCIENCE 729, 734 (2000) (suggesting that biased cultural learning and evaluation is
based on types of brain activity). Recently, there have been complaints of "subtle" and
"insidious" racial stereotyping in video games. See Michel Marriott, The Color of Mayhem,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2004, at El. In general, people tend to agree on the content of many
of the stereotypes of most major social groups. See Devine & Elliot, supra note 180, at
1145-46 (concluding that there is a clear and highly negative contemporary black
stereotype, but also that there is a contrasting positive stereotype).
250 Aboud & Amato, supra note 249, at 69-70 (reviewing studies).
251 See John F. Dovidio, On the Nature of ContemporaryPrejudice: The Third Wave, 57
J. SOCIAL ISSUES 829, 839 (2001); Patricia G. Devine et al, Breaking the PrejudiceHabit:
Progress and Obstacles, in REDUCING PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION, supra note 232, at

185, 192 ("Although prejudice reduction is not easy and clearly requires effort, time, and
practice, prejudice appears to be a habit that can be broken").
252 See Wilson et al., supra note 167, at 103-04 (hypothesizing that unconscious implicit
attitudes can coexist with learned explicit attitudes, but that implicit attitudes may still
uncontrollably override explicit attitudes in certain situations); see also supra notes 179-183
and accompanying text (explaining that most Americans are aware of negative stereotypes
of blacks and that these stereotypes are frequently activated, despite professed personal
beliefs that are more positive).
253 BARONE ET AL., supra note 158, at 190 (declaring that an individual will seek to prove

that a target conforms to a predetermined stereotype rather than to create a new schema); see
also Denise Sekaquaptewa & Penelope Espinoza, Biased Processing of StereotypeIncongruency is Greaterfor Low than High Status Groups, 40 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 128, 128 (2004) ("Research in social cognition has documented several
information processing biases in response to expectancy violation or stereotype
inconsistency .... ").
254 See Lucy Johnston & Miles Hewstone, Cognitive Models of Stereotype Change, 28 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 360, 363 (1992) (defining the subtyping model as one where

"extremely disconfirming members" of a minority subgroup are isolated so that the group

2005]

BA TSON'S BLIND-SPOT

In essence, if there is a member of a category that is atypical of the category
(for example, an effusive engineer), then a person may create a new
subordinate category instead of altering her perception of the stereotype. A
commonly used illustration is the "black businessman" who is commonly
ascribed characteristics that "overlap very little with the global stereotype of
255
Blacks."
The process of subtyping leaves perceptions unchanged in the face of
incongruent information, and thus the overarching category remains
homogeneous. Subtyping helps explain the person who holds racist beliefs and
yet can sincerely say "some of my best friends are black." Positive attributes
of the friends do not necessarily affect the negative attributions made to the
racial group. The expectancy effect, behavioral confirmation effect, or selffulfilling prophecy occurs when the decision-maker's expectations
256
For example, in a famous
unconsciously brings about the event she expects.

stereotype remains intact and unchanged). See generally Zo Richards & Miles Hewstone,
Subtyping and Subgrouping: Processesfor the Prevention of and Promotion of Stereotype
Change, 5 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REv. 52 (2001) (discussing a number of
studies conducted on subtyping and subgrouping). Subtyping may not be useful if either the
person's behavior is too incongruent with the category, or a large amount of information is
known about the person. In such a situation individuation or personalization may occur.
This is illustrated by the story of a researcher interviewing girls with mothers that worked in
male-dominated occupations. See Rothbart, supra note 199, at 53-54. One girl, whose
mother was a cross-country truck driver, was asked whether women could be truck drivers.
Id. She replied no, and when asked about her own mother responded, "that is my mother,
that is not women." Id.; see also Laurie A. Rudman & Kimberly Fairchild, Reactions to
CounterstereotypicBehavior: The Role of Backlash in CulturalStereotype Maintenance, 87
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 157, 157-61 (2004) (concluding that targets may conform
to a stereotype to avoid backlash and social rejection for counterstereotypical behavior,
thereby reinforcing stereotypes in perceivers and the general culture).
255 Patricia G. Devine & Sara M. Baker, Measurement of Racial Stereotype Subtyping, 17
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 44, 48 (1991); see also Matthew Weeks & Michael
B. Lupfer, Complicating Race: The Relationship Between Prejudice,Race and Social Class
Categorizations,30 PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 972, 982 (2004) (finding that

race was more likely to "dominate[] the categorization of lower-class [b]lack[s]" than
middle-class blacks).
256 See generally Lee Jussim & Christopher Fleming, Self-Fulfilling Propheciesand the
Maintenance of Social Stereotypes: The Role of Dyadic Interactions and Social Forces, in
STEREOTYPES AND STEREOTYPING, supra note 232, at 161 (explaining that self-fulfilling
prophecies occur when people interpret, explain or remember others' behavior so as to
confirm their beliefs, even if those beliefs are erroneous and unsupported by objective
evidence). Of course, sometimes the effect occurs when people conform their behavior to
the expectancies of others. See Mark P. Zanna & Susan J. Pack, On the Self-Fulfilling
Nature of Apparent Sex Differences in Behavior, 11 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 583,
585-86, 589 (1975) (studying male and female behavioral responses to meeting a new friend
or potential date, and concluding that "female subjects presented themselves in ways that
conformed to the ideal stereotypes that desirable males held for women in general").
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experiment researchers told teachers that some students, actually selected at
random, were "bloomers" who would show dramatic increases in intelligence
over the year. 257 At the end of the year the bloomers performed better on
intelligence tests than the other students.2 58 Because nobody told the students
of their expected improvement, the researchers concluded that the teachers'
expectations and the way they behaved towards the students brought about the
expected effect.2 59 In this respect, researchers have found that self-fulfilling
260
prophecies can maintain stereotypes about both race and gender.
The example above describes how grouping can alter perception and result
in inaccurate stereotypes. Outside the laboratory, however, an experimenter
does not assign people to groups. Rather, an individual does the assigning. It
appears as though people assign other individuals to groups based on the most
salient aspects of the person being grouped. 261 When grouping, a person often

257

See ROBERT ROSENTHAL & LENORE JACOBSON, PYGMALION IN THE CLASSROOM:

TEACHER EXPECTATION AND PUPILS' INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT 174-76 (1968).
258

Id. Rosenthal and Fode had previously demonstrated a similar effect with rats. See

Robert Rosenthal & Kermit L. Fode, The Effect of Experimenter Bias on the Performanceof
the Albino Rat, 8 BEHAV. SCI. 183, 184-85 (1963). "Bright" rats learned to run mazes better
than "dull" rats, where the only difference between the two groups was the experimenters'
expectations. Id. at 188.
259 ROSENTHAL & JACOBSON, supra note 257, at 180 (speculating that the teachers may
have treated the "bloomer" group children in a more friendly and encouraging fashion,
which has been shown to improve intellectual performance). A similar self-fulfilling
prophecy operating at an unconscious level was found with respect to the treatment of boys
and girls in the classroom. See MYRA SADKER & DAVID SADKER, FAILING AT FAIRNESS:
How AMERICA'S SCHOOLS CHEAT GIRLS 42-76 (1994) (discussing how girls "receive less
time, less help, and fewer challenges" in school than boys, who are "reinforced for breaking
the rules ... [and] rewarded for grabbing more than their fair share of the teacher's time and
attention").
260 See generally Mark Snyder, On the Self-PerpetuatingNature of Social Stereotypes, in
COGNITIVE PROCESSES, supra note 110 (discussing studies which have shown how
stereotypes such as physical attractiveness, race, and sex roles may channel interaction
between a perceiver and target in a way that causes the target's behavior to conform to the
stereotype).
261 See Jason P. Mitchell et al., Contextual Variations in Implicit Evaluation, 132 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 455, 458 (2003) (presenting the results of experiments where
subject's attitudes changed depending on the most salient feature of the object under
observation). People also appear to assign themselves to groups. To test this hypothesis,
Steele and Aronson conducted an experiment in which they manipulated the salience of
African American identity by including a question about racial demographics on some, but
not all, pre-test questionnaires. See Claude M. Steele and Joshua Aronson, Stereotype
Threat and the Intellectual Test Performance of African Americans, 69 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 797, 806-08 (1995). The African American students asked the demographic
question, the higher salience condition, performed more poorly on the accompanying test of
verbal ability. Id. (showing that priming black participants with racial identity lowered their
performance on a difficult verbal test, even when the test was not presented as indicative of
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creates an image of the "typical" member of a group. 262 A new person is then
matched with the most accessible stereotype to determine how far apart (or
how different) the category and the person might be. 263 Salient aspects of the
person are most important in activating the relevant stereotype, 264 and race and
for a
gender (two categories that cannot constitutionally serve as a basis
265
peremptory challenge) are two of the most salient aspects of a person.
III.

STEREOTYPE ACTIVATION: How UNCONSCIOUS STEREOTYPING
INFLUENCES INFERENCE, JUDGMENT AND BEHAVIOR

A peremptory challenge results from the attorney's decision, often by the
"seat-of-the-pants," 266 that a potential juror would not be good her side at trial.
The challenge is unconstitutional if the lawyer purposefully discriminates on
the basis of the potential juror's race or gender, and, but for the potential
juror's race or gender, she would not have exercised the peremptory
challenge. 267
intellectual ability); see also Baca R. Levy, Improving Memory in Old Age Through Implicit
Self-Stereotyping, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1092, 1106 (1996) (demonstrating
how priming techniques can enhance the memory of older participants whose memory
capabilities have been affected by insidious stereotypes about aging); Margaret Shih et al.,
Stereotype Susceptibility: Identity Salience and Shifts in Quantitative Performance, 10
PSYCHOL. Sci. 80, 83 (1999) (concluding that a sociocultural group's performance on a
quantitative activity, such as a math test, can be negatively or positively affected based on
subtle activation of positive or negative stereotypes); Steven J.Spencer et al., Stereotype
Threat and Women's Math Performance, 35 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 4, 10-14

(1999) (showing that weaker female performance on a math test can be eradicated by
eliminating the applicability, and thus the salience, of gender stereotypes to the situation).
262 See Rosch, supra note 141, at 46 (explaining how humans categorize around
"perceptually salient points" such as color and form, and that these points form "cognitive
prototypes" for categories). This is generally known as the "prototype" model because it is
not necessary for the "typical" member of a group to actually exist. Another theory, the
"exemplar" model, posits that the image considered for comparison is an actual category
member. See Smith, supra note 163, at 391 (contrasting earlier abstract models of
categorization, where people store information about typical tendencies of a category, with
an "exemplar-based" model, where people store more specific information, such as details
of certain category members).
263 See Mitchell et al., supra note 261, at 460.
264 "Activating," rather than "selecting," is the correct term, as this process is not
conscious.
265 See sources cited infra note 286. Categorization of biracial people might be more
difficult than categorization of uniracial people. See Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, supranote
230, at 345 (finding that prejudiced subjects categorized facial expressions in a stereotypic
manner).
266 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 138 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting) (declaring that
preemptory challenges are based on "seat-of-the-pants instincts," which are stereotypical
and many times mistaken).
267 See supra Part I.C.3 (discussing purposeful discrimination in the Batson context and
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A challenge may, however, have been caused by a racial or gender-based
stereotype that affected the way the attorney (decision-maker) processed
information about the potential juror. In this case, the stereotype, or schema,
acted as an implicit theory that affected how the attorney perceived, registered,
stored, assigned meaning, and remembered information about the venire
person, all without the attorney's awareness or intention.2 68 Put slightly
differently, stereotypes can lead to a peremptory challenge by altering the way
an attorney unconsciously sees and uses information.2 69 "[Tlhe activated
stereotypic concepts serve to simplify and structure the process of social
perception by providing a ready-made framework for conceptualizing the
[other person] ."270
explaining tests applied by courts to determine whether a Batson violation has occurred,
including the "but-for" and "tainted view" approaches).
268 See Mahzarin R. Banaji et al., Implicit Stereotyping in Person Judgment, 65 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 272, 279-80 (1993) (discussing one of many ways in which
exposure to information can influence an individual's judgment of a target without that
individual's knowledge of the influence); John A. Bargh, The Automaticity of Everyday Life,
in THE AUTOMATICITY OF EVERYDAY LIFE: ADVANCES IN SOCIAL COGNITION 1, 1-2 (Robert

S. Wyer Jr. ed., 1997) (arguing that much of everyday life is driven by automatic cognitive
processing); Irene V. Blair & Mahzarin Banaji, Automatic and Controlled Processes in
Stereotype Priming, 70 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1142, 1158-59 (1996) (stating that
the "present research supports proposals that stereotypes operate in an automatic fashion");
Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer's Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to Disambiguate
Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1314, 1327-28
(2002) (finding that knowledge of the cultural stereotype depicting blacks as violent may
produce bias, and that even blacks may show this bias); Devine, supra note 159, at 15
(explaining that "automatically activated stereotype-congruent or prejudice-like responses"
can become independent of an individual's actual attitudes or beliefs and function
automatically, like a bad habit); Greenwald & Banaji, supra note 118, at 20 (writing that
"most social cognition occurs in the implicit mode"); Wittenbrink et al., supra note 134, at
271-73 (commenting that data show that implicit stereotypes and implicit prejudices exist).
269 See WILSON, supra note 95, at 22, 31 ("Some very important tasks that we usually
ascribe to consciousness can be performed nonconsciously, such as deciding what
"
information to pay attention to [and] interpreting and evaluating that information ....
Thus, the unconscious is "a spin doctor that interprets information outside of awareness.");
Bodenhausen & Macrae, supra note 156, at 20 (stating that the effects of automatic
stereotyping are "typically not consciously intended.., rather they arise spontaneously
because of basic properties of the human information processing system"); Jay J. J.
Christensen-Szalanski & Cynthia Fobian Willham, The Hindsight Bias: A Meta-analysis,48
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 147, 163-64 (1991) (suggesting
that cognitive factors rather than motivational factors may be the main cause of bias); Terry
Connolly & Edward W. Bukszar, Hindsight Bias: Self-Flattery or Cognitive Error, 3 J.
BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 205, 208-09 (1990) (supporting a cognitive rather than
motivation account of certain kinds of bias).
270 Galen V. Bodenhausen et al., Affective Influences on Stereotyping and Intergroup
Relations, in HANDBOOK OF AFFECT AND SOCIAL COGNITION 319, 331 (Joseph P. Forgas ed.,
2001).
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Moreover, the decision-maker will generally assume that her perception of
the world is its truthful representation, as opposed to a subjectively constructed
representation. 27' The automatic use of these stereotypes is not necessarily
related to whether the decision-maker consciously agrees or disagrees with the
particular stereotype. 272 "[S]cores of studies now support the essentially
273
automatic aspect of stereotyping."
The following section analyzes some cognitive means by which stereotypes
could lead to the biased exercise of a peremptory challenge. 274 "[P]eople's
perceptions are somewhere between usually and always filtered through their
own biases, prejudices, and preconceptions; they simply forget or
misremember what they saw. .... -271 Some psychological theories predict that
See Robert J. Robinson, Actual Versus Assumed Differences in Construal: "Naive
Realism" in Intergroup Perception and Conflict, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 404,
404-05 (1995) (describing people as "naive realists" for their tendency to "not fully
appreciate the subjective status of their own construals").
272 See Devine, supra note 159, at 15 (stating that "automatically activated stereotypecongruent or prejudice-like responses" can operate independently of an individual's current
attitudes and beliefs); Dovidio, supra note 168, at 535-36 (asserting that implicit and
negative racial attitudes held by whites may be unconscious and automatic); Fazio et al.,
supra note 134, at 1013 (concluding that there are truly non-prejudiced individuals, truly
prejudiced individuals, and individuals who make conscious efforts to inhibit and control
their automatically activated racial reaction); Greenwald, supra note 134, at 1464 (finding
that implicit attitudes can show up as judgments controlled by automatic evaluation, without
an individual's awareness). But see Kerry Kawakami et al., Racial Prejudice and
Stereotype Activation, 24 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 407, 413-14 (1998)
(finding some correspondence between automatic stereotyped responses and personal
agreement with the stereotypes).
273 Fiske, supra note 18, at 128; see also Tadesse Araya et al., Reducing Prejudice
Through Priming of Control-Related Words, 49 EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 222, 222 (2002)
(documenting extensive research showing that stereotypes can be spontaneously or
automatically activated); Blair & Banaji, supra note 268, at 1143 (asserting that "theories of
stereotyping generally hold that stereotype activation is an automatic process that operates
when the appropriate situational cue is present"); Irene V. Blair, supra note 118, at 243
(summarizing "impressive evidence for the automatic operation of stereotypes and
prejudice"); Fiske, supra note 110, at 364 ("According to current wisdom, automatic
categorization and automatic associations to categories are the major culprits in the
endurance of bias."); Tamara Towles-Schwen & Russell H. Fazio, Choosing Social
Situations: The Relation Between Automatically Activated Racial Attitudes and Anticipated
Comfort Interacting With African Americans, 29 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 170,
170 (2003) ("[A]utomatically activated attitudes and stereotypes can exert powerful effects
on judgments and behavior.") (citations omitted).
274 Stereotypes, caused by categorization, can of course lead to far worse consequences
than merely the unconstitutional use of a peremptory challenge. See, e.g., Miles Hewstone
et al., Intergroup Bias, 53 ANN. REv. PSYCHOL. 575, 594 (2002) (referring to ethnic
cleansing in Bosnia and genocide in Rwanda and asserting that "[slocial categorization
clearly contributes to the most extreme forms . . . of bias").
275 SCHAUER, supra note 186, at 94; see also Elizabeth F. Loftus et al., The Reality of
271
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unconscious bias is most likely to occur in ambiguous situations where it is
hard to determine conclusively what is or is not prejudiced. 276 The peremptory
challenge, where attorneys are legitimately allowed to use their nondiscriminatory hunches, or even exercise a challenge for no reason at all, is
precisely such an ambiguous situation.
Psychologists have shown that stereotypes influence the inferences that
people draw from another person's social behavior, including what the
person's behavior actually was, what stimulus the person responded to, and

why a person reacted the way he did.277 For the purposes of illustration, I have
occasionally used plausible examples to demonstrate how these processes

might work for jury selection. In each case, I have assumed that the attorney
exercising the peremptory challenge is a prosecutor with good intentions.
A.

Activation and Accessibility

A social schema helps identify or classify people and predict how they will
act or what they will be like. 278 The initial categorization occurs extremely

rapidly, in a matter of fractions of a second. 279 Once a person is initially
classified, the schema acts as an implicit and unconscious theory to be

Illusory Memories, in MEMORY DISTORTION: How MINDS, BRAINS, AND SOCIETIES
RECONSTRUCT THE PAST 47, 65-66 (Daniel Schacter ed., 1995) (stating that misinformation
can lead an individual to have false memories that the individual believes as much as
genuine memories).
276 Dovidio et al., supra note 24, at 145 (explaining how discrimination is likely to occur
when the appropriate behavior is not obvious or when the "aversive racist" can rationalize
the negative response on the basis of a factor other than race). On the other hand, in clearcut situations where a response is indisputably prejudiced, the actor will consciously avoid
the response in order to maintain her self-image as egalitarian and unprejudiced. Id.
277 See David Dunning & David A. Sherman, Stereotypes and Tacit Inference, 73 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 459, 459-461 (1997) (proposing that "stereotypes alter the
tacit inferences people make when comprehending descriptions of social behavior').
278 See supra notes 158-165 and accompanying text (explaining how social schemas
operate unconsciously to help a person efficiently organize and integrate new material into
familiar understanding).
279 See Banaji & Hardin, supra note 134, at 137 (implementing techniques designed to
assess the rapidity of automatic stereotype responses); Devine, supra note 159, at 7
(discussing the implications of automatic stereotype activation). It is worth noting that
unconscious processes can occur much more quickly than conscious processes. See DANIEL
M. WEGNER, THE ILLUSION OF CONSCIOUS WILL 56-58 (2002) (stating that whereas a
conscious response takes a half second or longer, a pre- or unconscious response can occur
in as little as a tenth of a second). Sometimes an attorney may be aware that he has made
his judgment quickly, even if he cannot explain why. See People v. Francisco C., No.
F034910, 2002 WL 110580, at *15 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 25, 2002) (affirming trial court's
acceptance of prosecutor's peremptory challenges, who when asked why he had eliminated
a Hispanic woman from the panel, said, "I don't have an explanation as to her.... In my
mind I eliminated her right off the bat").
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confirmed or rejected.
To determine whether a person falls into a particular category, in uncertain
situations decision-makers often use a "representativeness heuristic" to make
predictions and judgments. 28 1 The decision-maker unconsciously matches
salient attributes of a social schema with salient attributes of the person she is
decision-maker will
categorizing. 282 The closer the match, the more likely the
283
initially judge the person to be a member of the category.
The features decision-makers use to categorize others are those that are most
accessible, which tend to be those that have proved useful for understanding
Typically, the initial
and predicting behavior in similar situations. 284
categorization involves using salient visual cues. 285 Race, ethnicity, and
gender, because they are "visually accessible, culturally meaningful, and
2 86
interactionally relevant," are often the most salient features of a person.
280 See Susan T. Fiske et al., The Continuum Model: Ten Years Later, in DUAL-PROCESS
THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 231, 234 (Shelly Chaiken & Yaacov Trope eds., 1999)
("[O]nce perceivers categorize the encountered individual, they automatically tend to feel,
think, and behave toward that individual in the same way they tend to feel, think, and
behave toward members of that social category more generally .... ").
281Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Psychology of Prediction, 80 PSYCHOL.
REV. 237, 237 (1973).
282 Sometimes the most salient information is merely the information received first. See
S E. Asch, Forming Impressions of Personality, 41 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 258,
258-59 (1946) (demonstrating, in a classic study, that the overall evaluation of a person
depended upon the presentation order of traits on a list).
283 See Fiske et al., supra note 280, at 233-34 (proposing that certain categories, such as
gender and race, are available to perceivers instantaneously because they are so easily
applied to virtually every person in every encounter).
284 See Susan T. Fiske, supra note 110, at 375 (explaining that visual clues are "useful
categories" because they are "physically manifest," "socially functional," and "can shape
encounters from the outset").
285 Id. (observing that stereotypes can be triggered by visual and immediately accessible
clues).
286 See id.; see also Dovidio, supra note 24, at 158 (asserting that "race is a fundamental
type of social categorization"); John F. Dovidio et al., Racial Stereotypes: The Contents of
Their Cognitive Representations, 22 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 22, 32-33 (1986)
(investigating racial stereotypes and social cognition); Charles Stangor & James E. Lange,
Mental Representations of Social Groups: Advances in Understanding Stereotypes and
Stereotyping, in 26 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 357, 358 (Mark P.
Zanna ed., 1994) (stating that people use the "physically apparent social-category
memberships of others"); Taylor et al., supra note 146, at 779 (hypothesizing that people
would categorize others by "physical and social discriminators such as race and sex"). The
third commonly used category, in addition to race and sex, is age. See Fiske, supra note
110, at 375 (referring to race, sex and age as the "Top Three" in categorical stereotypes).
Race and gender have perhaps been made even more noticeable by virtue of
anti-discrimination and affirmative action laws. Even the prospect of being viewed as racist
or sexist may render these characteristics more salient, as it is notoriously difficult for

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85:155

Perceiving different races may even involve varying physiological responses
from parts of the brain.287 Using race or sex for the initial categorization is
likely particularly frequent in a situation like voir dire, where there is generally
little beyond race and sex on which an attorney could make an initial
categorization.
In addition, a decision-maker may increase her use of stereotypes if she is
strongly motivated to predict the behavior of a person. 288 Clearly, a zealous
advocate is likely to be strongly motivated to predict potential biases of a juror.
Researchers have also demonstrated that other factors that increase stereotype
2
use include "time pressure, need for closure, [and] moderate cognitive load.", 89
An interesting issue is how people categorize others who are salient in more
than one category, such as an African American woman. Here, it is clear that
290
contextual clues often help determine the type of schema that is activated.

people to consciously avoid thoughts. See generally Daniel M. Wegner et al., Paradoxical
Effects of Thought Suppression, 53 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5 (1987) (describing
subjects' unsuccessful attempts to suppress thoughts). In addition, people may find it
challenging to not think of others in terms of their social categories. There is a Saturday
Night Live skit in which an account executive becomes increasing frustrated - eventually
jumping out of a window - because he cannot determine the gender of a new employee.
Saturday Night Live (NBC television broadcast, Oct. 24, 1992).
287 See William A. Cunningham et al., SeparableNeural Components in the Processing
of Black and White Faces, 15 PSYCHOL. SCIENCE 806, 811 (2004) (finding greater
"amygdala activation for Black than White faces" and that the difference "was stronger the
higher the participants' racial bias on the [Implicit Association Test]"); Allen J. Hart et al.,
DifferentialResponse in the Human Amygdala to Racial Outgroup vs Ingroup Face Stimuli,
11 NEUROREPORT 2351, 2351 (2000) (finding that there is differential activation of the
amygdala, a major part of the limbic system that plays a key role in regulating emotion and
the development of memories, in response to pictures of people from other races); Phelps et
al., supra note 249, at 730-33 (correlating amygdalar activation of whites presented with
unfamiliar black faces with indirect, implicit measure of racial evaluation); see also
Elizabeth A. Phelps, Faces and Races in the Brain, 4 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 775, 775
(2001) (suggesting that faces of people of other races can differentially activate parts of the
perceiver's brain).
288 See generally Ziva Kunda & Steven J. Spencer, When Do Stereotypes Come to Mind
and When Do They Color Judgment? A Goal-Based Theoretical Frameworkfor Stereotype
Activation and Application, 129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 522, 529-30 (2003) (finding that a
stereotype may be prompted if it is necessary for an individual to predict another's attributes
or likely behavior).
289 Mary E. Wheeler & Susan T. Fiske, Controlling Racial Prejudice:Social Cognitive
Goals Affect Amygdala and Stereotype Activation, 16 PSYCHOL. SCIENCE (forthcoming
2005) (manuscript at 57, on file with the author) (finding that social goals affected
stereotyping).
290 See Mitchell et al., supra note 261, at 46 (demonstrating that both overt and subtle

contextual cues unconsciously affect whether race or gender based automatic attitudes are
activated). Furthermore, there is evidence that automatic prejudice against blacks may vary
somewhat based on the person's facial features. See Robert W. Livingston & Marilynn B.
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For example, a decision-maker is more likely to categorize an Asian female
performing a female stereotypic action, such as putting on lipstick, as a
"woman," and an Asian female performing an Asian stereotypic action, such as
eating with chop sticks, as "Asian. '291 In voir dire, however, there are likely to
be few additional contextual clues that could mediate the categorization.
As far back as 1954, researchers hypothesized that race- or sex-based
schemas could be activated automatically or unconsciously. 292 This was
conclusively demonstrated in 1989.293
In a ground-breaking study,

psychologist Patricia Devine showed that even the preconscious presentation
of racial material (material that is shown so quickly that the perceiver cannot
294
consciously register it) was sufficient to trigger the use of racial stereotypes.
Later research has demonstrated the same triggering effect for gender
295
stereotypes.

Those who are skeptical of the claim that race or sex will differentially
activate schemas may be even more surprised to learn that they subconsciously
Brewer, What Are We Really Priming? Cue-Based Versus Category-Based Processing of
Facial Stimuli, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 17 (2002) (concluding that

"affective responses to visual facial features occur at early automatic stages of processing,
independent of elicitation of category stereotypes"). The more "black" the features, such as
a broader nose or more pigmented skin, the greater the prejudice. Id. Similarly, the more
familiar the male or female name, such as Joe or Jennifer, the faster the automatic response
than with less familiar names such as Cole or Carly. See C. Neil Macrae et al., What's in a

Forename? Cue Familiarity and Stereotypical Thinking, 38 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc.

PSYCHOL. 186, 187-88 (2002) (hypothesizing that subjects would need less time to verify
the gender of a familiar forename than an unfamiliar forename).
291See C. Neil Macrae et al., The Dissection of Selection in Person Perception:
Inhibitory Processes in Social Stereotyping, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 397, 402-

05 (1995) (demonstrating how external factors influence various components of the
categorization process and allow a perceiver to choose among "competing superordinate
categories" to which a target belongs).
292 See ALLPORT, supra note 136, at 17-27.
293See generally Devine, supra note 159 (using three studies to test automatic processes
in prejudice).
294 Id. at 12 (finding that both high- and low-prejudice individuals produce stereotypic
responses when their ability to consciously monitor a stereotype activation is inhibited).
This is not to say that racial material will always prompt the automatic use of a categorybased stereotype. See Livingston & Brewer, supra note 290, at 15-16 (finding support for
the theory that an individual's automatic evaluation of a facial prime might reflect a
response to a perceptual cue rather than an evaluation of the racial category the cue
represents)..
295 See John A. Bargh, The Cognitive Monster: The Case Against the Controllability of
Automatic Stereotype Effects, in DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra

note 280, 361, 363 (discussing how later studies in automaticity demonstrated that gender
could trigger stereotype activation). See generally Phyllis A. Katz et al., GenderProcessing
and Person Perception, 8 Soc. COGNITION 186 (1990) (studying the effect of various factors
in processing gender information).
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activate behaviors as well.29 6 For example, researchers have demonstrated that
when an African American stereotype is activated, without the conscious
awareness of the subject, the subject is more likely to exhibit hostile nonverbal
actions. 297 A similar study has shown that when experimenters prompt
subjects with a stereotype of senior citizens, subjects will reduce their walking
speed. 298 In fact, stereotype activation affects "how polite, how rude, how
296 See Bargh, supra note 268, at 1-3; Mark Chen & John A. Bargh, Nonconscious
Behavioral Confirmation Processes: The Self-Fulfilling Consequences of Automatic
Stereotype Activation, 33 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 541, 545 (1997) (hypothesizing
that when an individual automatically activates a stereotype while perceiving another, it can
result in automatic behavioral tendencies that correspond with the stereotype); see also
Dasgupta, supra note 123, 151-57 (examining thirty-six studies showing links between
implicit attitudes and behavior toward outgroups, including groups defined by race, sex,
sexual orientation, age, and weight). See generally S. Christian Wheeler & Richard E.
Petty, The Effects of Stereotype Activation on Behavior: A Review of Possible Mechanisms,
127 PSYCHOL. BULL. 797 (2001) (comparing behavioral research on self- and otherstereotype activation). It may surprise some law professors that the activation of schemas
can also affect cognitive abilities. For example, subjects demonstrated better performance
on a test of general knowledge following the activation of a "university professor" schema
than following the activation of a "soccer hooligan" schema. See Ap J.Dijksterhuis & Ad
van Knippenberg, The Relation Between Perception and Behavior, or How to Win a Game
of Trivial Pursuit, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 865, 868, 873 (1998) (showing how
activating the mental representation of a social group can lead to behavior that coincides
with attributes of the stereotype, like intelligence or stupidity); see also Shih et al., supra
note 261, at 82 (reporting that performance on a mathematics exam can be affected by
manipulations of the salient stereotyped identity).
297 See John A. Bargh et al., Automaticity of Social Behavior: Direct Effects of Trait
Construct and Stereotype Activation on Action, 71 J.PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 230,
242 (1996) (demonstrating that a stereotype can cause behavior corresponding with the
stereotype, such as a hostile facial expression or tone of voice); Fazio et al., supra note 134,
1019-20 (finding the test subjects' behavior less friendly toward a black experimenter
following automatic stereotype activation). Implicit racial associations are in fact a better
predictor of whites' nonverbal behavior towards blacks than their explicit racial attitudes.
Dovidio et al., supra note 175, at 66 (finding implicit prejudice predicted whites' nonverbal
friendliness towards blacks). This might also contribute to a self-fulfilling prophecy. See
supra notes 256-260 and accompanying text. If someone is exhibiting hostile nonverbal
behaviors toward African Americans it is not surprising that the African Americans might
reciprocate. Accordingly, a lawyer questioning an African American venire member might
generate the hostile behavior that later causes her to challenge the venire member. See Dor&
Butler & Florence L. Geis, Nonverbal Affect Responses to Male and Female Leaders:
Implications for Leadership Evaluations, 58 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 48, 54, 57
(1990) (finding that female public speakers receive more negative nonverbal behavior from
the audience than male speakers, and that this can occur "without conscious awareness").
298 Bargh et al., supra note 297, at 237; cf Ap J.Dijksterhuis et al., Seeing One Thing
and Doing Another: Contrast Effects in Automatic Behavior, 75 J.PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 862, 866-67 (1998) (finding that elderly subjects primed with a stereotype about
the elderly, such as that elderly people are slow, contrasted their behavior away from the
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299
aggressive, how smart, or how dumb people appear."
A prosecutor will likely have a representative picture of a "good juror." She
will match and compare salient attributes of each potential jury member to
salient attributes of the "good juror." If, for example, the prosecutor envisions
that a "good juror" has the "moral courage to say that someone is guilty," those
potential jury members who have this feature will be more likely to be
categorized as good jurors.
This process is not conscious. 300 It is not clear which features might lead the
prosecutor to the conclusion that someone has "moral courage," and thus fits
the "good juror" schema. The prosecutor's representative picture of a "good
juror" might, for example, be based on an image of those jurors who had voted
to convict in the past. Her picture might also be based on an image of a white
juror or a male juror.30 1 The salient features of the schema, however, can
greatly impact the prosecutor's initial categorization, which is really an
implicit assessment of the person's suitability for the category.
The activation of the initial schema, or the priming of the initial theory, can
occur unconsciously. This initial theory acts like a hypothesis, deeply
mediating how people process additional information. Researchers have
frequently shown that a tentative hypothesis can bias judgment
and
302
decision-making, affecting nearly all aspects of cognitive functioning.

B.

Selective Search, Attention and Recall

Once a decision-maker has a tentative hypothesis about a person, she must
process information in order to support or reject the hypothesis. Keeping in
mind that our senses receive more than eleven million pieces of information
every second, and that the highest number of pieces that we can consciously
process is roughly forty, much of our information processing can and must
occur unconsciously. 30 3 Generally, our unconscious minds act as a filter to
stereotype and walked quickly down a hallway).
299 Kerry Kawakami et al., Automatic Stereotyping: Category, Trait, and Behavioral
Activations, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 3, 14 (2002).
300 More specifically, there may be a conscious process, but there will also be an
unconscious process.
301 To illustrate, picture in your mind a wise and just judge (not a specific judge you
know, or may have seen on television). I suspect that most people will at least initially
picture an elderly white male, as opposed to any other race or gender. Similarly, the default
schema for "person" tends to be a "white, heterosexual, able-bodied, youngish man." Fiske,
supra note 110, at 366.
302 See infra notes 306-321 (describing how decision-makers seek out data to confirm
their expectations and neglect to search for inconsistent data, which results in biased
conclusions and judgments).
303 WILSON, supra note 95, at 24. Researchers generated the figure of eleven million by
counting receptor cells of each sense organ. Id. Wilson notes that "[i]t would be terribly
wasteful to design a system with such incredible sensory acuity but very little capacity to
use the incoming information." Id.
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determine what information the brain will consciously address. 304 It is this
unconscious filter that allows us to hear our name when spoken across the
30 5
room at a cocktail party.
A decision-maker will usually attempt to evaluate an uncertain proposition,
such as "that juror should be challenged," by constructing a case to support the
proposition rather than by attempting to discredit it.30 6 Decision-makers will
tend to actively seek out data that confirms the theory 30 7 and neglect to search
for inconsistent information, even when given rewards for an accurate
assessment. 30 8 This "cognitive confirmation effect" 30 9 appears to apply to both
304 The modifier "generally" is necessary because we often choose - or attempt to choose
- what we do pay attention to, such as reading this article instead of noting smell,
temperatures, or sounds.
305 This "cocktail party effect," which is the recognition of information in an unattended
auditory channel, has been empirically tested. In practice, although it appears to function
roughly one third of the time, it clearly demonstrates the presence of an unconscious
See generally DONALD E. BROADBENT, PERCEPTION AND
monitoring system.
COMMUNICATION (1958); Barry Arons, A Review of the Cocktail Party Effect, J. AM. VOICE
1/O SOC'Y, July 1992, at 35, available at http://xenia.media.mit.edu/-barons/cocktail.html
(accessed Nov. 8, 2004).
306 See Hillel J. Einhorn & Robin M. Hogarth, Confidence in Judgment: Persistence of
the Illusion of Validity, 85 PSYCHOL. REV. 395, 397 (1978) (explaining the difficulty people
have in using "disconfirming information," or information gained by the nonoccurrence of
an action); Mark Snyder & Nancy Cantor, Testing Hypotheses About Other People: The Use
of HistoricalKnowledge, 15 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 148 (1979) (demonstrating
how a perceiver's expectations about a target's hostility caused the target to behave in a
more hostile manner than a target whose perceiver did not anticipate hostility); Yaacov
Trope & Erik P. Thompson, Lookingfor Truth in All the Wrong Places?Asymmetric Search
ofIndividuatingInformation About Stereotyped Group Members, 73 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 229, 239-40 (1997) (concluding that "category-based expectancies" influence
how perceivers encode, retrieve, integrate, and gather information because a perceiver's
processing is often biased toward confirming expectancies). This effect may be related to
the general dislike that people have for uncertainty. See THOMAS GILOVICH, How WE
KNow WHAT ISN'T So: THE FALLIBLITY OF HUMAN REASON IN EVERYDAY LIFE

9 (1991)

("Human nature abhors a lack of predictability and the absence of meaning."); Gideon
Keren & L6onie E.M. Gerritsen, On the Robustness and Possible Accounts of Ambiguity
Aversion, 103 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 149, 170 (1999) ("Uncertainty, in whatever form, is an
undesirable situation that... we try to reduce or minimize.").
307 See Lucy C. Johnston & C. Neil Macrae, Changing Social Stereotypes: The Case of
the Information Seeker, 24 EuR. J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 581, 587 (1994) (showing how subjects,
when given a choice over the amount and nature of information received about a group,
preferred stereotype-matching information).
308 See Galen V. Bodenhausen, Stereotypic Biases in Social Decision Making and
Memory: Testing Process Models of Stereotype Use, 55 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
726, 734 (1988) (finding that the activation of a stereotype results in more attention paid to
stereotype-consistent information than stereotype-inconsistent information); Mark Snyder &
William B. Swann, Jr., Hypothesis-Testing Processes in Social Interaction, 36 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC PSYCHOL. 1202, 1205 (1978) (finding that subjects focused on asking
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3 10
positively and negatively valued hypotheses.
The famous Wason card test demonstrates this effect. 31 1 It involves four
face-up cards, showing, for example, the letters E and K and the numbers 4 and
7. Participants are instructed to turn over those cards required to determine the
truth of the following hypothesis: if a card has a vowel on one side, then it has
an even number on the other side. Only a small percentage of participants get
the right answer, E and 7, with many of the remaining participants choosing E
and 4. Researchers interpret turning over the 4 as an example of trying to
confirm the accuracy of the hypothesis. 312 Failing to turn over the 7, the most
common error, represents a failure to try to disprove the hypothesis, since
turning over the 7 would prove the hypothesis false if there is a vowel on the
313
other side.

questions that confirmed the presence of a social trait).
309 See John M. Darley & Paget H. Gross, A Hypothesis-Confirming Bias in Labeling
Effects, 44 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 20, 20 (1983) (defining the "cognitive
confirmation effect" as an "expectancy-confirmation effect" that happens in the absence of
interaction between perceiver and target, due to the fact that perceivers selectively interpret
and recall aspects of the target's actions so as to confirm the perceiver's expectations). This
effect is similar to a self-fulfilling prophecy, see supra notes 256-260 and accompanying
text, except that it occurs when there is little or no interaction between the perceiver and the
perceived. Two individuals with different hypotheses can thus view an identical situation
and both find their contradictory hypotheses confirmed. In Darley & Gross's study subjects
watched a videotape of a child taking an academic test. See Darley & Gross, supra, at 22.
Those subjects who had been told the child was from a high socioeconomic background
rated the child's performance much higher than those who had been told she was from a low
socioeconomic background. Id. at 28. Subjects in both conditions referred to episodes from
the videotape to justify their judgment. Id. In addition, subjects who saw only
socioeconomic data and did not see a videotape tended to rate the child as average. Id.
310 See Douglas C. Strohmer et al., Personal Hypothesis Testing: The Role of
Consistency and Self-Schema, 35 J. COUNSELING PSYCHOL. 56, 63 (1988) (finding partial
support for the theory that individuals will evaluate themselves so as to match their own
self-evaluations; for example, an individual with a negative view of himself will evaluate
himself to confirm with that negative view and to disconfirm a positive view, and vice
versa).
311 See P. C. Wason, Reasoning, in NEW HORIZONS IN PSYCHOLOGY 135, 139-42 (Brian
M. Foss ed., 1966) (conducting various experiments to demonstrate that subjects sought out
only evidence to confirm their hypotheses and then announced the hypotheses as rules to see
if their hypotheses were correct).
312 See Joshua Klayman & Young-Won Ha, Confirmation, Disconfirmation, and
Information in Hypothesis Testing, 94 PSYCHOL. REV. 211, 213 (1987) (discussing Wason's
interpretation that subjects were "seeking confirmation" by predominantly looking for cases
that fit their hypotheses).
313 See Laurence Fiddick et al., No Interpretation Without Representation: The Role of
Domain-Specific Representations and Inferences in the Wason Selection Task, 77
COGN1r1ON 1, at 1 (2000) (commenting on how "the task is conceptually so simple"); see
also Klayman & Ha, supra note 312, at 222 (commenting on the tendency of research
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Interestingly, this is perhaps one cognitive bias of which the courts are
aware. Disparate questioning of the venire is sometimes used as evidence of
purposeful discrimination. 314 In Miller-El, the Supreme Court noted "that, if
the use of disparate questioning is determined by race at the outset, it is likely a
justification for a strike based on the resulting divergent views would be
pretextual. ' '315 Thus, if a prosecutor consciously or unconsciously expects that
black jurors will be against the death penalty, then she is more likely to ask
black venire members questions that would reveal their views on the death
penalty (or would be more likely to ask, if she were not aware of trial courts'

potential sensitivity to this factor).
Partially as a result of the cognitive confirmation effect, decision-makers
require less information to reach theory-confirming decisions than theorydisproving decisions, even when there is no objective basis for them to hold
the particular theory. 3 16
They may ignore or reinterpret inconsistent
information. 317 Not surprisingly, they may also reach such decisions more

subjects

to test hypotheses

through positive confirmation rather than negative

disconfirmation).
314 See Ex parte Pressley, 770 So. 2d 143, 146 (Ala. 2000) (stating that "disparate
examination of members of the venire" is one kind of evidence that a movant may use for a
Batson motion (quoting Ex Parte Branch, 526 So. 2d 609 (Ala. 1987))).
315Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 344 (2002). On remand the court of appeals
found that the record revealed that the disparate questioning was based "on the member's
views on capital punishment and not race." See Miller-El v. Dretke, 361 F.3d 849, 860 (5th
Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 124 S.Ct. 2908 (2004); see also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79,
97 (1985) ("[T]he prosecutor's questions... during voir dire examination... may support
or refute an inference of discriminatory purpose"); Devose v. Norris, 53 F.3d 201, 204-05
(8th Cir. 1995) (holding that the prosecutor's failure to apply the same criteria to strike both
black and white jurors was pretextual); Splunge v. Clarke, 960 F.2d 705, 708-09 (7th Cir.
1992) (asserting that non-black and black jurors who were asked the same questions and had
identical answers were treated differently); Norfolk S. Ry. v. Gideon, 676 So. 2d 310, 312
(Ala. 1996) (displaying that counsel's lack of adequate voir dire of a black juror led to a
failure to provide "legitimate race-neutral reasons for its strike"); Kaczamarek v. State, 91
P.3d 16, 30 (Nev. 2004) (finding no evidence of disparate questioning); State v. Lamon, 664
N.W.2d 607, 632 (Wis. 2003) (Abrahamson, C.J, dissenting) (stating that a circuit court
should examine the totality of the circumstances, including disparate questioning of venire
members).
316 Peter H. Ditto & David F. Lopez, Motivated Skepticism: Use of DifferentialDecision
Criteria for Preferred and Nonpreferred Conclusions,63 J.PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
568, 573 (1992); see also Rothbart & Park, supra note 212, at 135 (finding fewer instances
of behavior were required to confirm the attribution of a trait to a person than to disconfirm
the attribution); Trope & Thompson, supra note 306, at 232 (finding that subjects posed
fewer questions to those in groups about which they had strong stereotypes).
...See Susan T. Fiske et al., Category-Basedand Attribute-Based Reactions to Others:
Some Informational Conditions of Stereotyping and Individuating Processes, 23 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 399, 420 (1987) (finding that information that is inconsistent
with a certain category is often reinterpreted to fit into the established category); William B.
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quickly.3 18

A decision-maker often will also pay closer attention to, and thus register
theory-disproving
rather than
more
securely, 319 theory-confirming
"The knowledge stored in memory is one's cognitive
information. 320
representation of information that has been previously processed. 321 People
store information in many different and unequal ways. 32 2 The more visually
salient the information, the more likely people will encode and retain
information as a picture than as verbally encoded material. 323 People
Swann, Jr. & Mark Snyder, On TranslatingBeliefs into Action: Theories of Ability and
Their Application in an InstructionalSetting, 38 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 879, 884
(1980) (finding that individuals labeled as having low ability who outperformed individuals
labeled as having high ability were still perceived as having low ability, notwithstanding the
powerful contradictory evidence).
318 See B. Keith Payne, Prejudice andPerception: The Role ofAutomatic and Controlled
Processes in Misperceiving a Weapon, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 181, 190
(2001) (finding that people identified guns faster than tools when they had been shown
black faces rather than white faces, in both cases without their conscious awareness); see
also Correll et al., supra note 268, at 1325 (finding that in a video game participants would
shoot at an armed African American target more quickly than an armed Caucasian).
9 Because most peremptory challenges are exercised shortly after the relevant
information is received, the problem is usually one of roughly contemporaneous recall,
depending, of course, on when the other party makes its Batson motion. The difficulties of
inaccurate recall are likely to be greater as the time elapsed between event and recall
increase. Fortunately, this is not usually a problem with Batson inquiries, although it is not
unheard of. See State v. Marlowe, 89 S.W.3d 464, 469 (Mo. 2002) (stating that "post-hoc
justifications are irrelevant," as the "focus of the third stage is the plausibility of the
contemporaneous explanation"). But see Zachary R. Dowdy, Judge Must Explain an Old
Jury Choice, NEWSDAY, Jan. 28, 2004, at A22 (reporting the case of a prosecutor who had to
explain peremptory challenges from a twenty year old trial).
320 See David Hamilton et al., Stereotype-Based Expectancies: Effects on Information

Processingand Social Behavior,46 J. Soc. IssuEs 35, 37-39 (1990) (describing the effect of
pre-existing expectancies on information processing); Angelo J. Kinicki et al., Effects of
Category Prototypes on Performance-RatingAccuracy, 80 J.APPLIED PSYCHOL. 354, 36466 (1995) (explaining the affect of category activation on interpretation of results); see also
Charles Stangor & David McMillan, Memory for Expectancy-Congruent and ExpectancyIncongruentInformation:A Review ofthe Social and Social Developmental Literatures, 111
PSYCHOL. BULL. 42, 42-43 (1992) (describing a meta-analysis finding that expectancyinconsistent information is rarely remembered).
321 Steven J. Sherman et al., Social Inference and Social Memory: The Interplay Between
Systems, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 65, 74 (Michael A. Hogg & Joel
Cooper eds., 2003) (examining "several ways in which memory can guide and influence the
inferences we make").
322 See Donal E. Carlston & Eliot R. Smith, Principles of Mental Representation, in
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: HANDBOOK OF BASIC PRINCIPLES 184, 184-85 (E. Tory Higgins &

Arie W. Kruglanski eds., 1996).
323 Shelley E. Taylor & Susan T. Fiske, Salience, Attention, and Attribution: Top of the
Head Phenomena, in 11 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 249, 271-73
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remember information encoded as a picture more accurately and vividly,324 and
thus it has greater impact.
Thus, people will more readily recall behaviors and traits that confirm their
stereotypes than behaviors that either have no relation to or contradict the
stereotypes. As a result, once a person has been categorized into a group,
observers will tend to remember the person's behaviors that are associated with
that group. 325 For example, if an observer has categorized someone as a
lawyer, it will be easier to remember that she is articulate and was captain of
the debate team (and it may also be easier to remember that she is
argumentative). In addition, people perceive information that is more readily
recalled as more accurate, regardless of whether the information is in fact

objectively true. 326

(Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1978). The idea goes back to Lippman, who wrote that stereotypes
were "picture[s] ... we carry about in our heads." LIPPMAN, supra note 142, at 89.
324 See Taylor & Fiske, supra note 323, 271-73 ("subjects remembered the information
best 'seen' from their particular vantage point"). A picture may in fact be worth a thousand
words.
325 See Jack Fyock & Charles Stangor, The Role of Memory Biases in Stereotype
Maintenance,33 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 331, 339-40 (1994) (supporting the hypothesis that
people tend to more readily recall expectancy-confirming information about social groups
than expectancy-disconfirming information following a meta-analysis of twenty-six relevant
experiments); C. Neil Macrae et al., On the Regulation of Recollection: The Intentional
Forgettingof StereotypicalMemories, 72 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 709, 711 (1997)
(illustrating that stereotyping an individual facilitates finding stereotypical attributes in the
individual); C. Neil Macrae et al., Stereotypes as Energy-Saving Devices: A Peek Inside the
Cognitive Toolbox, 66 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 37 (1994) (showing the tendency
to remember traits of individuals who are placed in stereotype categories as opposed to
individuals not associated with a category); see also Myron Rothbart et al., Recall for
Confirming Events: Memory Processes and the Maintenance of Social Stereotypes, 15 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 343, 350 (1979) (discussing an experiment which showed
the effect of expectancy on categorization); Stangor & McMillan, supra note 320, at 42
(presenting a meta-analysis on "how social expectations influence when and
how.. information that is congruent or incongruent with expectations... is stored in, and
retrieved from, long-term memory"). See generally Hamilton & Sherman, supra note 148,
at 1 (reviewing studies conducted on social cognition). This result applies even when there
is no self-serving need for consistency. See James K. Beggan & Scott T. Allison, The
Landslide Victory That Wasn 't: The Bias Toward Consistency in Recall of Election Support,
23 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 669, 674-76 (1993) (finding a recall bias in a situation where
there was no implication for self-evaluation).
326 Norbert Schwartz et al., Ease of Retrieval as Information: Another Look at the
Availability Heuristic, 61 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 195, 196-97 (1991). In this
study, researchers asked test subjects to recall examples of their own assertive behavior. Id.
Those who were asked to recall only six examples judged themselves as higher in
assertiveness than those asked to recall twelve examples. Id. The authors concluded that
recalling six instances was significantly easier than recalling twelve instances because six
instances were more accessible in memory for most people. Id. The subjects saw the more
readily accessed memories as a better indicator of their underlying character, and judged
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In fact, people also create "memory illusions," in which they recall
stereotype-confirming behaviors that never actually transpired. 327 These
memory illusions do not mean that we are dishonest; rather, it just means that
we have innocently associated the categorized person with behaviors that
strongly resemble our expectations

of persons of that "type.

' 328

Not

surprisingly, people assume that they reached their conclusions about the
categorized person because of the "objective" evidence, rather than because of
their biased recall of information.
C.

Interpretationand Assigned Meaning: BiasedEvaluation
An activated schema, acting as an implicit hypothesis, affects how people

330
329
and thus may lead to inaccurate biased judgment.
interpret new stimuli,

themselves accordingly. Id. This impact was found notwithstanding that twice as many
instances of assertive behavior were recalled by those who judged themselves less assertive.
Id. The same effect occurred when researchers asked test subjects to recall unassertive
behaviors. Id.
327 See Tadesse Araya et al., Remembering Things That Never Occurred: The Effects of
To-Be-Forgotten Stereotypical Information, 50 EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 27, 27 (2003);
Nancy Cantor & Walter Mischel, Traits as Prototypes: Effects on Recognition Memory, 35
J.PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 38, 41-45 (1978) (describing an experiment that showed
the tendency to recall "nonpresented but conceptually related material as opposed to
nonpresented, unrelated material"); Alison P. Lenton et al., Illusions of Gender: Stereotypes
Evoke False Memories, 37 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 3, 5 (2001) (showing how
stereotypes exaggerate "stereotype-confirming cognitive tendencies" by "'adding' false
information"); C. Neil Macrae et al., Creating Memory Illusions: Expectancy-Based
Processingand the Generation of False Memories, 10 MEMORY 63 (2002) (examining the
methods of creating false memories). A close variant of this effect occurs when people
confuse what they inferred or imagined with what was actually presented. See Morgan P.
Slusher & Craig A. Anderson, When Reality Monitoring Fails: The Role of Imagination in
Stereotype Maintenance, 52 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 653, 658-60 (1987) (finding
that stereotyped traits and situations imagined about a target were confused with the
information actually presented about the target, leading participants to believe that the
reality matched the stereotype). The invention and subsequent recall of stereotypeconsistent information also occurs with physical objects. See William F. Brewer & James
C. Treyens, Role of Schemata in Memory for Places, 13 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207, 210-24
(1981) (finding that people told they were waiting in an office often recalled officeconsistent items such as books, which were really not there, and omitted items that were,
such as a skull). For a general discussion of stereotype-based memory distortions, see B.
Keith Payne et al., Memory Monitoring and the Control of Stereotype Distortion, 40 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 52, 52-62 (2004). Courts have occasionally accepted false
reasons for exercising a peremptory challenge. See sources cited supra note 73.
328 Nancy Cantor & Walter Mischel, Prototypicality and Personality: Effects on Free
Recall and PersonalityImpressions, 13 J. RES. PERSONALITY 187, 198-.201 (1979).
329 WILSON, supra note 95, at 53-54 (asserting that "we often unconsciously bend new
information to fit our preconceptions"); Russell H. Fazio, On the Automatic Activation of
Associated Evaluations. An Overview, 15 COGNITION & EMOTION 115, 129 (2001) (stating
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In essence, the schema is the structure through which people interpret

information. For example, here is a simple illustration from when I lived in
Thailand. Almost every morning I used to see a thin elderly man in the street,
begging for food. I knew he owned nothing besides his clothes, lived nearby
with a transient group of males, had never married, and had no living family. I
might have thought his life rather sad, had I not also known that he was a
Buddhist monk, and that begging for food was a religious practice. The fact
that he was a monk, however, affected my interpretation of all the other

information.
1.

Ambiguous Events

People interpret ambiguous events differently depending on which schemas
are activated.

For example, in one classic study experimenters activated a

"hostility" schema in subjects. 33 1 First, they subliminally presented to the
subjects words such as "hostile" and "insult.

' 332

Then they asked subjects to

interpret a number of ambiguous actions, such as a tenant refusing to pay rent
333

until repainting was completed or refusing to let a salesman enter the house.

Those subjects who had the activated hostility schema (even though they were
that automatically activated schemas can "determine how objects are construed"); Taylor &
Crocker, supra note 160, at 91 ("The schema provides hypotheses about incoming stimuli,
which include plans for interpreting and gathering schema-related information."); see also
Howard Lavine et al., Threat, Authoritarianism,and Voting: An Investigation of Personality
and Persuasion,25 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 337, 340 (1999) ("people's prior
attitudes can bias their judgments of the validity of attitude relevant information"); Charles
G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization:The Effects of PriorTheories
on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098, 2098,

2108 (1979) (examining the affects of existing impressions on interpreting data).
330 Joshua Correll et al., supra note 268, at 1319 (finding that subjects responded more
inaccurately to stereotype-inconsistent targets); Ap Dijksterhuis & Ad van Knippenberg,
The Knife That Cuts Both Ways: Facilitatedand Inhibited Access to Traits as a Result of
Stereotype Activation, 32 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL, 271, 273 (1996) (asserting that
"compared to the absence of a stereotype activation ... the activation of a stereotype may
enhance or reduce retrieval probabilities"); Payne, supra note 318, at 190 (demonstrating
how activating different schema influenced the test subjects' ability to accurately identify
tools).
331 John A. Bargh & Paula Pietromonaco, Automatic Information Processingand Social
Perception: The Influence of Trait Information Presented Outside of Conscious Awareness
on Impression Formation, 43 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 437, 439-48 (1982)
(describing the reaction of experiment subjects to a hostility schema). Traits other than
hostility also trigger these same results. See John A. Bargh, Does Subliminality Matter to
Social Psychology? Awareness of the Stimulus Versus Awareness of Its Influence, in
PERCEPTION WITHOUT AwARENESs: COGNITIVE, CLINICAL, AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES 237,

240 (Robert F. Bornstein & Thane S. Pittman eds., 1992) (looking at the effect of "priming
stimuli" on the interpretation of ambiguous relationships).
332 Bargh & Pietromonaco, supra note 331, at 441.
333 Id.
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not consciously aware of it) were more likely to judge the person performing
the ambiguous behaviors to be aggressive and antisocial. 334 These subjects
were also more likely to judge the person more negatively on traits unrelated to
335
hostility, such as intelligence.
These findings are "important not because of the subliminality per se but
because one cannot be aware of the influence of subliminally presented
stimulus.

' 336

The unconscious

affects judgment

without the

person's

awareness or control, and thus without any knowledge of the actual causes.
Experimenters have demonstrated this effect with respect to race, in that
people will assign different significance to identical actions depending on the
actors' race, 337 or depending on whether a racial stereotype has been
activated.338 Once a person has assigned meaning to a behavior, it is this
assigned meaning, rather than the raw stimulus, that the person will use in
making future judgments and predictions. 339 For example, an ambiguous
shove is remembered as either playful or violent rather than being remembered
as a shove. 340 People assume that their memories were "generated exclusively
by the objects or episodes they are remembering." 34 1 The impact of this
Id. at 446-47.
335 Id.
336 Bargh, supra note 331, at 237.
337 Joshua Correll et al., supra note 268, at 1325 (arguing that traits associated with
African Americans "can act as a schema to influence perceptions of an ambiguously
threatening target"); Birt L. Duncan, Differential Social Perception and Attribution of
Intergroup Violence: Testing the Lower Limits of Stereotyping of Blacks, 34 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 590, 596 (1976) (showing that differing perceptions of a given behavior
can depend on race); H. Andrew Sagar & Janet Ward Schofield, Racial and Behavioral
Cues in Black and White Children's Perceptions of Ambiguously Aggressive Acts, 39 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 590, 594-95 (1980) (finding that a black actor's behavior
was categorized as more threatening and less friendly that the identical actions performed by
a white actor); see also Kurt Hugenberg & Galen V. Bodenhausen, Facing Prejudice:
Implicit Prejudice and the Perception of FacialThreat, 14 PSYCHOL. Sci. 640, 640 (2003)
(demonstrating that people's implicit racial stereotypes influence their perceptions of facial
expressions). This effect has also been demonstrated with stereotypes other than race. See
Paul R. D'Agostino, The Encoding and Transfer of Stereotype-Driven Inferences, 18
SOCIAL COGNITION 281 (2000) (relating occupation to stereotypes); Darley & Gross, supra
note 309, at 20 (socioeconomic background).
338 Devine, supra note 159, at 11- 12 (finding that activating components of a stereotype
about blacks, such as laziness or poverty, would also activate other components of the
stereotype, such as hostility).
339 See Lee Ross et al., Social Explanation and Social Expectation: Effects of Real and
Hypothetical Explanations on Subjective Likelihood, 35 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
817, 827-28 (1977); Fiske, supra note 110, at 370-71.
340 See Duncan, supra note 337, 596-97 (finding that subjects recalled a black person
shoving someone as more violent than a white person performing the same action).
"' Daniel T. Gilbert et al., The Illusion of External Agency, 79 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 690, 698 (2000).
114
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encoding on future decisions grows as more time elapses between stimulus and
342
decision.
2.

Differential Criteria

In other situations, people will differentially weight criteria in order to reach
their unconsciously preferred outcome.
People will tend to evaluate
information that is consistent with their tentative theory less critically than
inconsistent information. 343 For example, in one recent study experimenters
344
asked subjects to assist with admissions decisions to their university.
Subjects gave weaker recommendations to black students who were strong on
one dimension but weak on another, such as high test scores but low grades,
than to comparable white students, because they would weight the dimensions
differently. 345 If the black student had weaker test scores, subjects would
weigh test scores more heavily, whereas if the white student had weaker test
scores, subjects would weigh grades more heavily. 346 Participants were not
347
aware of their bias.
Because people remember expectancy confirming events more easily than
disconfirming or irrelevant events, 348 the schema or stereotype is strengthened
even though the stereotype helped influence the encoding in the first place.
For example, a prosecutor looking for "deferential" jurors might interpret a
venire woman's words as "aggressive," but interpret the same words stated in
the same way by a man merely as "assertive," or perhaps not even notice the
words at all. 349 The prosecutor remembers this evaluation, rather than simply
342

See Thomas K. Srull & Robert S. Wyer, Jr., The Role of Category Accessibility in the

Interpretation of Information About Persons: Some Determinants and Implications, 37 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1660, 1661-62 (1979) (discussing the theory that "once a
concept is activated.., its relative accessibility is enhanced, and its likelihood of being used
to encode subsequent information increases").
141 See Ditto & Lopez, supra note 316, at 573 (finding that subjects were able to affirm
their tentative theories with consistent data more quickly than they could disconfirm such
theories with inconsistent data); Einhorn & Hogarth, supra note 306, at 397 (arguing that
people have difficulty making effective use of "disconfirming information"); Lord et al.,
supra note 329, at 2105-06 (concluding that acceptance of a study's findings depends much
more on whether the findings coincide with their "existing beliefs" as opposed to how the
study was performed).

31 See Gordon Hodson et al., Processes in Racial Discrimination:Differential Weighing
of ConflictingInformation, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 460, 464 (2002).
141 Id. at 467-68.
346 Id. at 469-70.
341 Id. at 460-61 (providing background information regarding aversive racism, the type
of racism examined in the study).
348 See supra notes 319-324 and accompanying text (describing situations where people
remember events that coincide with their expectations more easily than conflicting events).
341 See generally Monica Biernat et al., Judging and Behaving Towards Members of
Stereotyped Groups: A Shifting Standards Perspective, in INTERGROUP COGNITION AND
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the words themselves, and might therefore strike the woman from the venire.
But for the potential juror's gender, the prosecutor would not have exercised
the strike. A court in this situation, however, would be unlikely to find a
violation in step three of the Batson inquiry because the prosecutor would be
telling the truth about the reasons for her strike. She subjectively believes that
she struck the juror because she was too aggressive, which is a gender-neutral
reason. To the degree that people telling the truth appear credible, the judge
would likely uphold the strike.
3.

Attributing Cause

Attribution is "an inference about why an event occurred or about a person's
dispositions. '350 Our understanding about why an action occurred is often
critical to our judgment regarding its importance and its predictive value.
Attribution theories suggest that the causes of all human action may either be
internal (in the actor), external (the environment or situation), or a combination
of both.351 Furthermore, the cause may be stable or transitory. 352 People will
see and respond differently to results attributed to a person's enduring
character or dispositional factors than those same results ascribed to variable
situational factors. 353 Thus, we will view an investor that strikes it rich on the
INTERGROUP BEHAVIOR 151, 164 (Constantine Sedikides et al. eds., 1998) (finding that

equally assertive men and women are judged differently because of stereotype-based
shifting standards of evaluation, for example, people conclude she's "very good, for a
female"). The Supreme Court appears to be aware of the possibility of this phenomenon in
the employment context. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989)
(White, J., concurring) ("Thus, even if we knew that [the plaintiff] Hopkins had "personality
problems," this would not tell us that the partners who cast their evaluations of Hopkins in
sex-based terms would have criticized her as sharply (or criticized her at all) if she had been
a man.").
350 JOHN H. HARVEY & GIFFORD WEARY, PERSPECTIVES ON ATTRIBUTIONAL PROCESSES 6

(1981). For a general discussion of attribution theory in social psychology, see Daniel T.
Gilbert, OrdinaryPersonology, in 2 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 110, at
89.
351 See FRITZ HEIDER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS 146-59 (1958)
(discussing theories of attribution); see also Daniel T. Gilbert & David H. Silvera,

Overhelping, 70 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 678, 678 (1996) (examining the affects
of "overhelping" on a performer's confidence). People will make substantial dispositional
assumptions based solely on the appearance of the person being judged. HARRY C.
TRIANDIS, INTERPERSONAL BEHAVIOR 24, 106-14 (Lawrence S. Wrightsman ed., 1977)

(describing examples of situations in which a "person forms an impression of another and
acts according to this impression").
352 See HEIDER, supra note 351, at 153 (discussing attribution that evolves from

"fluctuating personal state[s]").
I" For example, those who do not believe that there is discrimination against blacks (a
situational factor) will assume that the results blacks achieve are attributable to their internal
characteristics (dispositional factors). See Lawrence, supra note 89, at 325 ("If there is no
discrimination, there is no need for a remedy; if blacks are being treated fairly yet remain at
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stock market, or a punter at the racetrack, as more likely to repeat if the gains
are ascribed to skill rather than luck. The more we attribute the cause to the
actor and to stable factors, the greater will be the perceived predictive value of
the action.354 There is such a robust tendency to overattribute other peoples'
behavior to stable, character factors that psychologists have called it
'355
"fundamental attribution error.
356
Overattribution is particularly common for stereotype-consistent events.
We are more likely to see events that confirm our expectations or fit our
schemas as having stable internal causes, and those events that clash with our
expectations as having fleeting situational causes. 357 We thus perceive
stereotype-consistent events as more useful for prediction.
An exception to the above error can occur when group identity is salient,
such as when there are only a few members of an outgroup. In this
circumstance people are more likely to attribute outgroup members' positive

the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder, only their own inferiority can explain their
subordinate position.")
35' Lee Ross, The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings: Distortions in the
Attribution Process,in COGNITIVE THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 337, 347-51 (Leonard
Berkowitz ed., 1978) (explaining fundamental attribution errors).
" Id.; see also Daniel T. Gilbert & Patrick S. Malone, The CorrespondenceBias, 117
PSYCHOL. BULL. 21, 21 (1995) (referring to this overattribution error as "one of the most
fundamental phenomena in social psychology"); Bertram F. Malle & Joshua Knobe, Which
Behaviors Do People Explain? A Basic Actor-ObserverAsymmetry, 72 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 288, 288 (1997) (observing that "many studies have shown that...
observers [prefer] person causes"); Yaacov Trope & Ruth Gaunt, ProcessingAlternative
Explanations of Behavior: Correctionor Integration?,79 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
344, 344 (2000) (asserting that "[florty years of social psychological research... have
provided considerable empirical support" for the fundamental attribution error).
356 See Fiske, supra note 110, at 369 ("By attributing stereotype-confirming information
to the underlying disposition of a person, the perceiver asserts that the stereotypic material
resides in the nature... of the target individual."); see also Susan K. Green et al., A General
Model of the Attribution Process, 6 BASIC & APPLIED PSYCHOL. 159, 159-61 (1985)
(proposing a model of attribution largely dependent on the salience of the schema and
whether the event is expected).
157 See Duncan, supra note 337, at 597 (comparing the likelihood of attributing violent
behavior to an individual's race when the individual was black as opposed to attributing the
same violent behavior to external factors when the individual was white); David L.
Hamilton, A Cognitive-Attributional Analysis of Stereotyping, in 12 ADVANCES IN
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 53, 65 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1979) ("[B]ehaviors
which confirm stereotypic expectations are attributed to the actor's dispositional
characteristics, but. . . behaviors inconsistent with one's stereotype tend to be attributed to
external factors."); Linda A. Jackson et al., Stereotype Effects on Attributions, Predictions,
and Evaluations: No Two Social Judgments are Quite Alike, 65 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 69, 69 (1993) (citing studies); Maass et al., supra note 205, at 512 (explaining
how an "in-group member may be described as 'hurting somebody,' whereas the out-group

member may be described as 'aggressive').
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actions to transient situational causes, thereby "explain[ing] away" such
actions, and their negative actions to stable dispositional causes. 358 The
359
reverse is true for people's attributions about ingroup members' actions.
This attribution bias may help explain the empirical finding that a demographic
similarity between juror and defendant affects how the juror evaluates the
defendant and how lenient the juror will be, at least when cases are weak or
rather than conscious
ambiguous. 360 It is often unconscious cognitive bias,
361
motivation or intent, that leads to this intergroup bias.
Thus a prosecutor may attribute different causes to the same event,
depending on the nature of the potential juror and the attorney exercising the
strike. A prosecutor who sees a potential juror with messy hair as similar to
herself may attribute the curious hairstyle to windy conditions (transient,
external) whereas if she sees the potential juror as dissimilar she may attribute
it to a slovenly character (stable, internal). Alternatively, if slovenly
appearance is linked to a stereotype then the prosecutor is also more likely to
358 See Thomas F. Pettigrew, The Ultimate Attribution Error: Extending Allport's

Cognitive Analysis of Prejudice, 5 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 461, 464-66
(1979); see also Fiske, supra note 110, at 369 (stating that people tend to explain
discrepancies by attributing them to situational factors); Maass et al., supra note 217, at 521
(observing that "participants did describe negative out-group behaviors more abstractly than
positive out-group behaviors"); Joseph G. Weber, The Nature of Ethnocentric Attribution
Bias: Ingroup Protection or Enhancement?, 30 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 482, 499
(1994) (stating that subjects "tended to explain outgroup positive behaviors more in terms of
external causes").
359 Our attribution bias in favor of ingroups and against outgroups is in many ways an
extension of our self-serving habit of crediting external causes for failure and internal causes
for success and a similar bias in favor of our friends. See Daniel T. Gilbert et al., Looking
Forwardto Looking Backward: The Misprediction of Regret, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 346, 349
(2004) (remarking that people "did not realize how readily they would absolve themselves
of responsibility for their disappointing outcomes"); Shelley E. Taylor & Judith Hall
Koivumaki, The Perception of Self and Others: Acquaintanceship, Affect, and ActorObserver Differences, 33 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 403, 404 (1976) (referring to a
positivity bias for intimate others). This self-serving attribution bias is so prevalent that it is
known as the "ultimate attribution error." Pettigrew, supra note 358, at 464 (relating the
"fundamental attribution error" to subjects views of their intimate others).
360 See Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury DecisionMaking: 45 Years on DeliberatingGroups,
7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & LAW 622, 674 (2001) (concluding that jury-defendant bias,
occurring across a number of studies and contexts, "appears to be a robust phenomenon");
Kerr et al., supra note 317, at 561 (finding that when evidence against the accused was so
strong the juror-defendant similarity and resulting leniency effect did not hold); David
Landy & Elliot Aronson, The Influence of Characterof the Criminal andHis Victim on the
Decision of Simulated Jurors, 5 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 141, 151 (1969) (finding

that jurors will be more lenient on defendants that they can identify with).
361 See Graham C. L. Davey, Preparednessand Phobias: Specific Evolved Associations
or a Generalized Expectancy Bias?, 18 BEHAV. & BRAIN Sci. 289, 296-97 (1995)
(proposing that cultural factors are also important in determining expectancy bias).
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make attributions to stable and internal causes. Naturally, if a "good juror" is a
well-groomed juror, then the slovenly person is more likely to be struck than
the person unluckily caught in the wind. The prosecutor will be completely
oblivious to the fact that a stereotype or similarity may have affected her
decision. Rather, because of the different causal attributions, she will see the
362
two potential jurors as not similarly situated.
In short, social psychological research strongly supports the conclusion that
"[t]he interpretation of a behavior in line with a chronically accessible or
primed social construct [e.g. a stereotype] is seen by the subject to be due to a
property of the behavior; there is no awareness of the interpretative work done
by the capturing construct . ,,363 When a lawyer sees a potential juror, she
will almost instantaneously categorize that person, likely on the basis of race or
sex. This categorization activates stereotypes, or schemas, so that the lawyer
will tentatively assign the attributes contained in the stereotype to the potential
juror. The lawyer will not necessarily be conscious of the stereotypes, or if she
is aware of them, she will not necessarily believe that they are true. She will,
however, search for, and pay greater attention to information that confirms her
expectations. She will encode the information in a different way, and recall it
more easily. She will also interpret ambiguous information to confirm the
expectancy.
If it is true, for example, that lawyers consciously or unconsciously know
that there is a perception that blacks are more likely to acquit defendants, 364 or
that women are more likely to convict in rape cases, 365 then this perception will
likely affect lawyers' initial expectations regardless of whether they believe the
perception is accurate. By the time the lawyer exercises the peremptory
challenge, stereotypes may have thoroughly affected her observation and
interpretation of the information upon which she makes her decision. 366 This
362 It is also worth noting that the common denominator of most theories in personality
analysis is that accurate dispositional assessment is extremely difficult and time consuming.
See generally RICHARD I. LANYON & LEONARD D. GOODSTEIN, PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT

(2d ed. 1982).
363 John A. Bargh, ConditionalAutomaticity: Varieties of Automatic Influence in Social
Perception and Cognition, in UNINTENDED THOUGHT, supra note 147, at 31-32 (emphasis

added).
4 See, e.g., Billy M. Turner et al., Race and PeremptoryChallenges During Voir Dire:

Do Prosecution and Defense Agree?, 14 J. CRIM. JUST. 61, 66-68 (1986) (finding that
prosecutors and criminal defense lawyers believed that black jurors are more likely to acquit
a criminal defendant).
365 See J.E.B. v. Ala. ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 149 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(referring to "a plethora of studies" that demonstrate "female jurors are somewhat more
likely to vote to convict than male jurors"); see also Jennifer McEwan, Decision Making in
Legal Settings, in BEHAVIOUR, CRIME AND LEGAL PROCESSES: A GUIDE FOR FORENSIC

PRACTITIONERS 111, 112 (James Maguire et al. eds., 2000) (stating "all-women juries are
more likely to convict for rape" when commenting on the effect of gender on the verdict).
366 The lawyer may still be acting in good faith, and have a race- and gender-neutral
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kind of peremptory challenge, although based on or resulting from race or
gender, is unlikely to be detected by the Batson procedure because the lawyer
would disclose her subjective truth, and presumably be credible.
D.

The Accuracy of Our Self-Awareness

Batson is based on the common-sense notion that we know why we do what
we do. In fact, it can almost be painful to think otherwise. 367 Psychologists
and philosophers, however, have challenged this notion.
Long before
psychology developed experiments by which to test this proposition,
Benedictus de Spinoza observed in 1677 that men's "opinion is made up of
consciousness of their own actions, and ignorance of the causes by which they
''368
are determined.

Based on recent studies, many have now concluded that "[tihe mind is a
system that produces appearances for its owner.... [The mind] leads us to
think that it causes its own actions ... it really doesn't know what causes its
own actions." 369 This more modem understanding is underpinned by the
knowledge that processes beyond our conscious awareness perform, at least
sometimes or at least in part, numerous critical cognitive tasks.370 These tasks
include "deciding what information to pay attention to, interpreting and

evaluating that information, learning new things, and setting goals for
ourselves." 37 1 Whereas Freud suggested that consciousness was merely the tip
of the iceberg, 372 modem research suggests that consciousness may in fact be
more akin to a "snowball on top of that iceberg. '373 In truth, people often do
not know the reasons for their own behavior.
The problem is that we do not see the intricate set of physical and mental

explanation.
367 See MARVIN MINSKY, THE SOCIETY OF MIND

306 (1985) ("[N]one of us enjoys the

thought that what we do depends on processes we do not know.").
368 BENEDICTUS DE SPINOZA, ETHICS 105 (G.H.R. Parkinson ed. & trans., Oxford Univ.

Press 2000) (1677).
369 WEGNER, supra note 279, at 28. Wegner in fact goes further, asserting that "in fact
the mind can't ever know itself well enough to be able to say what the causes of its actions
are." Id. (emphasis added).
370 See WILSON, supra note 95, at 23-24 (explaining that one characteristic of the
adaptive unconscious is that people do not know how it selects, interprets, and evaluates
information). It is perhaps easier to accept the critical role of the unconscious in cognitive
tasks when one considers the numerous other tasks performed by the unconscious. Id. One
of the most important involves the "sixth sense," proprioreception, or the way we know
what position our body parts are in. Id. at 19. The unconscious monitoring of these body
positions allows people to sit up, walk and run. Id.
37I Id.

at 22.

372 See SIGMUND FREUD, NEW INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON PSYCHOANALYSIS

(James Strachey ed. & trans., W.W. Norton & Co. 1965) (1933).
"' WILSON, supra note 95, at 6.
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374
processes, including psychological mechanisms, that determine our actions.
We often experience causation as "as a result of an interpretation of the
apparent link between the conscious thoughts that appear in association with
action and the nature of the observed action... [or] as the result of self375
perceived apparentmental causation.

In essence, we make a simple mistake of equating correlation with
causation. Rather than our conscious thought bringing about an observed
action, in some situations there will be an unconscious thought that leads to
both. Because (by definition) we are contemporaneously unaware of the
unconscious thought, we think it is the conscious thought that brought about
the action. Accordingly "we readily accept [this] far easier explanation of our
'
behavior: We intended to do it, so we did it. 376
Researchers have demonstrated this point in a study showing how people
may learn and act on information, but not know how or even what they have
learned. 377 The study involved a gambling game using one of four decks of
cards. 378 If played repeatedly, two of the four decks would result in small

374 Of course, the inability to understand our actions is not only a consciousness related
problem. Scholars also describe human judgment as a contributor. See, e.g., Amos Tversky
& Daniel Kahneman, Belief in the Law of Small Numbers, 76 PSYCHOL. BULL. 105, 108-09
(1971) (describing human judgment as indefensible and ludicrous). More recently, scholars
have described the ordinary person (and presumably the ordinary attorney) as oblivious,
ignorant and beset by misconceptions. See, e.g., LEE Ross & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE
PERSON AND THE SITUATION 124, 69, 86, 139 (1991) (asking "[h]ow could people be so
wrong... ?").
115 WEGNER,

supra note 279, at 65-66.

376 Id. at 27. Wegner goes on to note the application of science fiction writer Arthur C.

Clarke's insight that "any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic"
to self-perception. Id. (quoting ARTHUR C. CLARKE, PROFILES OF THE FUTURE: AN INQUIRY
INTO THE LIMITS OF THE POSSIBLE 21 (1973)).
When we turn our attention to our own minds, we are faced with trying to understand
an unimaginably advanced technology. We can't possibly know (let alone keep track
of) the tremendous... influences on our behavior because we inhabit an
extraordinarily complicated machine.... We believe in the magic of our own causal
agency.
Id. at 27-28. More importantly for the peremptory challenge, the Supreme Court appears to
believe in the magic of the striking attorney's causal agency.
377 See Antoine H. Bechara et al., Deciding Advantageously Before Knowing the
Advantageous Strategy, 275 SCIENCE 1293 (1997) (exhibiting behavior based on
nonconscious information before having conscious knowledge of the information). Thus,
people may learn stereotypes without knowing how they were learned the stereotype, or
knowing what stereotype they learned. Other examples of learning without knowledge
thereof include the well-proven cases of amnesiacs who learn new things, and of people
who act on suggestions received while under general anesthesia. See WILSON, supra note
95, at 25 (examining amnesiacs ability to learn unconsciously).
378 Bechara et al, supra note 377, at 1293 (explaining the rules of an experiment to show
the occurrence of nonconscious learning before conscious leaming).
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losses to the subject and two would result in small gains. 379 Participants
learned to select cards from the decks that would result in gains, but they were
not consciously aware that they were making a choice and that the choice was
informed. 380 At an unconscious level, however, the subjects' nervous system
"knew" what was occurring. Subjects' skin conductance response changed
when they considered choosing cards from the losing decks. 38' In this situation
at least, the unconscious learned well before the conscious mind knew what
382
was occurring.
In the above experiment, when asked "[t]ell me all you know about what is
going on in this game," subjects responded that "they did not have a clue" and
later that they had a "hunch. '383 The former answer is particularly unlikely in
the Batson inquiry, but lawyers have occasionally offered the latter answer as a
reason for striking a venire member. 384 The problem with the latter answer is
that although a hunch is facially race- or gender-neutral, but for the venire
member's race or gender there might have never been the hunch. Sometimes
in response to the judge's question, the lawyer "would be more honest to say,
385
'My decision was determined by internal forces I do not understand.'
in
The studies mentioned previously in which people's behaviors changed
386
If
direct response to subliminally primed stereotypes make the same point.
asked "why?" the actor would not know, or have access to, the real reason.
Posthypnotic suggestion demonstrates an extreme example of our inability
to pinpoint the reasons for our behavior. Posthypnotic suggestion occurs when
a hypnotized subject is instructed to do something ("clap your hands three
times and stand on one leg") after the hypnosis session has ended. 387 One
might think subjects, knowing that they had been hypnotized, would
reasonably assume that anything peculiar that they did could be attributed to
the hypnosis. Instead, subjects may go to astonishing lengths to explain their
behavior:
I tell a hypnotized subject that when he wakes he is to take a flower-pot
from the window, wrap it in a cloth, put it on the sofa and bow to it three
times. All of which he does. When he is asked for his reasons he answer,
'You know, when I woke and saw the flower-pot there I thought that as it
was rather cold the flower pot had better be warmed a little, or else the
379Id.
380 Id.
381 Id.

382 Id. (finding that some participants never consciously learned how the game worked,

but still made advantageous choices).
383 Id.

384 See sources cited supra note 97.
385 MINsKY, supra note 367, at 306.
386 See sources cited supra note 296 (discussing experiments on responses to subliminal

schema activation).
387 ALBERT MOLL, HYPNOTISM 72

(4th ed. 1898) (1889).
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plant would die. So I wrapped it in the cloth, and then I thought that as
the sofa was near the fire I would put the flower-pot on it; and I bowed
because I was pleased with myself for having such a bright idea.' He
added that he did not consider the proceeding foolish, [since] he had told
388
me his reasons for so acting.
Researchers have found similar effects in people with split-brains (where the
left and right hemispheres of the brain cannot communicate). In such patients,
the left half of the brain, which controls verbalization, will make up
explanations for actions controlled by the right half of the brain that cannot be
true, all without the patients' awareness.3 89 Certain kinds of amnesiacs do the
same thing.390
Of course, just because amnesiacs, players of a certain card game, splitbrain patients, those performing post-hypnotic suggestions, and others faced
with subliminal priming make up clearly false reasons for their behavior,
without any knowledge of their creativity, does not prove that everyone else
does as well. They do, however, illustrate the possibility dramatically, and
various cleverly designed studies have shown the effect, albeit somewhat more
subtly, among the rest of us.
Research demonstrates that people's ability to gauge the impact of different
stimuli, such as race or sex, on their behavior can be modest or minimal. 39 1
Subjects in numerous experiments could rarely state correctly which stimulus
led to which emotional response, but rather listed non-significant factors as
crucial and neglected to list significant factors. 392 The results of another

388 Id. at 170-71.

Moll notes that "when subjects [who have undergone hypnosis] are

questioned as to their motive they make different answers; they either believe that they have
so acted of their own accord, and invent reasons for their porceedings, or they say they felt
impelled to act so, or they only say, "It came into my head to do it." Id. at 171. An

alternative to giving a false causal explanation was for subjects to occasionally deny having
performed the behavior that they had just performed. Id. at 162-63.
389 See WILSON, supra note 95, at 95-97.
390 See OLIVER SACKS, THE MAN WHO MISTOOK HIs WIFE FOR A HAT AND OTHER

CLINICAL TALES 109 (1987) (stating that "[a]bysses of amnesia" were bridged by "fictions
of all kinds").
391See Daniel T. Gilbert et al., supra note 341, at 698 (stating that "people have little
appreciation for the ease with which internal processes can shape and reshape their
memories of an event").
392 Id. ("Numerous studies demonstrate the difficulty people encounter when trying to
identify the particular external event that caused an affective experience."); see WILSON,
supra note 95, at 97-104 (describing situations in which people might not accurately identify
what made them act a certain way); see also Donald G. Dutton & Arnold P. Aron, Some
Evidence for Heightened Sexual Attraction Under Conditions of High Anxiety, 30 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 510, 510-11 (1974) (evaluating the link between emotion
and sexual attraction); Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy D. Wilson, Telling More Than We
Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes, 84 PSYCHOL. REV. 231, 242 (1977)
(evaluating stimulus factors when asked to name particular types of consumer products);
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experiment showed that although subjects were undoubtedly organizing
information by means of sex and race, they plainly did not know that they were
393
using these attributes.
Researchers have argued that if people are asked to identify the reasons for
their decisions they merely produce seemingly plausible explanations for their
behavior, sometimes without introspection. 394 This is not to say that
introspection, the idea that we can determine our motives by thinking about
why we have done something, is necessarily helpful. 395 Introspection can, in
fact, increase inaccuracy. 396 For example, researchers asked college students
to consider and record the reasons their romantic relationships were proceeding
in a certain direction. 397 Compared to a control group, the introspecting
Paul Slovic & Sarah Lichtenstein, Comparison of Bayesian and Regression Approaches to
the Study of Information Processing in Judgment, 6 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM.
PERFORMANCE 649, 683-84 (1971) (reviewing studies which found "serious discrepancies"
between people's subjective assessment of why they reached judgments and the objective
factors); Timothy D. Wilson et al., Judging the Predictorsof One's Own Mood: Accuracy
and the Use of Shared Theories, 18 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 537, 540-41 (1982)

(evaluating subjects' ability to determine predictors of moods); Timothy D. Wilson &
Richard E. Nisbett, The Accuracy of Verbal Reports About the Effects of Stimuli on
Evaluations and Behavior, 41 Soc. PSYCHOL. 118, 119 (1978); Timothy D. Wilson &
Dolores Kraft, Why Do I Love Thee?: Effects of Repeated Introspections About a Dating
Relationship on Attitudes Towards the Relationship, 19 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.

BULL. 409, 409-11 (1993) (evaluating how people view their relationships).
313 Shelley E. Taylor, A Categorization Approach to Stereotyping, in COGNITIVE
PROCESSES, supra note 110, at 90-94 (illustrating two experiments where subjects
unconsciously used sex and race to organize information).
394 See WEGNER, supra note 279, at 146. See also E-mail from Dan Wegner, Professor
of Psychology, Harvard University, to Antony Page, Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana
University School of Law - Indianapolis (Nov. 19, 2004) (on file with author) (describing
an experiment where people attributed their thoughts to non-existent subliminal voices, and
assigned attributes to the (non-existent) voices).
395 See Wilson, supra note 130, at 133 (noting that "a fundamental problem [of
introspective reports] is whether participants have access to their thoughts and feelings")
(citations omitted). The assumption is almost as though the mind is a dark cave, and
introspection is a flashlight that can reveal the unconscious contents to consciousness. See
WILSON, supra note 95, at 160. One must merely aim the flashlight at whatever it is one
wishes to discover and it shall be illuminated. Id. To mix metaphors, in reality our minds
are "an inscrutable cauldron of mental activity." Timothy D. Wilson & Nancy Brekke,
Mental Contamination and Mental Correction: Unwanted Influences on Judgments and
Evaluations, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 117, 129 (1994).
396 From the perspective of a Batson inquiry, the only clearly demonstrable positive
impact of introspection is that it may actually increase guilt among those who consciously
believe themselves not to use stereotypes, perhaps resulting in increased cognitive effort to
reduce stereotype use. See Corrine I. Voils et al., Evidence of Prejudice-RelatedConflict
and Associated Affect Beyond the College Setting, 5 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL.
19, 30-31 (2002) (citing three studies concerning prejudice reduction hypotheses).
391 Wilson & Kraft, supra note 392, at 411-12 (explaining the methodology used for the
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students were less consistent, if not less accurate, about the state of their
relationships, at least based on their predictions of how long the relationships
would last.398 Experiments have also demonstrated that introspection reduces
the accuracy of people's predictions about their own actions, 399 affects their
post-choice satisfaction-levels, 4°° and inhibits people's ability to predict realworld occurrences. 4 1 Introspection also may reduce recall for certain kinds of
402
stimuli.
Judges expect self-knowledge or self-awareness when they ask lawyers why
they exercised peremptory challenges. 40 3 The prosecutor may answer x, y, or z
as the relevant reason for her peremptory challenge, without ever knowing that
the reason she interpreted x, y, or z negatively, remembers x, y, or z, or even
study).
398 Id. at 412-15. Feelings were also changed in that the introspecting students reported
more changes in happiness (both positive and negative). Id. at 415-16. That introspection
can change the underlying feelings was also demonstrated by a study in which the
accessibility of positive and negative attributes of a person was varied. See Timothy D.
Wilson et al., Effects of IntrospectingAbout Reasons: Inferring Attitudes from Accessible
Thoughts, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 16, 18-19, 24-26 (1995) (asking subjects to
relay their impressions of a target person, sometimes from memory, based on various
presented descriptions of that person). Subjects who then analyzed their thoughts about the
person reported more extreme evaluations than those who did not analyze their thoughts, but
still remembered the accessible attributes just as well. Id. (explaining that the subjects often
changed the way they thought about another person when their existing attitudes were
readily available in memory).
399 Timothy D. Wilson & Suzanne J. LaFleur, Knowing What You 'l Do: Effects of
Analyzing Reasons on Self-Prediction, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 21, 33 (1995).
400 See Timothy D. Wilson et al., IntrospectingAbout Reasons Can Reduce Post-Choice
Satisfaction, 19 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 331, 337 (1993) (arguing that
analyzing reasons can lead to post-choice dissatisfaction).
40 See Jamin B. Halberstadt & Gary M. Levine, Effects of Reasons Analysis on the
Accuracy of Predicting Basketball Games, 29 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 517, 525 (1999)
(explaining that analyzing reasons can impair accurate real-world predictions); see also
Timothy D. Wilson & Jonathan W. Schooler, Thinking Too Much: Introspection Can
Reduce the Quality of Preferences and Decisions, 60 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 181,
191 (1991) (finding that merely introspecting about one's reasoning could affect one's
future judgments negatively).
402 Jonathan W. Schooler & Tonya Y. Engstler-Schooler, Verbal Overshadowing of
Visual Memories: Some Things Are Better Left Unsaid, 22 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 36, 61
(1990) (demonstrating that verbalizing memories can in some situations impair subsequent
recall).
403 In one case the Supreme Court appeared to acknowledge the possibility of people's
lack of self-knowledge, but concludes that sincerity is an adequate safeguard. See Dennis v.
United States, 339 U.S. 162, 171 (1950) ("One may not know or altogether understand the
imponderables which cause one to think what he thinks, but surely one who is trying as an
honest man to live up to the sanctity of his oath is well qualified to say whether he has an
unbiased mind....")
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noticed x, y, or z in the first place is because of her own unconscious and the
potential juror's race or gender. An attorney may well in good faith think she
has identified her reasons, without knowing that her reasons were distorted by
her unconscious expectations. The decision-maker is not dishonest; she just
lacks adequate self-awareness.
It is worth stressing again that we are not consciously aware of our
misjudgment or guesswork. As a result, when the judge asks for an
explanation for a strike, the lawyer gives a plausible but invented reason. The
lawyer believes the reason, so she can hardly be said to be lying. She may, 40in4
fact, be very confident in her reasoning, regardless of its accuracy.
Similarly, since the lawyer actually believes the reason, she will presumably
appear credible, and thus have little difficulty surviving the third step of
40 5
Batson.
These results imply that few attorneys will always be able to correctly
identify the factor that caused them to strike or not strike a particular potential
juror. 40 6

The prosecutor may have actually struck on the basis of race or

gender, but she plausibly believes she was actually striking on the basis of a
race- or gender- neutral factor. Because a judge is unlikely to find pretext, the

peremptory challenge will have ultimately denied potential jurors their equal
protection rights.

404 WILSON, supra note 95, at 113 (arguing that we have a "misleading feel of
confidence" about our inaccurate judgments because we have access to large amounts of
internal information and believe we must be accurate even when we are not. Wilson refers
to this as the "illusion of authenticity").
405 See supra Part I.C.3 (explaining Batson's third step, where the trial court decides
whether the movant has proven "purposeful discrimination").
406 This invention - in subjective good faith - of explanations serves as a basis for
several psychological theories. The most important of these is Leon Festinger's cognitive
dissonance theory. He proposed simply that people will change or revise their attitudes to
justify their actions. LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 18-19 (1957)
(arguing that people attempt to reduce their internal dissonance by altering their thoughts to
relate to their actions). So, for example, a person that believes they have chosen to write an
essay arguing a particular perspective (or compensated a small amount for writing the essay)
will come to support the position more than another for whom choice was not emphasized
(or who was compensated a larger amount). Darwynn E. Linder et al., Decision Freedom as
a Determinant of the Role ofIncentive Magnitude in Attitude Change, 6 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 245, 245-46 (1967). Even in a situation where people state their beliefs
initially, their subsequent actions cannot only change those beliefs, but also their memories
of those initial beliefs. Those people who had written essays in the condition of perceived
choice (and low compensation) not only changed their beliefs but also claimed that their
beliefs were unchanged. See Daryl J. Bern & H. Keith McConnell, Testing the SelfPerception Explanation of Dissonance Phenomena: On the Salience of Pre-Manipulation

Attitudes, 14 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 23, 24, 28 (1970).
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WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?

40 7
As noted above, judges and scholars have strongly attacked Batson.

Many of these critics have also advanced various proposals to solve, or at least
reduce, the problems they perceive in Batson. This section evaluates various
proposals in light of the social psychology research described in the previous
40 8
two sections, and recommends solutions.
A.

Attorney Responses

There is a "near-perfect consensus" that stereotypes are "[a] sluggard's best
friend. '40 9 They have clear benefits, in the sense that they permit the decisionmaker to make rapid inferences 410 and reduce cognitive effort, 4 11 which can be
of critical importance in the stressful context of jury selection. "The ability to
understand new and unique individuals in terms of old and general beliefs is
certainly among the handiest tools in the social perceiver's kit. ' 4 12 On the
other hand, if the unconscious use of stereotypes violates potential jurors'
equal protection rights, then this negative factor outweighs the benefits of
using stereotypes. 4 13 In addition, decision-making on the basis of stereotypes
is morally undesirable for all attorneys who believe in egalitarian, nonprejudicial standards.
Independently of any legal changes to the Batson framework, an attorney
may (and hopefully will) thus want to eliminate any unconscious
407 See supra Part I.D.

408 Nearly all commentators agree that the equal protection framework on which Batson

is based either already addresses, or should address, unconscious bias. See discussion supra
note 89. If Batson does not address unconscious bias, the first requirement would be to
change the standard so that the question is not about the striking lawyer's subjective state of
mind but rather whether the race or gender of the juror made the difference in the exercise
of the strike. See discussion supra note 89.
409 Daniel T. Gilbert & J. Gregory Hixon, The Trouble of Thinking: Activation and
Application of Stereotypic Beliefs, 60 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 509, 509 (1991).
410 C. Neil Macrae et al., Activating Social Stereotypes: A FunctionalAnalysis, 30 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 370, 384 (1994).
411 Macrae et al., supra note 325, at 44 (demonstrating that participants who had a
stereotype available to facilitate information processing performed better on a concurrent
cognitive task than participants without the available stereotype). Interestingly, stereotypes
may help with the efficient processing of both congruent and incongruent information. See
Jeffrey W. Sherman et al., Stereotype Efficiency Reconsidered: Encoding Flexibility Under
Cognitive Load, 75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 589, 601 (1998).
412 Gilbert & Hixon, supra note 409, at 509.
413 Professor Johnson notes
[t]hat the defendant may not be able to prove on appeal that a prosecutor does not strike
white jurors for the stated reason does not mean that the ethical prosecutor is free to
strike for that reason; constitutional law is enforced through burdens of proof, but
constitutional obligations are not defined by them.
Johnson, supra note 52, at 502.
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4 14
discrimination in determining whether to exercise the peremptory challenge.
Non-use, however, is not necessarily easy. "[R]eviews of the literature reveal
reduce prejudice and discrimination have, at best, yielded
that attempts to 415
mixed findings."
In order to make any adjustments for unconscious stereotyping, the attorney
must first become aware that such stereotypes exist and that she may be using
them. 4 16 In this respect, it is interesting to note that the Implicit Association
Test4 17 has shown, based on over one million iterations, that "most Americans

414

See Margo J. Monteith, Self-Regulation of Prejudiced Responses: Implications for

Progress in Prejudice-Reduction Efforts, 65 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 469, 471
(1993) (demonstrating subjects' attempts to alter their own behavior when their past
behavior violates or is perceived to violate their subjectively held egalitarian beliefs). See
also Johnson, supra note 52, at 500-07 (setting forth steps for ethical prosecutors to take
before exercising a challenge).
415 Nilanjana Dasgupta & Anthony G. Greenwald, On the Malleability of Automatic
Attitudes: Combating Automatic Prejudice With Images of Admired and Disliked
Individuals, 81'J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 800, 800 (2001). See also Voils et al.,
supra note 396, at 30 (stating that "an implied goal of the hundreds of publications on
prejudice and stereotyping ... has been to understand how prejudice might be alleviated").
There are only two approaches to eliminating unconscious bias that will always be one
hundred percent effective. See Wilson & Brekke, supra note 395, at 134-36. In the
peremptory challenge context, the first approach would be to prevent the lawyer from
knowing the potential juror's race or gender. See discussion infra notes 514-517 and
accompanying text (discussing the use of blind questionnaires). A law school parallel is the
practice of blind grading. The second approach would be to eliminate any subjective
discretion, which in the context of the peremptory challenge appears impossible, short of its
elimination.
416 See Fritz Strack & Bettina Hannover, Awareness of Influence as a Preconditionfor
Implementing Correctional Goals, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ACTION: LINKING COGNITION

AND MOTIVATION TO BEHAVIOR 579, 579 (Peter M. Gollwitzer & John A. Bargh eds., 1996)
(explaining that people must be motivated to correct stereotypes, which requires that they
are aware of the stereotypes); see also Dovidio et al., supra note 24, at 154 ("Aversive
racists recognize that prejudice is bad, but they do not recognize that they are prejudiced.");
Bertram Gawronski et al., Implicit Bias in Impression Formation:Associations Influence the
Construal of Individuating Information, 33 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 573, 585 (2003)
(suggesting that teaching people about the effect of their potential unconscious stereotypes
may induce people to attempt to adjust for them); Timothy D. Wilson et al., Mental
Contaminationand the Debiasing Problem, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 185, 190 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002) (explaining that their

hunch is that people's default response is to assume that their judgments are unbiased and
observing "that people are more willing to attribute bias to other people's judgment than to
their own").
"I For a description of the test, see Anthony G. Greenwald et al., supra note 134, 146467.
Various
implicit
association
tests
(IATs)
can
be
found
at
https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/demo/selectatest.htm (accessed Nov. 6, 2004). The
IAT has been shown to be a significant predictor of discriminatory behaviors and
judgments. See Allen R. McConnell & Jill M. Liebold, Relations Among the Implicit
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'418

The data is more

have an automatic preference for white over black.

nuanced with respect to gender, but there is no shortage of evidence of
419
widespread implicit stereotypic beliefs about women.
Assuming an attorney is aware that her unconscious may be affecting her
behavior and that she is motivated to change, can she change? 420 If this article
were written ten years earlier, social psychology would probably have
answered "no. '42 1 Based on more recent research, however, the answer is
probably "yes, but not without struggle. '422 Several different strategies are
Association Test, DiscriminatoryBehavior, and Explicit Measures of Racial Attitudes, 37 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 435, 435 (2001) (conducting a study testing the legitimacy of
IATs for predicting behaviors). The IAT has also been shown to correlate with amygdalar
activation. See Phelps, supra note 249, at 5 (finding that the amygdala may be related to
unconscious responses to racial stimuli). Although there has been a "research explosion"
due to the IAT, there remains dispute over what, precisely, the test is actually measuring,
and whether the IAT actually distorts some findings. See Michael A. Olson & Russell H.
Fazio, Reducing the Influence of Extrapersonal Associations on the Implicit Association
Test: Personalizing the lAT, 86 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 653, 653 (2004)
(criticizing the IAT and proposing an alternative). See generally Nilanjana Dasgupta et al.,
The First Ontological Challenge to the JAT: Attitude or Mere Familiarity?, 14 PSYCHOL.
INQUIRY 238 (2003) (explaining and critiquing the IAT).
at
Association
Test,
418 See
Implicit
https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/demo/selectatest.html (accessed Oct. 27, 2004); see also
Dasgupta, supra note 123, 146-47 ("White Americans, on average, show strong implicit
preference for their own group and relative bias against African Americans... [and] other
ethnic minority groups such as Latino... Asians... and non-Americans.") (citations
omitted). Researchers recently demonstrated that capital defense attorneys and Cornell law
students have implicit attitudes about race, as measured by the Implicit Associate Test, that
closely resemble those of the general population. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri
Lynn Johnson, Implicit Racial Attitudes of Death Penalty Lawyers, 53 DEPAUL L. REV.
1539, 1553 (2004).
419 See Dasgupta, supra note 123, at 147 (citing studies explaining ingroup favoritism
among racial groups, age groups, and sexes).
420 An unwanted unconscious influence on mental processes has been referred to as
"mental contamination." See Wilson et al., supra note 416, at 185. Their model of
debiasing requires that in addition to awareness and motivation, the decision-maker must be
aware of the direction and magnitude of the bias. Id. at 187.
421 Mahzarin R. Banaji et al., The Social Unconscious, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: INTRAINDIVIDUAL PROCESS 134, 143 (Abraham Tesser & Norbert

Schwarz eds., 2001) (finding that there is "abundant evidence that stereotypes that operate
unconsciously defend their territory fiercely, influencing social interactions even when
perceivers are consciously vigilant and motivated to defeat them") (citations omitted).
422 See Patricia G. Devine et al., Prejudice With and Without Compunction, 60 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 817, 817 (1991) (writing that "efforts to defeat prejudice are
likely to involve a great deal of internal conflict"); see also Patricia G. Devine et al., The
Regulation of Explicit and Implicit Race Bias: The Role of Motivations to Respond Without
Prejudice, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 835, 845 (2002) ("[Fully overcoming the
prejudice habit presents a formidable task.... ."); cf ALLPORT, supra note 136, at 408 ("To
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possible. As discussed below, one could attempt to correct for the stereotyping
(correction), prevent the stereotype from having an effect (suppression), or
reduce or alter the implicated stereotype (reduction and change).
1. Correction
There are several ways of attempting to correct for bias. In one method, if
an attorney's decision rule is to strike when factors reach a total of 100,423 in
the case of African Americans the attorney might raise the total to 125.424 Or,
for those who do not think in numerical terms, the attorney's decision rule
might change from striking when there is a slight possibility of bias against her
client to when there is a significant possibility.
Professor Johnson suggests that ethical prosecutors should ask themselves
several questions before exercising a strike. "Would I allow this person to sit
as a juror if she were white?" 425 Is my explanation for the challenge
"inextricably linked with race or racial stereotypes?" 426 If it is, is there "any
other accessible trait that has less of a linkage with race" that is almost as
effective? 427 Professor Johnson argues that a prosecutor in doubt should not
428
exercise the strike.
In essence, both of these approaches use a correction strategy. They accept
that there will inevitably be bias in judgments but attempt to remedy the impact
of those judgments through debiasing.
One major problem for any correction strategy is determining the magnitude
of the correction required. Unfortunately, people are not very good at this
determination. 429 Some research suggests that among those who are very
motivated to avoid discrimination, overcorrection is a common problem. 430 In
change [prejudice], the whole pattern of life would have to be altered.").
423 See Wallace v. Morrison, 87 F.3d 1271, 1273 (11 th Cir. 1996) (providing an example
of a prosecutor using a numerical rating system to evaluate jurors).
424 Joshua Correll and colleagues have considered whether differential criteria may
explain their findings of racial bias in a video shooting game. See Correll et al., supra note
268, at 1327. They note, without being able to prove, that participants may unconsciously
require a higher level of certainty to shoot at an armed white target than to shoot at an armed
African American target. Id.
425 Johnson, supra note 52, at 501.
426

Id. at 503.

427

Id.

428

Id. at 506.

429

See Bodenhausen & Macrae, supra note 156, at 37 (explaining that attempts to correct

bias can result in overcompensation); Diederik A. Stapel et al., The Smell of Bias: What
Instigates Correction Processes in Social Judgments?, 24 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 797, 803 (1998) (discussing studies where subjects were asked to correct their
behavior); Wilson et al., supra note 416, at 191-92 (arguing that attempts to correct
judgments are no guarantee of success).
430 See Bridget C. Dunton & Russell H. Fazio, An Individual Difference Measure of
Motivation to ControlPrejudicedReactions, 23 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 316,
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turn, overcorrection may create a constitutional problem. 431 A second problem

is that a correction strategy appears to require significant cognitive
resources, 432 and cognitive resources are scarce for busy lawyers during voir
dire.
2.

Suppression

A more aggressive and controversial intervention is for the attorney to
attempt to suppress the stereotypes and thereby prevent them from affecting

Although this self-regulation requires significant
her decision-making.
cognitive effort, a strongly motivated lawyer may be able to avoid the impact
of stereotypes provided that she is not too distracted or under too much time
pressure. 433 Professors John Bargh and Tanya Chartrand have reasoned that

324 (1997) (illustrating that those who wished to control their feelings of discrimination
tended to overcompensate); Michael A. Olson & Russell H. Fazio, Trait Inferences as a
Function ofAutomatically Activated Racial Attitudes and Motivation to ControlPrejudiced
Reactions, 26 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 9 (2004) (reporting results of their study
that are "similar to occasional reports of Whites 'bending over backwards' to favor Blacks")
(citations omitted); Towles-Schwen & Fazio, supra note 273, at 179 (explaining the
occurrence of overcorrection among those who wish to avoid discrimination).
431 A court would have to decide whether the conscious correction and possible
overcorrection of unconscious bias deserves the same level of strict scrutiny as conscious
bias. One state appellate court has held that a failure to exercise a peremptory challenge
may be sufficient to show discrimination (but for the fact that the juror was a particular race,
she would have been struck), but the Arizona Supreme Court overturned this decision. See
State v. Paleo, 5 P.3d 276, 279 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000), overruled by State v. Paleo, 22 P.3d
35, 37 (Ariz. 2000) (overruling the court of appeal's finding that waiver of a peremptory by
itself could create the inference of discriminatory purpose). The Arizona Supreme Court
overruled on the basis that waiver of a peremptory by itself was inadequate to meet step one
of Batson. Id. The court noted, however, that waiver plus some other evidence could create
an inference of discrimination. See id.; see also Wilkerson v. Texas, 493 U.S. 924, 927
(1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) ("[tjhe court must determine...
whether a prosecutor's explanation for his lack of objection to white jurors is
credible .. ").
432 See Daniel T. Gilbert et al., Blurry Words and Fuzzy Deeds: The Attribution of
Obscure Behavior, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 18, 18 (1992) (suggesting that
correction will be "impaired by competing cognitive demands"); Kunda & Spencer, supra
note 288, at 535-36 (summarizing research that demonstrates that the availability of
cognitive resources can moderate the use of stereotypes).
133 See Daniel M. Wegner, Ironic Processes of Mental Control, 101 PSYCHOL. REv. 34,
34-35 (1994) (explaining that attempts to control one's thoughts can lead to the complete
opposite of the intended effect); Daniel M. Wegner & Ralph Erber, The Hyperaccessibility
of Suppressed Thoughts, 63 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 903, 911-12 (1992)
(explaining that a person in a stressful situation has a diminished ability to suppress
unwanted thoughts); see also Laura Smart & Daniel M. Wegner, Covering Up What Can't
Be Seen: Concealable Stigma and Mental Control, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
474, 474 (1999) (commenting that the "effect has been observed repeatedly").
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"[t]o consciously and willfully regulate one's own... evaluations [and]
decisions... requires considerable effort and is relatively slow. Moreover, it
appears to require a limited resource that is quickly used up, so conscious selfregulatory acts can only occur sparingly and for a short time. 434
Even without this difficulty, the mere fact of attempting to suppress
stereotypic thoughts may result in the "hyperaccessibility" of the
stereotypes. 435

This, paradoxically, may result in even more stereotypic

judgments. 436 In other words, despite a conscious and deliberate attempt to
minimize the impact of stereotypes, the conscientious - but busy - attorney
may end up being more likely to exercise a peremptory on the basis of race or
gender. This ironic result, the "rebound effect, ' 437 has led researchers to
conclude "that suppression is not simply an ineffective tactic of mental control;
it is counterproductive, helping assure the very state of mind one had hoped to

434 John. A. Bargh & Tanya L. Chartrand, The Unbearable Automaticity of Being, 54
AM. PSYCHOL. 462, 476 (1999).
435Wegner & Erber, supra note 433, at 908-10 (comparing recall of words that subjects
were to suppress with words upon which they were to concentrate).
436 See C. Neil Macrae et al., On the Regulation of Recollection: The Intentional
Forgettingof Stereotypical Memories, 72 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 709, 716-17
(1997) (arguing that memorization of stereotype consistent information facilitated by
stereotype activation resulted in subjects finding it harder to forget such information); B.
Keith Payne et al., Best Laid Plans: Effects of Goals on Accessibility Bias and Cognitive
Control in Race-Base Misperceptions of Weapons, 38 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 384,
394-95 (2002) (finding that instructions to avoid racial bias made race salient, resulting in
an equal amount of stereotyped misidentifications as those who had not received the
instructions); Jeffrey W. Sherman et al., Stereotype Suppression and Recognition Memory
for Stereotypical and Nonstereotypical Information, 15 Soc. COGNITION 205, 205 (1997)
(observing that recall and recognition of stereotypical behavior by an Asian woman were
increased among subjects who were instructed to suppress their use of stereotypes); Richard
M. Wenzlaff & Daniel M. Wegner, Thought Suppression, 51 ANN. REv. PSYCHOL. 59, 7980 (2000) (citing studies that support the conclusion that trying to suppress stereotypes can
actually increase the use of stereotypes); Natalie A. Wyer et al., The Spontaneous
Suppression of Racial Stereotypes, 16 Soc. COGNITION 340, 348 (1998) (finding that
subjects rated African Americans more stereotypically when subjects were attempting to
suppress stereotype use); see also C. Neil Macrae et al., Out of Mind but Back in Sight:
Stereotypes on the Rebound, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 808, 813-14 (1994)
[hereinafter Macrae, et al., Stereotypes on the Rebound] (explaining that the process of
suppressing stereotypes may paradoxically promote the use of the stereotypes); C. Neil
Macrae et al., Saying No to Unwanted Thoughts: Self-Focus and the Regulation of Mental
Life, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 578, 586 (1998) (explaining that self-focus may
help regulate mental stereotypes). But see Margo J. Monteith et al., Consequences of
Stereotype Suppression: Stereotypes on AND Not on the Rebound, 34 J. Exp. SOC. PSYCHOL.
355, 372-73 (1998) (finding no rebound effect for subjects with low-prejudice towards
homosexuals).
411Macrae et al., Stereotypes on the Rebound, supra note 436, at 578 (describing a study
in which participants exhibited this "rebound effect").
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3. Reduction or Change
Interestingly, experimenters have shown that retraining can affect the
unconscious use of stereotypes, provided that the retraining is sufficiently
extensive. 4 39 Specifically, Kawakami and her colleagues' theory was that
since practice (or repetition) was a key process by which stereotypes become
automatically activated, then perhaps repeated practice at negating the
stereotypic association would stop the automatic activation. 440
The "negation" training itself was very simple, albeit extensive, involving
480 repetitions. 441 Experimenters taught participants to respond negatively to
stereotypic traits and positively to non-stereotypic traits.442 The results of the
study showed that people could learn to reduce their activation of stereotypes,
not only of the stereotypic associations included in the training but of other
related stereotypes as well. 443 In addition, the results did not immediately
disappear following the experiment. 444 The psychologists hypothesized that
because, in general, goals eventually become internalized with repeated
445
practice, then the goal of "not stereotyping" would also become automatic.
Sensitivity training, at least in some situations, can also reduce automatic
stereotyping.

446

411 Wenzlaff& Wenger, supra note 436, at 83.
411 See Kerry Kawakami et al., Just Say No (to Stereotyping): Effects of Training in the

Negation of Stereotypic Associations on Stereotype Activation, 78 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. 871, 884 (2000) (explaining that participants who received training in negating
stereotypes were able to reduce their unconscious use of stereotypes).
440 Id. at 872 (theorizing that people can be trained in negating stereotypic associations,
which would then reduce the automatic activation of those stereotypes).
" Id. at 873-81 (explaining the methodologies of the experiments).
442 Id. at 881-83. For example, subjects were shown photographs of black faces and one
half a second later subjects were shown a word. Id. If the word was stereotypic of black
people, such as athletic or poor, the subjects were directed to respond "no," whereas if the
word was non-stereotypic, such as ambitious or uptight, the subjects were directed to
respond "yes." Id. at 881.
443

Id. at 885.

44 Id. at 884 (discussing that the results were still "clearly visible" 24 hours after the
training).
'5 Id. ("participants may have learned spontaneously to implement a self-regulatory
process"); see also Gordon B. Moskowitz et al., Preconscious Control of Stereotype
Activation Through ChronicEgalitarian Goals, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 167,
168 (1999) (arguing that some people may become so practiced at reducing the activation of
stereotypes that the inhibition itself becomes preconscious).
446 See generally Lauri A. Rudman et al., "Unlearning" Automatic Biases: The
Malleability of Implicit Prejudice and Stereotypes, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
856, 865 (2001) (finding in two quasi-experimental studies that a semester long diversity
course significantly reduced automatic stereotyping with regards to race). But see VALIAN,
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Although negation and sensitivity training might be too costly or timeconsuming, other reduction strategies are relatively straightforward. Some
evidence demonstrates that merely increasing "the salience of egalitarian

norms" can reduce the use of stereotypes. 447 It appears possible that having

judges remind lawyers, or having senior lawyers remind junior lawyers, of the
constitutional and448moral requirement not to discriminate would have a
beneficial impact.
Behavioral control may also lead to the reduction of stereotype activation.
If an individual is presented with the opportunity to behave in an unprejudiced
way, and then that individual does behave in an unprejudiced way, her
unconscious processes may change in two ways. First, the unprejudiced
behavior provides the unconscious with more data from which to infer a
person's "true" beliefs. 449 Second, the more often a behavior is performed, the
450
less conscious attention and effort is required to perform the behavior again.
ourselves is
"Changing our behavior to match our conscious conceptions of
451
thus a good way to bring about changes in the.., unconscious.
Another possibility is that people may reduce or alter their use of
stereotypes through more "frequent exposure to admirable members of
stigmatized groups (e.g., famous African Americans) and disliked members of
valued groups (e.g., infamous European Americans) .... 452 Participants in a
relevant study first performed a general knowledge test involving identification

supra note 129, at 315 (arguing that awareness training programs may be
"counterproductive" in the case of gender).
4" See Kunda & Spencer, supra note 288, at 532.
448 Professor Brown has recommended, albeit for different reasons, that judges should
state in open court that prospective jurors have a constitutional right not to be treated in a
racially or sexually discriminatory manner. See Brown, Jr., supra note 102, at 302-03.
Similarly, Professor Armour has suggested that "reminding decisionmakers of their personal
beliefs... may help them to resist" unconscious discrimination. Jody Armour, Stereotypes
and Prejudice: Helping Legal DecisionmakersBreak the PrejudiceHabit, 83 CAL. L. REV.
733, 759-60 (1995). Interestingly, researchers have been able to reduce the automatic use of
stereotypes by subliminally priming participants with words like "fair" and "friendly." See
John A. Bargh et al., The Automatic Will: Nonconscious Activation and the Pursuit of
BehavioralGoals, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1014, 1017 (2001).
449 WILSON, supra note 95, at 212.
450 Id. This is similar to the negation training discussed earlier in this article. See supra
text accompanying notes 439-445.
451 Id. In some ways this is not a new idea. Aristotle wrote "we become just by doing
just actions, temperate by temperate actions, and courageous by courageous actions."
ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 23 (Roger Crisp ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press

2000)
452 Dasgupta & Greenwald, supra note 415, at 801; see also Irene V. Blair et al.,
Imagining Stereotypes Away: The Moderation of Implicit Stereotypes Through Mental
Imagery, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 828, 837 (2001) (finding that the
visualization of strong women leads to a reduction in automatic gender stereotyping).
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of people such as Colin Powell (U.S. Secretary of State), Tiger Woods (golf
champion), Timothy McVeigh (convicted of the Oklahoma bombing) and Ted
453
Kaczynski (the Unabomber), and then were tested for their implicit racism.
Exposure to admirable blacks reduced automatic race bias against blacks,
compared to those in control conditions, and the effect lasted at least one
day.454
Interestingly, this exposure did not change people's explicit
455
attitudes.
In another study, automatic racial bias was also reduced when a black, rather
than white, experimenter gave participants their instructions. 456 Exposure to a
counterstereotypic person, such as a competent black, may have prompted this
effect. 457 Alternatively, the cause may have been "social tuning," which is an
attempt to match one's perspective to the presumed perspective of one's
interviewer. 458 Support for the "social tuning" hypothesis is provided by the
finding that learning of a perceived social consensus consistent or inconsistent
with one's racial beliefs can affect one's automatic stereotyping. 459 If these
findings are accurate, one might expect fewer improper racial challenges
before black judges and improper gender-based challenges before female
460
judges.
A final way of altering the impact of automatic stereotyping is by varying
the conditions of the voir dire process. Conscious attitudes, as opposed to
unconscious stereotypes, are more likely to control responses where the
decision-maker has enough time and opportunity to consider the decision
carefully, 461 and where she is more alert. 4 62 Judges could, therefore, allow
411 See Dasgupta & Greenwald, supra note 415, at 802.

454 Id. at 806-07 (finding that internal evaluations of historically disfavored groups may
at least temporarily be modified by presenting people with admirable members of those
groups).
455 Id. at 808.

456 Brian S. Lowery et al., Social Influence Effects on Automatic Racial Prejudice, 81 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 842, 851 (2001).

411 See Jennifer A. Richeson & Nalini Ambady, Effects of Situational Power on
Automatic Racial Prejudice, 39 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 177, 181 (2003) (finding

that white participants showed less automatic racial bias when expecting to be in a
subordinate role to a black participant than when expecting to be in a superior role). But see
Jennifer A. Richeson & Nalini Ambady, Who s in Charge? Effects of Situational Roles on
Automatic Gender Bias, 44 SEX ROLES 493, 505 (2001) (finding that male participants
showed more automatic negative attitudes towards women when expecting to be in a
subordinate role to a female participant than when expecting to be in an equivalent role).
458 See Lowery et al., supra note 456, at 843.
459 Gretchen B. Sechrist & Charles Stangor, Perceived Consensus Influences Intergroup
Behavior and Stereotype Accessibility, 80 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 645, 651
(2001).
41 One might well expect this anyway, regardless of one's assumption about the cause.
461 See John F. Dovidio et al, supra note 175, at 66-67 (2002) (finding that thoughtful,
"explicit" attitudes were tied to deliberative behaviors, while implicit attitudes were tied to
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additional time for voir dire, which would also have the advantages described
in Part IV.B.4.
Legal Responses

B.
1.

Eliminating the Peremptory

For the peremptory challenge, the most extreme solution is the best solution.
In Justice Marshall's Batson concurrence, he argued that eliminating the
discriminatory use of the peremptory challenge "can be accomplished only by
eliminating peremptory challenges entirely. '463 Justice Marshall was only the
most prominent of those calling for the elimination of the peremptory
challenge. Many other judges and academics have strongly supported this
view, 464 or have argued that the legal system should at least reduce the use of
spontaneous behaviors); Steven J. Stroessner et al., Affect and Stereotyping: The Effect of
Induced Mood on Distinctiveness-BasedIllusory Correlations,62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 564, 574 (1992) (finding that the mood of participants can affect how they
process information).
462 See Galen V. Bodenhausen, Stereotypes as Judgmental Heuristics: Evidence of
Circadian Variations in Discrimination, I PSYCHOL. Sci. 319, 321 (1990) (finding self
reported "morning people" used stereotypes less often in the morning and more often in the
evening, and the reverse for "evening people"). Less helpfully, some psychological studies
indicate that people are more likely to engage in prejudicial stereotyping when they are in
happy or angry moods. Galen V. Bodenhausen et al., Happiness and Stereotypic Thinking
in Social Judgment, 66 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 621, 628 (1994) (finding that
people in a positive mood who hear about stereotypical behavior are more likely to jump to
a stereotypic conclusion than people in a neutral mood); Vicki M. Esses & Mark P. Zanna,
Mood and the Expression of Ethnic Stereotypes, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1052,
1064-65 (1995) (discovering that people in negative moods are more likely to use
unfavorable stereotypes of ethnic groups then people in a neutral mood); Jaihyun Park &
Mahzarin R. Banaji, Mood and Heuristics: The Influence of Happy and Sad States on
Sensitivity and Bias in Stereotyping, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1005, 1017-18
(2000) (finding that mood affects people's reliance on certain stereotypes).
463 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 103 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring) (emphasis
added). Note that eliminating the peremptory challenge could occur concurrently with
changes to challenges for cause.
" See, e.g., Minetos v. City Univ. of N.Y., 925 F. Supp. 177, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1996);
Thorson v. State, 653 So. 2d 876, 896-97 (Miss. 1994) (Sullivan, J. concurring); People v.
Boiling, 591 N.E.2d 1136, 1142 (N.Y. 1992) (Bellacosa, J., concurring); Alschuler, supra
note 18, at 724; Raymond J. Broderick, Why the Peremptory Challenge Should Be
Abolished, 65 TEMP. L. REv. 414, 420-22 (1992); Robert L. Harris Jr., Redefining the Harm
of Peremptory Challenges, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1027, 1029 (1991); Hoffman, supra
note 102, at 810; Theodore McMillian & Christopher J. Petrini, Batson v. Kentucky: A
Promise Unfulfilled, 58 UMKC L. REV.361, 374 (1990) (Theodore McMillian is a judge on
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in St. Louis, Missouri who
recommended the elimination of peremptory challenges); Jere W. Morehead, supra note
102, at 639; The Supreme Court, 1990 Term: Leading Cases, 105 HARV. L. REV. 177, 265
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the peremptory challenge. 465 There is no need to repeat their arguments here
The psychological research reviewed here demonstrates the prevalence of
unconscious, automatic stereotype use and the difficulty in eradicating it, even
among those who are not of a mind to discriminate. This finding provides one
more powerful reason to eliminate the peremptory challenge. Because the
legislatures and courts show little or no likelihood of eliminating the
466
peremptory challenge, however, other proposals must be evaluated.
2. Category-Conscious Jury Selection
"[S]ecuring representation of the defendant's race on the jury may help to
overcome racial bias and provide the defendant with a better chance of having
a fair trial. ' 467 In order to achieve this goal (or at least in order to achieve the
appearance of a fair trial), various commentators have suggested different
forms of race-conscious jury selection. 468 The strongest proposals ensure a

(1991); David Zonana, The Effects of Assumptions About Racial Bias on the Analysis of
Batson's Three Harms and the Peremptory Challenge, 1994 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 203, 243
(1995); Brent J. Gurney, Note, The Casefor Abolishing Peremptory Challenges in Criminal
Trials, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 227, 230 (1986); Note, Due Process Limits on
ProsecutorialPeremptoryChallenges, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1013, 1014, 1024 (1986).
465 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 788 N.E.2d 968, 975 (Mass. 2003)
(Marshall, C.J., concurring) ("I am therefore persuaded that, 'rather than impose on trial
judges the impossible task of scrutinizing peremptory challenges for improper motives,' it is
time either to abolish them entirely, or to restrict their use substantially." (quoting
Commonwealth v. Calderon, 725 N.E.2d 182, 188 (Mass. 2000))); People v. Brown, 769
N.E.2d 1266, 1273 (N.Y. 2003) (Kaye, C.J., concurring) ("My nearly 16-year experience
with Batson persuades me that, if peremptories are not entirely eliminated (as many have
urged), they should be very significantly reduced."); Ogletree, supra note 102, at 1146-48
(1994) (arguing in favor of eliminating the peremptory challenge for all parties except the
criminal defendant).
466 Notwithstanding this view, England and Wales abolished the peremptory challenge in
1988. Criminal Justice Act, 1988, c. 33, § 118(1) (Eng.). These countries enacted the
statute primarily for reasons of efficiency, however, rather than to combat race or genderbased discrimination injury selection.
467 Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 61 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring) (stressing that
the composition of a jury may affect the outcome of a case); see also Leslie Ellis & Shari
Seidman Diamond, Race, Diversity, and Jury Composition: Battering and Bolstering
Legitimacy, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1033, 1038-40 (2003) (describing advantages of racially
representative juries); Deborah A. Ramirez, The Mixed Jury and the Ancient Custom of
Trial by Jury De Medietate Linguae: A History and a Proposalfor Change, 74 B.U. L. REV.
777, 798 (1994) ("To the extent that persons of color can contribute points of view that may
not be readily apparent to majority jurors, the deliberative process may be substantially
fairer and wiser.").
468 See generally Nancy J. King, Racial Jurymandering: Cancer or Cure? A
Contemporary Review of Affirmative Action in Jury Selection, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 707
(1993) (arguing for methods which increase public confidence in trials by guaranteeing
minority representation on juries). Although there does not appear to be any U.S.
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certain minimum number or percentage of minorities on the petit jury. For
example, several commentators have proposed legislation that would guarantee
that at least half of the members of a jury pool are of the same race as the
defendant in a criminal trial.469 A similar proposal sets the minimum number
of same-race jurors for a petit jury at three. 470 A more nuanced version

jurisdiction that follows race conscious selection, Hennepin County in Minnesota requires
that at least two out of twenty-three grand jurors be members of a minority group.
According to census results, Hennepin County has a minority population of nearly 10%. If
there are no minority group members on the grand jury panel after 21 grand jurors have
been selected (or only one member after 22 have been selected), then the remaining two (or
one) grand jurors must be minority members. Id. at 726 (quoting TASK FORCE ON RACIAL
COMPOSITION OF THE GRAND JURY, OFFICE OF THE HENNEPIN COUNTY ATTORNEY, FINAL
REPORT 45 (1992)). At least five states do not mandate the random selection of grand

jurors, thus other counties (assuming no constitutional issues) may also follow a similar
method. See Hiroshi Fukurai & Darryl Davies, Affirmative Action In Jury Selection:
Racially Representative Juries, Racial Quotas, and Affirmative Juries Of The Hennepin
Model And The Jury De Medietate Linguae, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 645, 659 (1997)
(attempting to determine the prevalence of the "Hennepin County race-balancing model of
jury selection" in other states and counties). By contrast, the federal government does
require random selection of grand jurors. See Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28
U.S.C. § 1863(a) (2000) ("Each United States district court shall devise and place into
operation a written plan for random selection of grand and petit jurors .... ).
Previously, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan had introduced a
program that had the effect of reducing the number of whites available to serve as grand
jurors (thereby increasing the percentage of minority grand jurors), however, this program
was struck down as unconstitutional. See United States v. Ovalle, 136 F.3d 1092, 1105-07
(6th Cir. 1998) (holding such a balancing plan unconstitutional as it was not narrowly
tailored to meet the State's compelling interest in ensuring that jury pools represented fair
cross section of the community); see also United States v. Greene, 971 F. Supp. 1117, 112124 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (describing efforts to achieve racial parity in jury pools in Eastern
Michigan). See generally Albert W. Alschuler, Racial Quotas and the Jury, 44 DUKE L.J.
704 (1995) (asserting the fairness and constitutionality of race sensitive jury selection
methods similar to the one used in Hennepin County); Avern Cohn & David R. Sherwood,
The Rise and Fall of Affirmative Action in Jury Selection, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 323
(1999) (tracking the course of racial balancing programs from inception in the Eastern
District of Michigan to its end as a result of the Sixth Circuit decision in Ovalle).
469 See DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 273-74 (1980)
(discussing race conscious selection and minimum number guarantees); see also Ramirez,
supra note 467, 783-90 (analyzing the historical roots of a similar practice, "the mixed
jury"); Daniel W. Van Ness, Preserving a Community Voice: The Case for Half-and-Half
Juries in Racially-Charged Criminal Cases, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 1, 45 (1994)
(proposing the use of a half-and-half jury in certain limited circumstances).
470 See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REv.
1611, 1698 (1985) (choosing three jurors of the same race as the defendant based on social
psychological research indicating that this was the minimum number required to influence
the remaining jurors); see also LORD JUSTICE AULD, REVIEW OF THE CRIMINAL COURTS OF
ENGLAND AND WALES 156-59 (2001) (proposing that at least three ethnic minority jurors
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requires that the racial composition of the petit jury mirror the racial
47
composition of the community where the trial occurs. '
Applied to gender, these proposals would require a specific number of men
and women on the jury (for example, mandating a jury of half men and half
women). In fact, to the degree that gender may be more transparent than race
or ethnicity, and because there are only two sexes rather than many races or
ethnicities, these proposals more easily apply to gender-based jury selection
than to race-based jury-selection.
Commentators have previously noted two problems with this approach. The
first problem is that classifications on the basis of race are likely
unconstitutional, as they must face strict scrutiny. 472 The second problem is
that jurors may feel that they must represent a particular constituency, be it the
defendant, the victim, or their own racial or ethnic group or gender, and make
473
their decision accordingly.
474
The research discussed previously on the strong effects of grouping

should be seated in trials where race is an issue), available at http://www.criminal-courtsreview.org.uk/auldconts.htm (accessed Oct. 29, 2004). Other research has shown that an
initial minority of less than four rarely produces a hung jury. See HARRY KALVEN, JR. &
HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 462 (1971) (confirming with evidence from an extensive

study that "juries which begin with an overwhelming majority in either direction are not
likely to hang").

Henry Fonda's performance in the film TWELVE ANGRY MEN (Metro-

Goldwyn-Mayer 1957), in which a sole juror is able to convince the remaining eleven
jurors, is apparently very much the exception.
471 Note, The Casefor Black Juries, 79 YALE L.J. 531, 548 (1970) (exploring the creation
of jury districts on a state and federal level). But see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86
n.6 (1986) ("It would be impossible to apply a concept of proportional representation to the
petit jury in view of the heterogeneous nature of our society.").
472 See Edward S. Adams & Christian J. Lane, Constructinga Jury that Is Both Impartial
and Representative: Utilizing Cumulative Voting in Jury Selection, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 703,
728-29 (1998) (comparing race-conscious jury selection with unconstitutional voting
districts). Classifications on the basis of sex generally only face intermediate scrutiny, and
thus are more likely to survive constitutional challenges. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.,
511 U.S. 127, 134 (1994) (highlighting historic cases upholding treating women differently
with regards to jury service); id. at 154 (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting) (arguing in his dissent
that Batson should not be extended to preemptory challenges based on gender because
gender-based classifications are subject to a lesser standard of scrutiny as compared to race
classifications).
471 See JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF

DEMOCRACY 140 (1994) (calling any jury system based on proportional or particular
representations an "invitation to jurors" to serve as an interested representative of a
particular group to which they belong); see also Ellis & Diamond, supra note 467, at 1037
(commenting that "not endorsing a particular allocation of seats on the jury to members of a
particular group [avoids] the lure of a legislature-like jury drawn from, and potentially
beholden to, particular parts of the community").
171 See supra Part II.1 (discussing the effects on perception and bias of placing an
individual within or outside of a group).

2005]

BA TSON'S BLIND-SPOT

provides a third critique of this approach. By treating the juror as a member of
a group, group membership will become more475salient, and this can affect
judgment and decision-making, often negatively.
Other commentators have suggested proposals that, although not necessarily
explicitly race-conscious, would likely result in greater diversity on the petit
jury. A particularly promising suggestion is offered by Professor Kim FordeMazrui who, analogizing juries to legislatures, suggests a scheme he calls
"jural districting," which would create twelve sub-districts within the jury
district. 476 The scheme would require the petit jury be comprised of one
member from each sub-district. This procedure may well satisfy the Equal
Protection Clause and might create more diverse juries, to the degree that subdistricts are both more homogeneous than the districts from which they are
derived and different from each other.477 The proposal does not, however,
affect gender-based peremptory challenges in any way. In addition, the same
problem arises that jurors may perceive themselves as representing particular
communities, and this "may reinforce divisions between those communities
478
and groups."
Many commentators have suggested a system that is almost the reverse of
the peremptory challenge system. In place of peremptory challenges, parties
would have the right to choose affirmatively some or all of the potential jurors,
and generally could use race or any other protected category as a basis for their
selections. 479 Under some versions of this proposal, peremptory challenges or
...See supra notes 200-220 and accompanying text.
476 See Kim Forde-Mazrui, Jural Districting: Selecting Impartial Juries through

Community Representation, 52 VAND. L. REv. 353, 359-60 (1999) (proposing "jural
districts" as a method for increasing the likelihood of representative juries while avoiding
equal protection challenges). Jural districting appears to closely resemble Lindsay Jones'
proposal for "jury seat districts." See Nancy J. King, The Effects of Race-ConsciousJury
Selection on Public Confidence in the Fairnessof Jury Proceedings:An EmpiricalPuzzle,
31 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1177, 1198 (1994) (describing Mr. Jones' unpublished proposal to
"subdivid[e] metropolitan jury districts into twelve smaller subdistricts").
477Forde-Mazrui, supra note 476, at 395 (stressing the benefits of "jural districting" as
compared to "at-large methods," which include more proportionate and diverse
representation as well as likely endorsement by courts).
4718
See King, supra note 476, at 1199 (concluding that any attempt to require
representation from each community or group will worsen the dividing line between groups
as well as cast a negative light on districts without such representation requirements).
471The first proponent of "affirmative selection" appears to have been Tracey Altman.
See Tracey L. Altman, Note, Affirmative Selection: A New Response to Peremptory
Challenge Abuse, 38 STAN. L. REv. 781, 806-08 (1986) (describing in detail the actual
procedure of an "affirmative selection" system). This system was then advocated for capital
cases. See, e.g., Hans Zeisel, Comment, Affirmative PeremptoryJuror Selection, 39 STAN.
L. REv. 1165, 1170-71 (1987) (examining the benefits of an affirmative selection process in
capital jury selection). Since that time there have been several proponents of different
variations of affirmative selection, some involving chance or cumulative voting. See, e.g.,
Adams & Lane, supra note 472, at 739-746 (describing a system resembling cumulative
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functional equivalents (sometimes subject to Batson) would also be
480
available.
Some of the objections to the affirmative selection systems are similar to
those for the explicitly race-conscious proposals. To the degree that they
permit attorneys to act on the basis of race, or to a lesser degree gender, they
are constitutionally suspect.4 8 1 Furthermore, to the degree that Batson is
applicable, the same Batson problems apply.482 Likewise, if jurors are aware
that the parties selected them on the basis of their group membership, then they
may see themselves as group representatives, 483 and the problems of salient
group identity would increase. An additional, important objection is that
affirmative selection proposals are more likely to result in hung juries because
parties are likely to select more polarized jurors, 484 assuming that the parties

voting in corporate law, where litigants receive votes equal to the size of the jury but may
choose to utilize them positively or negatively for as few or as many seats as they wish);
Anderson, supra note 99, at 392 (proposing a system "permitting the defendant to trade
some of his peremptory challenges to place qualified jurors, that he believes are favorable,
to judge his case"); Geoffrey Cockrell, Batson Reform: A Lottery System of Affirmative
Selection, 11 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB POL'Y 351, 381-82 (1997) (proposing a
"modified lottery" system in which attorneys give venire persons lottery tickets and a judge
draws the twelve tickets and the holders become the jurors); Donna J. Meyer, A New
PeremptoryInclusion to Increase Representativeness and Impartialityin Jury Selection, 45
CASE W. RES. L. Rev. 251, 280-87 (1994) (describing a system called "peremptory
inclusion" which allows the defendant to use one of his challenges to secure a person's spot
on the jury); Deborah Ramirez, Affirmative Jury Selection: A Proposalto Advance Both the
Deliberative Ideal and Jury Diversity, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 161, 171-74 (1998)
(advocating a system providing each litigant with a fixed number of affirmative peremptory
choices).
480 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 479. Although such systems would have the
potential of increasing minority representation on juries, they only address the problem of
Batson to the degree that a lack of minority representation is the problem. Clearly it would
not address the specific problem of the exercise of peremptory challenges because of a
potential jurors' minority status.
481The argument is set forth in detail at King, supra note 468, at 745-760 (predicting the
likely failure of race-conscious jury selection procedures to meet the strict scrutiny
standard). One might argue that in light of Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003),
which held that a law school had a "compelling interest in a diverse student body," jury
diversity is a compelling interest. A proponent would have to show that allowing attorneys
to use racial classifications is reasonably necessary to achieve this compelling objective.
This would require, among other things, the court to accept that Batson had failed.
482 See supra Part I.D (providing a critique of Batson).
483 See ABRAMSON, supra note 473, at 140 (concluding that any categorical method for
selecting jurors known to jurors would inevitably lead to jurors acting as representatives of
the community, voting in terms of their "preconceptions or preferences of their group").
484 Acknowledging this criticism, Adams and Lane have suggested exploring the
adoption of nonunanimous juries. See Adams & Lane, supra note 472, at 763 (offering
nonunanimous jury verdicts as a solution to the increased likelihood of hung juries that may
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485
are successful in identifying jurors who have biases in their favor.
The above suggestions, while arguably helping to ensure the Sixth
Amendment's fair cross section of the community requirement, do not address
the constitutional right that Batson and its progeny was supposed to guarantee:
486
the potential juror's right to serve on a jury irrespective of race or gender.
Although such proposals might mitigate some of the harm caused by the
discriminatory use of the peremptory by ensuring that petit juries include more
minority group members, the unconscious discriminatory use of the
487
peremptory would continue.

3.

Harsher Sanctions

Other approaches attempt to change the incentive structure for lawyers. The
argument is that the remedy at the trial court level for the improper use of a
peremptory challenge does not serve as an adequate deterrent. 488 Generally, in
the face of a Batson violation the trial court calls a new venire panel, which
may well be more inconvenient for the judge than for the litigants.489 This
result from polarized juries selected through a cumulative voting system). Currently,
Oregon and Louisiana permit nonunanimous jury verdicts for felony trials. See LA. CONST.
art. 1, § 17 (allowing a guilty verdict to be rendered by concurrence of ten out of twelve or
five out of six jurors for non-capital punishment criminal cases); OR. CONST. art. I, § 11
(requiring only ten out of twelve jurors to render a guilty verdict for all criminal
prosecutions except first degree murder). In federal trials, "[u]nanimity in jury verdicts is
required where the Sixth and Seventh Amendments apply." Andres v. United States, 333
U.S. 740, 748 (1948). Since 1967, England has permitted nonunanimous juries, provided
the jury deliberates for at least two hours. See Juries Act, 1974, ch. 23 § 17 (Eng.).
485 This assumption may well be incorrect. See Reid Hastie, Is Attorney-Conducted Voir

Dire an Effective Procedurefor the Selection of ImpartialJuries?,40 AM. U. L. REV. 703,
721 (1991) (rejecting the conclusion that attorneys are effective at identifying favorable or
unfavorable jurors).
486 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986) (applying the Equal Protection
Clause to jury selection).
487 In fact, it might be reasonable to assume that a lawyer that consciously discriminates
will be encouraged to discriminate more in an attempt to ensure that minority representation
does not exceed any guaranteed level.
488 See People v. Willis, 43 P.3d 130, 139 (Cal. 2002) (holding that courts should
consider more effective relief for Batson violations, including "imposing sanctions severe
enough to guard against a repetition of the improper conduct"); Alschuler, supra note 18, at
178 (arguing that the Batson remedy of dismissing the entire jury panel does not provide a
strong incentive against discrimination and may in some instances even aid in
discrimination); Brown, supra note 102, at 266 (concluding that the remedies for Batson
violations are highly ineffectual); Cavise, supra note 18, at 544 (questioning the
effectiveness of existing penalties for the improper use of peremptory challenges).
489 Ogletree, supra note 102, at 1116. At least one court has created an incentive for
defendants to exercise discriminatory challenges. See United States v. Huey, 76 F.3d 638,
641 (5th Cir. 1996) (reversing defendant's conviction, even though it was defendant's
counsel who made the discriminatory strikes). But see United States v. Boyd, 86 F.3d 719,
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outcome does not put the litigant in a worse position than if she had refrained
from attempting to strike the juror, and the result may even be preferable if the
490
old panel is undesirable.
The other main sanction is for the judge to place the potential juror who has
been the target of the improper peremptory challenge on the jury. 491 This
sanction creates a disincentive to exercise an improper challenge because the
492
targeted juror may be biased against the party that attempted to strike her.
At least four additional options could help deter improper challenges. First,
occasionally courts have imposed financial penalties on violators. 493 Second,
the American Bar Association or state bar associations could implement a
494
specific ethical rule against the discriminatory exercise of the peremptory.
724 (7th Cir. 1996) (disagreeing with the Huey court).
490 See Willis, 43 P.3d at 135 (describing how defendant's counsel admittedly engaged in
improper challenges in order to cure "a perceived imbalance in the initial jury venire"); see
also People v. Williams, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 769, 771 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (commenting on
trial court's view that repeated dismissals of panels could result in "never getting to trial,"
which could be an incentive for defendant); Cheryl A. C. Brown, Comment, Challenging
the Challenge: Twelve Years After Batson, Courts Are Struggling to Fill in the Gaps Left by
the Supreme Court, 28 U. BALT. L. REV. 379, 409 (1999) (suggesting that a new venire may
be an incentive for parties to improperly strike jurors).
491 The Batson court accepted both of these as remedies. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 80, at 99 ("[W]e express no view on [which remedy] is more appropriate ... for the
trial court to discharge the venire and select a new jury from a panel not previously
associated with the case, or to disallow the discriminatory challenges and resume selection
with the improperly challenged jurors reinstated on the venire." (citation omitted)).
492 See Williams, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 774 (explaining that conducting preliminary
peremptory challenges at the sidebar would prevent potential bias against a party who has
unsuccessfully attempted to challenge a juror); Alschuler, supra note 18, at 177
(commenting on the "difficult interpersonal situation for the juror, the prosecutor, and others
in the courtroom" that may result from restoring jurors who faced discriminatory
challenges); Brown, supra note 490, at 410 ("[T]he potential reinstatement of an excluded
juror is a strong incentive for avoiding discriminatory challenges because the jury may no
longer be impartial once an excluded juror has been reseated."). To help prevent this bias,
the American Bar Association has recommended that "[a]ll challenges, whether for cause or
peremptory, should be addressed to the court outside the presence of the jury, in a manner so
that the jury panel is not aware of the nature of the challenge, the party making the
challenge, or the basis of the court's ruling on the challenge." ABA STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE DISCOVERY AND TRIAL BY JURY 167 (3d ed. 1996)
493 See Gordon, supra note 107, at 712 n. 282 (discussing case where court costs for
thirty-nine members of the venire at forty dollars per juror were imposed on an attorney
improperly exercising a strike); see also People v. Muhammad, 133 Cal. Rptr. 2d 308, 319
(Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (overturning a trial court's imposition of monetary sanctions for Batson
violation because the trial court failed to comply with statutory provisions for imposing the
monetary sanctions); People v. Willis, 43 P.3d at 133 (trial court imposed, but later vacated,
monetary sanctions for Batson violation).
494 Brown, supra note 102, at 308-09 (arguing that first and foremost there must be a
uniform rule unequivocally stating that any Batson violation is professional misconduct);
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Third, judges could either give additional challenges to the non-striking lawyer
or reduce the remaining number of challenges available to the party improperly
exercising the challenge. 495 Fourth, at least with respect to prosecutors
improperly exercising the challenge, one commentator has gone as far as to
advocate the "dismissal of the criminal prosecution with prejudice," arguing by
analogy to the exclusionary rule. 496 At least one court has dismissed a civil
case with prejudice; the ruling, however, was overturned on appeal on the
grounds that this remedy was "excessive and inappropriate" where the
497
challenge of only one juror was at issue and other remedies were available.
Creating additional disincentives or punishment for the discriminatory
exercise of the peremptory challenge would presumably make attorneys more
vigilant about their use, if only by virtue of an in terrorem effect. It is also
clear that a high motivation to avoid using stereotypes can in some
circumstances reduce the unconscious use of stereotypes. 498 In this respect,
change is desirable.
Under the current framework, however, increased penalties are unlikely to
make much difference. An attorney acting in subjective good faith would
continue to act in subjective good faith (albeit perhaps a bit more cautiously),
and judges would still have the same difficulty in determining why a juror was
in fact struck. In addition, the above suggestions for increased penalties
discount an already existing penalty - namely having a judge determine in
open court that the attorney's explanation lacks credibility, or put more bluntly,

Gordon, supra note 107, at 713-17 (proposing that the legal profession, in addition to the
courts, should do its part in preventing discrimination in jury selection by adopting an
ethical rule). But see Abbe Smith, "Nice Work if You Can Get It": "Ethical" Jury Selection
in Criminal Defense, 67 FORDHAM. L. REv. 523, 546-48 (1998) (arguing that it can be
"unethical for a defense lawyer to disregard what is known about the influence of race and
sex on juror attitudes in order to comply with Batson").
495 Hopper, supra note 102, at 837; see also Koo v. McBride, 124 F.3d 869, 873 (7th Cir.
1997) (stating that granting the defendant additional peremptory challenges might be a
remedy for a Batson violation).
496 Ogletree, supra note 102, at 1117 (proposing "a version of the exclusionary rule" for
Batson violations). Ogletree has also recommended that judges should at least consider
disciplinary actions, such as complaint citations, censure or suspension, against prosecutors.
Id. at 1122.
411 See Hunt v. Harrison, 707 N.E.2d 232, 234-35 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (stating that the
trial court could have substituted a juror or dismissed the venire and brought in a new panel
as possible remedies instead of dismissing the case).
498 See generally E. Ashby Plant & Patricia G. Devine, Internaland External Motivation
to Respond Without Prejudice, 75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 811 (1998)
(highlighting several studies to "identiffy] factors that may either promote or thwart
prejudice reduction"); Lisa Sinclair & Ziva Kunda, Reactions to a Black Professional:
Motivated Inhibition and Activation of Conflicting Stereotypes, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 885, passim (1999) (using a study involving a Black doctor to analyze instances
of motivated suppression of stereotypes).
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that the attorney is lying and may be even racist or sexist as well. 499 In
addition, given the difficulty of the trial court's factual determination, a judge
500
may be less likely to find a Batson violation if there are additional penalties.
4.

Enhanced Voir Dire

Voir dire may be as limited as brief "yes" or "no" group questioning by the
judge, or as extensive as the open-ended individual questioning of potential

jurors by both judge and attorneys.50'

Many have suggested expanded voir

dire. 50 2 Especially when the attorneys conduct the voir dire process, 50 3 both
parties would have the opportunity to learn more about potential jurors and,
theoretically at least, whether they are more or less likely to render the desired
verdict.5 0 4 The hope is that more information would enable attorneys to use

"challenges intelligently in a case-specific manner, rather than relying on

improper stereotypes.

'50 5

499 See sources cited supra note 99 (equating a judge's rejection of a peremptory
challenge to labeling an attorney as a liar, racist or sexist).
500 See Charlow, supra note 82, at 60-61 (arguing that trial judges would be less inclined
to find Batson violations "if personal sanctions attached to errant attorneys").
501 See generally Valerie P. Hans & Alayna Jehle, Avoid Bald Men and People with
Green Socks? Other Ways to Improve the Voir Dire Process in Jury Selection, 78 CHI.KENT L. REv. 1179, 1183-86 (2003) (comparing voir dire practices in different state and
federal jurisdictions).
502 See id. at 1200-01 ("For greater effectiveness, voir dire should include a large number
and broader range of case-specific questions."); see also Anderson, supra note 99, at 392-96
(arguing for a jury selection procedure which affords the defendant more flexibility). For a
psychological perspective on the importance of a thorough voir dire, see Valerie P. Hans,
The Conduct of Voir Dire: A PsychologicalAnalysis, 11 JUST. Sys. J. 40, 41-42 (1986).
101See Rodriguez, supra note 102, at 794 ("An expansion of attorney-conducted voir dire
is... suggested."); Pam Frasher, Note, Fulfilling Batson and its Progeny: A Proposed
Amendment to Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedureto Attain a More Raceand Gender-Neutral Jury Selection Process, 80 IOWA L. REv. 1327, 1348 (1995)
(recommending "[liegislation requiring attorney-conducted voir dire"); see also David
Suggs & Bruce D. Sales, Juror Self-Disclosure in the Voir Dire: A Social Science Analysis,
56 IND. L.J. 245, 250-58 (1981) (finding that attorneys are better than judges at discovering
juror biases).
10 See Rodriguez, supra note 102, at 795 ("[B]oth a prosecutor and defense counsel
must be allowed a sufficiently thorough inquiry into the background and attitudes of
prospective jurors to enable them to make intelligent use of the [peremptory challenge]
right.").
505 Ogletree, supra note 102, at 1126; see also Babcock, supra note 7, at 561-62 (arguing
that more information is needed to prevent the use of stereotypes); Smith, supra note 494, at
526-28 (attributing limited voir dire as the cause of the author's use of stereotypes in jury
selection). The Supreme Court has also accepted that voir dire can assist counsel with
peremptory challenges, see Mu'min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 431 (1991), even as it
accepts extremely limited voir dire. See, e.g., Ristaino v. Ross 424 U.S. 589, 598 (1976)
(holding that examination of the voir dire process was not constitutionally required where
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One obvious problem is efficiency - there is cost in acquiring
information.50 6 The more time spent selecting the jury, the less time there is
available for other use of court and attorney time. Another problem is that
even with limited voir dire, jurors often feel that judges and lawyers have
inadequately respected their privacy, 50 7 and that the information sought
encourages the use of stereotyping.5 08
Finally, the research discussed previously suggests that additional
information, although desirable, is no panacea. 0 9 The categorization of people
is automatic and virtually instantaneous, and greatly affects how information is
perceived, evaluated and remembered.5 10 Perceptions, evaluations, and
memories based on increased information will therefore likely be biased in
favor of the automatically prompted conclusion.
On the other hand, there is also some evidence that increasing individuating
5 11
information will reduce the impact of automatically activated stereotypes.
racial prejudice was claimed in a case where a black man was charged with intent to murder
a white man); Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 526-27 (1973) (holding that voir dire,
although subject to the Fourteenth Amendment, is governed by the discretion of the trial
court).
506 POSNER, supra note 187, at 17 (stating that positive information costs, including the
"costs of acquiring information," are a widely-held assumption in economic theory). There
is also the cost of "absorbing or processing information." Id.
507 See Paula Hannaford, Safeguarding Juror Privacy: A New Framework for Court
Policies and Procedures, 85 JUDICATURE 18, 18 (2001) ("Numerous studies document that
perceived insensitivity to the privacy concerns of prospective jurors is one cause of
dissatisfaction with jury service.").
508 See Mary R. Rose, Expectations of Privacy, 85 JUDICATURE 10, 16 (2001) (reporting
survey findings in which jurors stated they felt that personal questions regarding family and
employment seem to "invite" stereotyping).
509 See supra Part IIIB-C.

"o See Thomas E. Nelson et al., Irrepressible Stereotypes, 32 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 13, 32 (1996) (observing that some studies suggest "continuing category effects
even under conditions that favor individuation").
511 See James L. Hilton & Steve Fein, The Role of Typical Diagnosticity in StereotypeBased Judgments, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 201, 201 (1989) (stressing the
strong effects of individuating information on subjects' judgment of others); Joachim
Krueger & Myron Rothbart, Use of Categoricaland Individuating Information in Making
Inferences About Personality, 55 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 187, 194 (1988)
(concluding on the basis of three experiments that the combination of categorical and case
information play a not insignificant role on judgment); Ziva Kunda & Paul Thargard,
Forming Impressions from Stereotypes, Traits and Behaviors: A Parallel-ConstraintSatisfaction Theory, 103 PSYCHOL. REv. 284, 300 (1996) (stating that the impact of
stereotypes is "diluted or eliminated" when individuating information is available); Kunda
& Spencer, supra note 288, at 528 tbl.1 n.c (noting that evidence that individuating
information reduces the use of stereotypes has been "obtained in many ... studies"); Nelson
et al., supra note 403, at 31-36 (arguing that providing or obtaining individuating
information may be the best and only real way to reduce the automatic use of stereotypes);
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Moreover, when there is an increase in available information, there is a greater
chance a lawyer will classify a potential juror on a basis other than, or in
addition to, the visible categories of race and gender.5 12 Everyone is
categorizable across multiple dimensions, provided those other dimensions are
known. For example, automatic attitudes regarding well-known black athletes
and white politicians varied based on whether the individual was
51 3

unconsciously categorized by race or occupation.
Some commentators have recommended a variant of expanded voir dire
based on the greater use of questionnaires. 514 Questionnaires can be relatively
private, efficient (both in not using court time and in highlighting areas that
require further individual questioning of jurors), and provide thorough
information. Most importantly, they may also be at least somewhat race- and
gender-blind, 5 15 allowing lawyers to examine data without having a gender or
race schema imposed thereon. 16 Even questionnaires that are not race and
gender blind may prove preferable to "live" voir dire because race and gender
are far less salient on the written page than they are in the flesh. The less

see also Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 281, at 243 (finding that prior probabilities
(analogous to stereotypes) may be ignored when individuating information is also
available).
512 See Frasher, supra note 503, at 1348 (concluding that in the absence of meaningful
information, parties rely on stereotypes to make peremptory challenges).
...See Mitchell, supra note 261, at 457 (conducting five experiments which show that
changes in context can rapidly reverse automatic attitudes). This effect can depend on the
salience of the category. Id.
114See Barbara Allen Babcock, A Place in the Palladium: Women's Rights and Jury
Service, 61 U. CrN. L. REV. 1139, 1177 (1993) ("[T]ailored questionnaires can help the
parties base their arguments for cause challenges and their exercise of peremptories on
actual suspicion of race prejudice rather than simply on the color of the potential juror's
skin."); Hans & Jehle, supra note 395, at 1198-99 (arguing that the use of jury
questionnaires is preferable to en masse jury questioning for identifying potential bias); Jean
Montoya, The Future of the Post-Batson Peremptory Challenge: Voir Dire by
Questionnaire and the "Blind" Peremptory, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 981, 1009 (1996)
(asserting that allowing voir dire by questionnaire only is the best way to ensure fair and
impartial juries based on a survey of trial lawyers).
515 Information that can serve as a proxy for race, like occupation and residence, would
still be permitted. See Montoya, supra note 514, at 1018 (allowing information closely
linked to race and gender to appear on "blind" jury questionnaires).
516 Perhaps the whole process can be made race and sex neutral, if lawyers do not have
the opportunity to visually or orally examine potential jurors. See Montoya, supra note 514,
at 1016-19 (proposing jury selection by blind questionnaire and without visual or oral
examination). There are several disadvantages with this proposal, including concerns about
its constitutionality, and that it would deny parties the opportunity to use demeanor
evidence. Id. at 1019-23. See also People v. Johnson, 71 P.3d 270, 282 (Cal. 2003)
(observing that in voir dire there is "the unspoken atmosphere of the trial court - the nuance,
demeanor, body language, expression and gestures of the various players").
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salient the stereotype, the less likely it will be activated automatically, 51 7 which
would be a worthwhile improvement.
It is important to note that if attorneys are able to obtain more and better
information about prospective jurors such that they are better able to determine
who will be sympathetic to their cases, and if different races or genders have
significantly differing views, 518 then lawyers will still exercise peremptory
challenges in a manner that produces a disparate impact on gender or race. For
example, if it is really true that black jurors are more sympathetic to black
criminal defendants than white jurors, 519 then, assuming this sympathy is
detected in voir dire, prosecutors will strike more black potential jurors. The
difference is that lawyers will no longer exercise the peremptories on the basis
of race or gender, and thus there will no longer be a violation of potential

jurors' equal protection rights.
5.

Changing the Step Three Evaluation

Many commentators have suggested changing the way courts scrutinize the
reason offered at the second step of Batson.520 One commentator has
suggested a three-part test to determine whether an attorney's reason is

517 See supra notes 281-287 and accompanying text (explaining in detail the way
individuals automatically categorize others after observing salient attributes).
518 See Kim Taylor-Thompson, Empty Votes in Jury Deliberations, 113 HARV. L. REV.
1261, 1264 (2000) (stating that it "is often true [that] the views of jurors of color and female
jurors diverge from the mainstream"). Some members of the Supreme Court also believe
that this is true. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 148-49 (1994)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("We know that like race, gender matters.... [I]n certain cases a
person's gender and resulting life experience will be relevant to his or her view of the
case."); id. at 156 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("The two sexes differ, both biologically and,
to a diminishing extent, in experience.. .'. [T]hese differences may produce a difference in
outlook which is brought to the jury room."); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 61 (1992)
(Thomas, J., concurring) ("[S]ecuring representation of the defendant's race on the jury may
help to overcome racial bias .. "); see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333 (2003)
(concluding that being a member of a racial minority in the U.S. is "likely to affect an
individual's views"). For a general discussion of the Supreme Court's inconsistent views on
whether the race of jurors affects jury decisions, see Nancy J. King, PostconvictionReview
of Jury Discrimination:Measuring the Effects of JurorRace on Jury Decisions, 92 MIcH. L.
REV. 63, 67-72 (1993).
"' See Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, How Much Do We Really Know
About Race and Juries? A Review of Social Science Theory and Research, 78 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 997, 1029-30 (2003) (reviewing mock juror studies and concluding that "[b]lack mock
jurors seem to be influenced by a defendant's race").
520 McMillian & Petrini, supra note 464, at 369 ("[i]neffective scrutiny of... [neutral]
explanations is the single greatest problem hindering the effective implementation of
Batson."); see DiPrima, supra note 54, at 889 (claiming that judges can better police
discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges through increased and improved
fact-finding and evidence-gathering).
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pretextual.5 2 1 The reason must be specific, rationally related to a characteristic
'
affecting juror qualifications, and must be "bona fide.

522

Others have focused on objective elements as inherently less suspect than a
"vague and highly subjective explanation," 523 and have argued in favor of the
striking attorney being required to provide additional "on-the-record reasons
whenever their stated explanations involve a substantial risk of being
pretextual." 524 Another variant is for the trial court to determine whether the
reason cited for the challenge applies to other unchallenged venire members.5 25
A judge would find pretext, for example, if a lawyer challenged a potential
juror because she is an elementary school teacher, but did not challenge every
elementary school teacher in the venire panel. Courts have already adopted
526
this approach in some circumstances.
This proposal ignores the fact that a lawyer's strategy for the exercise of a
challenge may not remain constant. The Supreme Court and others have
recognized that a lawyer may be more willing to exercise a challenge when she
has a lot of challenges remaining than when she has very few.5 27 In addition,
52

Serr & Maney, supra note 102, at 64.

522

Id.

523 Paul Schwartz, Comment, Equal Protectionin Jury Selection? The Implementation of
Batson in North Carolina,69 N.C. L. REv. 1533, 1566 (1991).
524 Id. at 1565 (providing examples of potentially pretextual explanations, such as
striking a juror based on his or her residence in a high-crime area, prior attendance at a
predominantly black university, or unemployment).
525 This rationale has been referred to as "disparate treatment." See Melilli, supra note
45, at 479 (listing disparate treatment as the most common reason for "rejecting proferred
neutral explanations"); see also Karen Bray, Comment, Reaching the Final Chapterin the
Story of Peremptory Challenges, 40 UCLA L. REV. 517, 543 (1992) (arguing that judges
should not permit venire members of a cognizable racial group to be challenged for a
claimed reason, when a white person with the same characteristic is not so challenged).
526 Melilli, supra note 45, at 479-80 (finding that disparate treatment, "is by far the most
prevalent rationale for rejecting proffered neutral explanations" based on a survey of almost
all published court decisions applying Batson before December 31, 1993); see, e.g., Turner
v. Marshall, 121 F.3d 1248, 1251 (9th Cir. 1997) ("A comparative analysis ofjurors struck
and those remaining is a well-established tool for exploring the possibility that that facially
race-neutral reasons are a pretext for discrimination."); Doss v. Frontenac, 14 F.3d 1313,
1316-17 (8th Cir. 1994) ("It is well-established that peremptory challenges cannot be
lawfully exercised against potential jurors of one race unless potential jurors of another race
with comparable characteristics are also challenged."); United States v. Sowa, 34 F.3d 447,
452 (7th Cir. 1994) (concluding that counsel's proffered reasons were prextext where the
same reasons applied to others); United States v. Chinchilla, 874 F.2d 695, 698 (9th Cir.
1989) (finding pretext for Hispanic juror challenged on the basis of residence when white
juror residing in same area was not challenged).
527 See, e.g., Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 665 (1987) ("[T]he number of
peremptory challenges remaining for counsel's use clearly affects his exercise of those
challenges. A prosecutor with fewer peremptory challenges in hand may be willing to
accept certain jurors whom he would not accept given a larger reserve of peremptories.");
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lawyers may consider the composition of the rest of the jury and the remainder
of the venire when deciding whether to exercise a challenge, both of which
keep changing during the jury selection process. 528 The fact that a lawyer, in
some circumstances, is less likely to exercise a challenge than in other
circumstances does not mean that the exercise was necessarily based on race or
5 29

gender.
Another problem with comparing challenges with non-challenges is that
different characteristics may in some cases have different meaning depending
upon the race or gender of the person involved. For example, one might draw
different conclusions about a white person wearing a t-shirt imprinted with a
racial slur than about a black person wearing the very same t-shirt.530 The
Miller-El v. Dretke, 361 F.3d 849, 857 (5th Cir. 2004) ("[A]n attorney's strategy regarding
the use of peremptory challenges necessarily changes as jury selection progresses and
peremptory challenges either remain unused or get used more rapidly"), cert. granted, 124
S. Ct. 2908 (2004); Hopp v. City of Pittsburgh, 194 F.3d 434, 440 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding
that discriminatory motive was not shown because "[a]n attorney with a general plan to
strike jurors who have a certain characteristic (such as jurors who are government
employees or jurors with prior involvement in a discrimination suit) may decide, as the
attorney's peremptory challenges dwindle, that it is important to strike a juror who lacks this
characteristic but who seems unappealing for some other, more compelling reason"); People
v. Allen, 653 N.E.2d 1173, 1178 (N.Y. 1995) (holding that an "uneven application of
neutral factors may not always indicate pretext.., but [may] simply [indicate] an
incomplete understanding of the full reasons for the prosecutor's decision to seat some
jurors while challenging others"); People v. Johnson, 255 Cal. Rptr. 569, 767 (Cal. Ct. App.
1989) ("Near the end of the voir dire process a lawyer will naturally be more cautious about
'spending' his... challenges."), quoted in People v. Dunn, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 638, 645-46
(Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
528 People v. Reynoso, 74 P.3d 852, 862 (Cal. 2003) ("[I]f one or more of the supposed
favorable or strong jurors is excused either for cause or peremptory challenge and the
replacement jurors appear to be passive or timid types, it would not be unusual or
unreasonable for the lawyer to peremptorily challenge one of these apparently less favorable
jurors even though other similar types remain. These same considerations apply when
considering the age, education, training, employment, prior jury service, and experience of
the prospective jurors ....
Moreover ... a lawyer necessarily evaluates whether the
prospective jurors remaining in the courtroom appear to be better or worse than those who
are seated."); People v. Johnson, 71 P.3d 270, 281 (Cal. 2003) ("[T]he particular
combination or mix of jurors which a lawyer seeks may, and often does, change as certain
jurors are removed or seated in the jury box."), cert. grantedin part, 124 S. Ct. 817 (2003),
dismissedfor lack ofjurisdiction, 124 S. Ct. 1833 (2004)
529 See Howard v. Moore, 131 F.3d 399, 408 (4th Cir. 1997) ("Batson is not violated
whenever two veniremen of different races provide the same responses and one is excused
and the other is not .... ").
530 This example is similar to that faced by the court in United States v. Hinton, 94 F.3d
396, 397 (7th Cir. 1996), where the court upheld, as race-neutral, a prosecutor's strike of a
black juror wearing a "Malcolm X" hat, even where the defense lawyer stated that he too
had a Malcom X hat. The example also resembles the reasoning of the prosecutor quoted in
Davis v. State, 596 So. 2d 626, 628 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991). The prosecutor claimed that it

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85:155

question can perhaps be finessed by examining the actual reason rather than
the evidence leading to the reason for striking. Thus a lawyer might challenge
the white person wearing the offensive t-shirt because she suspects racism, of
which the offensive t-shirt is merely evidence.
These proposals, aimed at improving the detection of pretext, may increase
the uncovering of subjective discriminatory intent. They are not, however,
well suited to discovering the unconscious discrimination described here, since
they tend to focus on the objective reasonableness of the reason. Objective
reasonableness might be a good step in the right direction, but the peremptory
531
challenge would then become no different from a weak challenge for cause.
There are "very profound difficulties involved in reconciling a juror challenge
system that is theoretically based on the attorney's inexplicable personal hunch
with a constitutional rule that requires attorneys to offer satisfactory 'neutral'
' 532
explanations for their choices.
In addition to the possibility of improved detection, by eliminating the
Batson procedure's requirement of subjective discriminatory intent, 533 judges
will no longer be forced to make the difficult finding that the lawyers before
them are dishonest.5 34 Instead, judges would be able to deny the strike without
was his experience that black women who dyed their hair blonde are "not cognizant of their
own reality and existence" and are undesirable jurors. Id. When questioned by the judge,
he stated that he would also strike a white woman who had her hair in "Jheri curls." Id. The
appellate court concluded that this reason was suspect. Id. at 629.
"I See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 127 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("A 'clear and
reasonably specific' explanation of 'legitimate reasons' for exercising the challenge will be
difficult to distinguish from a challenge for cause."). These proposals have not reconciled,
and cannot reconcile, the fundamental conflict between the peremptory challenge that is the
sole prerogative of the attorney and the peremptory challenge that is supervised by the
judiciary. Perhaps notions of rationality cannot consistently be applied to something as
"arbitrary and capricious" as the peremptory challenge. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S.
202, 212, 220 (1965) ("The essential nature of the peremptory challenge is that it is one
exercised without a reason stated, without inquiry and without being subject to the court's
control.").
532 People v. Hernandez, 552 N.E.2d 621, 625 (N.Y. 1990) (Titone, J., concurring)
(questioning the ability of any procedure to completely eradicate racial bias in peremptory
challenges).
133See discussion supra note 89 (examining the role of unconscious bias in the Batson
analysis).
"I Finding dishonesty clearly troubles some judges. See, e.g., William C. Smith,
Challenges of Jury Selection, A.B.A. J., Apr. 2002, at 34, 37 (quoting John Thomas
Marten, judge for the U.S. District Court, District of Kansas, as saying, "Except in the most
egregious case ... you have to accept [the lawyer's facially neutral explanation] at face
value unless it flies in the face of everything you know."); see Cavise, supra note 18, at 531
("To doubt the integrity of an attorney who has, in most cases, been in that trial courtroom
before and who is perhaps well-known to the trial judge is indeed asking a lot."); see also
sources cited supra note 99 (commenting on the unavoidable result of labeling an attorney a
potential liar when a judge questions an attorney's denial of any level of bias or
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such a stigmatizing finding. The judge would essentially be saying "although I
believe you acted in good faith, I also believe that the peremptory challenge
would not have been exercised but for the potential juror's race or gender."
Admittedly, this might still be a difficult finding, but it would surely be easier
than the accusation of falsity.
In summary, the best solution is to completely eliminate the peremptory
challenge. In the alternative, lawyers should be made aware of the possibility,
or likelihood, that they are unconsciously using race- and gender-based
stereotypes, and should actively and vocally affirm their commitment to
egalitarian non-discriminatory principles. Judges should explicitly note the
problems of race- and gender-bias before the start of jury selection. Judges
should also allow for the increased use of questionnaires, preferably those that
are race- and gender-blind. In addition, judges should permit more time for
jury selection, both for questioning potential jurors and for allowing lawyers
adequate time to think and combat their biases. Finally, judges should be
prepared to find less stigmatizing reasons for disallowing peremptory
challenges than the dishonesty of the lawyer before them. While these
measures clearly will not eradicate unconscious stereotyping and the resulting
discrimination, they will reduce their impact and frequency.
CONCLUSION

In our society race and gender, because they are highly salient
characteristics, still unconsciously form and trigger the use of stereotypes.
These stereotypes, once triggered, can greatly affect how we process
information and thus ultimately affect our decision-making. Stereotyping
almost inevitably introduces categorization related errors in social perceptions.
Worst of all, these processes are rarely accessible to our conscious minds.
Even though there are no issues of determining an organization's or a
legislature's intent, the peremptory challenge poses perhaps the most difficult
equal protection setting to address unconscious bias for two reasons. First,

lawyers often have very little information on which to exercise their
peremptory challenges, which encourages stereotype use. In other equal
protection contexts generally much more information is available. 535 Second,
lawyers have traditionally exercised the peremptory challenge on an arbitrary
and capricious basis. In other contexts decision-makers generally do not act on

discrimination).
53' Electoral re-districting is perhaps the only other area that resembles peremptory
challenges. See generally Tetlow, supra note 102 (arguing Batson incorrectly relied on the
equal protection clause and that the Shaw court further misapplied the equal protection
clause in extending the Batson analysis to reapportionment). Even in this context, however,
there is normally highly probative (and race-neutral) party registration and election data.
See Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 549 (1999) (requiring testimony and affidavits from
several key experts, including one who "reviewed racial demographics, party registration
and election result data").
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an arbitrary basis. 536 If the reasons for a peremptory ever become strong and
objective then the peremptory challenge itself becomes a challenge for cause.
Notwithstanding these unique problems of the peremptory challenge and
assuming that it is not abolished, the measures endorsed in Part IV would help
reduce the impact of its discriminatory use. If lawyers and judges fail to take
these measures, the promise of Batson, "to continue to progress as a multiracial
democracy," 537 will remain as distant as ever.

536 See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) ("[W]e know from our
experience that more often than not people do not act in a totally arbitrary manner, without
any underlying reasons, especially in a business setting.").
537 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630 (1991).

